[1] Criteria for determining the validity of the deposit of compensation due to the ruling of acceptance

[2] In a case where the deposit of compensation due to the adjudication of expropriation is null and void, whether the adjudication of expropriation becomes null and void (affirmative)

[3] The case holding that the deposit shall be null and void due to a defect in the requirements in the case where a landowner registered the change of the address on the registry before the adjudication of expropriation to the actual address but the contractor deposited the compensation for the

[1] Whether the deposit of the compensation for expropriation under the Land Expropriation Act is valid shall be determined on the basis of whether the requirements under Article 61(2) of the Land Expropriation Act and the Deposit Act are met, and the adjudication of expropriation, which is the premise for deposit, shall not be deemed valid as a matter of course on the ground that the said adjudication of expropriation is valid.

[2] The adjudication of expropriation is null and void because, even if a public project operator made a deposit of compensation under the adjudication of expropriation, if the deposit is null and void, it constitutes "if the public project operator fails to pay or deposit the compensation by the time of expropriation" under Article 65 of the Land Expropriation Act, and thus, the adjudication of expropriation becomes void. Therefore, the public project operator cannot acquire

[3] The case holding that the conclusion is not different on the ground that the deposit is null and void since the requirements of the deposit are deficient and the procedure for expropriation has been progress to the address prior to the registration of the landowner's change, in case where a public project operator deposits the expropriation compensation determined by the adjudication of expropriation because the landowner's address is unknown even though the landowner had changed his address on the register before the adjudication of expropriation was made to the actual place of residence

[1] Article 61 (2) of the Land Expropriation Act / [2] Articles 61 (2) and 65 of the Land Expropriation Act / [3] Article 61 (2) of the Land Expropriation Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 85Nu280 delivered on August 19, 1986 (Gong1986, 1230), Supreme Court Decision 89Nu879 delivered on August 8, 1989 (Gong1989, 1382) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 93Nu18594 delivered on April 15, 1994 (Gong194Sang, 1501)

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant (Seo Law Firm, Attorneys Park Jong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 94Na32612 delivered on March 10, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. We examine the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney.

A. As to the first ground for appeal

Whether the deposit of the compensation for expropriation pursuant to the Land Expropriation Act is valid is determined by whether the requirements prescribed in Article 61(2) of the same Act and the Deposit Act are met, and the deposit cannot be deemed as valid as a matter of course on the ground that the adjudication of expropriation, which is the premise of deposit, is valid. The Supreme Court precedents cited in the theory of lawsuit, are not appropriate for this case where the issue is different. There is no reason to discuss.

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

If a public project operator deposits compensation in accordance with the expropriation ruling, if the deposit becomes null and void, the expropriation ruling becomes null and void because the public project operator under Article 65 of the Land Expropriation Act did not pay or deposit compensation by the time of expropriation (see Supreme Court Decision 85Nu280 delivered on August 19, 1986, Supreme Court Decision 89Nu879 delivered on August 8, 1989), and therefore, the public project operator cannot acquire the ownership of the land concerned.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no reason to interpret the legal principles as in the judgment of the court below.

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

According to the facts duly established by the court below, the defendant changed the defendant's registered address on December 24, 1990 on the defendant's registry on December 24, 1990 before the decision to expropriate the land of this case was made, from "Seoul Dongdaemun-gu ( Address 1 omitted)" to "Seoul Dongdaemun-gu (Road 2 omitted) where the defendant actually resides," and the Mayor of Seoul Metropolitan Government deposited the compensation for expropriation under the decision to expropriate on December 24, 1991 as the defendant's address is unknown, and if the facts are the same, the deposit is invalid because the above requirements are insufficient, and the procedure for expropriation has been conducted as "Seoul Dongdaemun-gu (Road 1 omitted) prior to the registration of change of the defendant's address." The judgment of the court below is just, and there is no violation of law such as the theory of lawsuit in the judgment of the court below.

The Supreme Court precedents cited by the theory of lawsuit are not appropriate for the instant case, which differs from the case. There is no reason for both the discussion.

2. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Shin Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)