Whether such idle land constitutes idle land

After the acquisition of the instant land, it is impossible to grant a designated building permit as a park site, and it constitutes “where the use of the instant land is prohibited or restricted after the acquisition of the said land,” and the remainder is that the Plaintiff acquired the building for the purpose of constructing the new building and does not constitute idle land

The contents of the decision shall be the same as attached.

1. The Defendant’s disposition of imposition of KRW 9,917,510 against the Plaintiff on November 8, 1991 is revoked. 2. The litigation cost is assessed against the Defendant.

1. Details of the instant disposition;

In full view of the whole purport of the pleadings in the statements in Gap evidence 2 through 3, evidence 7, Eul evidence 1, and 2, the plaintiff acquired and owned 00 00000000000000000000000000000, June 29, 1983 (hereinafter "the land in this case"). Accordingly, the defendant can recognize the fact that the land in this case owned by the plaintiff constitutes idle land, etc. as of December 31, 1990, which is the date of the scheduled period of determination of the land excess profit tax under Article 8 (1) 14 (a) of the Land Excess profit Tax Act, and Article 21 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, which is the date of the scheduled period of determination of the land excess profit tax.

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The parties' assertion

The defendant asserts that the disposition of this case is lawful on the grounds of the above disposition and the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes. The plaintiff asserted that the disposition of this case is legitimate, and the plaintiff did not have any legal restrictions at the time of acquiring a building for the purpose of constructing a building. However, with respect to the part of 263 square meters of the land of this case acquired, it shall be designated as a park site and pursuant to Article 23 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, and the remaining part of 281 square meters shall be regarded as each idle land pursuant to Article 23 subparagraph 3 of the same Decree and Article 23 subparagraph 4 of the Addenda of the same Decree, and therefore, even though the whole land of this case does not fall under idle land as of the end of the scheduled decision period,

(b) Related statutes;

Article 2 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Building Act provides that the private land falling under the provisions of subparagraph 2 of Article 8 of the same Act shall be excluded from the date of acquisition of the above-mentioned idle land under subparagraph 5 of the same Article, and the provisions of Article 8 (1) 14 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the private land shall be excluded from the date of acquisition of the above-mentioned idle land within 10 years after the date of acquisition of the above-mentioned idle land, and it shall be excluded from the date of acquisition of the above-mentioned idle land for 2 years from the date of acquisition of the above-mentioned building, and the provisions of Article 8 (3) of the same Decree stipulate that the above-mentioned idle land shall not be deemed a period prescribed by the Presidential Decree for 3 years from the date of acquisition of the above-mentioned building, and if the use of the land is prohibited or restricted under Article 8 (1) 1 through 13 of the same Decree, it shall not be deemed that the above-mentioned idle land is no more than 9 years from the date of acquisition.

C. Determination

According to the above evidence No. 5, No. 6, No. 8 through 13, No. 5, No. 6-1, No. 7-1, No. 9-2, and No. 2, the plaintiff was found to have been incorporated into a new park area for the purpose of constructing a new park; according to the above evidence No. 1, No. 3, the construction of a new park area for the purpose of constructing a new park; the construction of a new park area for the purpose of which No. 1, No. 3, the construction of a new park area for the purpose of which No. 1, No. 9, No. 3, and the construction of a new park area for the purpose of which No. 9, No. 1, Dec. 29, 1983, the Minister of Construction and Transportation, as well as the construction of a new park area for the purpose of which No. 9, Dec. 3, 196, 196).

However, the issue of when a certain land is incorporated into a park site shall be determined on the basis of the time when the Minister of Construction and Transportation (the present Act is amended and the Minister of Home Affairs is the Minister of Home Affairs) designates it as a park area under Article 4 of the Natural Parks Act. However, if it is unclear whether a certain land is incorporated into a park area because it is located on the boundary line on the topographical map in the relevant park area publicly notified as a park site, and it is unclear whether it is incorporated into the park area by the topographical map alone, it is reasonable to determine whether it is incorporated into the park area as of the time when the head of Si/Gun publicly notified the matters on urban planning on the topographical map indicating

According to the above facts, among the land in this case, the above 263 square meters is the time when the above 263 square meters is incorporated into a park site by the public notice of the cadastral approval of the above Seoul Special Metropolitan City. Therefore, if the above 263 square meters portion, which is part of the plaintiff's acquisition of the land in this case, was designated as a park site, and the building permission is de facto impossible even as of the end of the above scheduled period, the above legal restrictions on the above part of the land in this case constitute a case where the above law is prohibited or restricted after the acquisition of land in Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, subparagraph 1 of Article 23 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and since the above restriction continues to exist at the time of December 31, 190, the above part of the land in this case does not constitute the land price of the above idle land for 3 years from the 190th day to the 19th day of December 19, 1988.

Therefore, the Defendant’s disposition of this case, based on the premise that the entire land of this case does not constitute idle land or that the entire land of this case constitutes idle land, should be deemed unlawful.

3. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case seeking its revocation is justified, and therefore it is so accepted and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition.