In a case where there are extenuating circumstances to deem that the agreed amount of remuneration for the attorney’s delegated duties unfairly excessive and contravenes the principle of trust and good faith or the concept of equity, whether the attorney’s claim for remuneration is limited to the extent deemed reasonable (affirmative), and whether in such a case, the court shall clarify the reasonable grounds therefor (affirmative)

[Majority Opinion] In a case where there is an agreement between an attorney-at-law and a client on the fee for the handling of delegated affairs, an attorney-at-law who has completed the delegated affairs may, in principle, claim the full amount of fees agreed upon. However, in light of the ordinary relationship with the client, the circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the case, the progress and difficulty of the handling of the case, degree of effort, the value of the subject matter of lawsuit, specific benefits the client gained in favor of the case, and other circumstances revealed in the pleading, an attorney-at-law who has completed the delegated affairs may claim only the amount of fees within the extent deemed reasonable exceptionally in exceptional cases where there are extenuating circumstances to deem that the agreed fee unfairly exceeds the principle of trust and good faith or the concept of equity. However, the restriction on

This legal doctrine has been developed by the Supreme Court over time, and its validity still can be recognized at present.

[Concurring Opinion by Justice Kim Shin and Justice Jo Hee-de] The Civil Act provides that the grounds for invalidation of a juristic act, such as a juristic act contrary to social order (Article 103) and an unfair juristic act (Article 104), shall be individually and specifically prescribed. In addition, there is also a statutory provision providing that “where the estimated amount of damages may be reduced to a reasonable extent, the court may reduce the estimated amount of damages to a reasonable extent,” as stipulated in Article 398(2) of the Civil Act providing that the content

However, in relation to the good faith principle, Article 2(1) of the Civil Act provides that “the exercise of rights and the performance of duties shall be in accordance with good faith,” and Article 2(2) of the same Act provides that “the rights shall not be abused,” but does not stipulate it as grounds for nullification of juristic acts. Therefore, the concept of equity, which is not prescribed by the good faith principle under Article 2 of the Civil Act or the Civil Act, cannot be the grounds for declaring a contract concluded between the parties as null and void.

Nevertheless, an attempt to restrict the validity of an individual agreement by the general principles such as the principle of good faith and the concept of equity is against the constitutional value, such as the principle of private autonomy, the fundamental order of free democracy, and the market economy order.

Articles 4, 10, and 119(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Articles 2, 103, 104, 398(2), and 686 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 91Da8722 Decided December 13, 1991 (Gong1992, 503) Supreme Court Decision 2009Da40677 Decided September 10, 2009, Supreme Court Decision 2012Da50353 Decided March 27, 2014, Supreme Court Decision 2014Da18322 Decided July 10, 2014

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and two others

Seoul Eastern District Court Decision 2016Na945 decided July 15, 2016

The part of the judgment of the court below regarding the claim for the retainer fee and value-added tax is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul Eastern District Court. All remaining appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Claim for agreed amount;

A. Regarding retainer fees and value added tax

(1) An attorney-at-law who has completed delegated affairs may, in principle, claim the full amount of fees agreed upon, in principle, where there is an agreement between the attorney-at-law and the client on the handling of delegated affairs. However, in light of the ordinary relationship with the client, the process of acceptance of the case, progress and difficulty of the case, degree of effort, the value of the subject matter of lawsuit, specific benefits the client gained in favor of the case, and other various circumstances revealed in the pleading, an attorney-at-law who has completed the delegated affairs may claim only the amount of fees within the extent deemed reasonable exceptionally (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da8722, Dec. 13, 1991; 2012Da50353, Mar. 27, 2014). However, the court should clarify reasonable grounds therefor (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da47274, Sept. 24, 2017).

This legal doctrine has been developed by the Supreme Court over time, and its validity still can be recognized at present. The reasons are as follows.

(A) The principle of private autonomy and freedom of contract, as the basic principle of private law, forms the basis for regulating judicial legal relations. However, such principle is not absolutely accepted without any restriction. Our Civil Act declares in general provisions the principle of trust and good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights as an important principle of the Civil Act. The principle of trust and good faith is a general principle that covers the entire legal order, thereby preventing any unreasonable outcome that may arise when applying positive laws or contracts formally and strictly, and realizing concrete feasibility. Private autonomy and the principle of trust and good-faith can be restricted according to the principle of trust and good-faith, and in specific cases, the scope of application is only a matter.

(B) Since a contract, such as delegation or trust, is aimed at protecting the rights and interests of the other party based on the trust relationship between the parties, the principle of good faith and the concept of equity are strong compared to a contract, such as a sale and purchase, merely an exchange of benefits.

Where a client delegates a lawsuit to an attorney-at-law, an attorney-law may conduct all procedural acts using professional legal knowledge. In particular, the Attorney-at-law Act focuses on the whole legal affairs to an attorney-at-law, but the mission of an attorney-at-law is to defend fundamental human rights and realize social justice, and perform duties independently and freely as a legal professional with public nature (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Da20011, Jul. 23, 2015). As such, the fact that the performance of duties by an attorney-at-law is significantly different from the business activities of a merchant for profit-making purposes should be considered when applying the good faith principle to the delegation contract.

(C) The provision of legal services, such as delegated legal affairs, may require high level of expertise, and, in principle, only attorneys-at-law may serve as a matter of principle. Information imbalances between attorneys-at-law and clients on the issues, legal principles, procedures, difficulty, etc. of a lawsuit may inevitably exist. It cannot be deemed that attorney-at-law fees are determined at an appropriate level in accordance with the general demand and supply rules. There is no sufficient device to ensure predictability in attorney-at-law fees. This is still true in the past and in the current situation where multiple attorneys-at-law are discharged by implementing

(D) There is no explicit provision that limits attorney fees upon delegation. As to attorney fees, Article 103 of the Civil Act on the public order and good-faith provides that there is a limit to deriving a concrete reasonable conclusion by applying Article 104 of the Civil Act on unfair legal acts. Moreover, since the effect pursuant to Article 103(b) and Article 104 of the Civil Act is the principle that all legal acts are null and void, it is difficult to derive a reasonable conclusion on the limitation of attorney fees through these provisions, and it is difficult to see that it is superior to the restriction of attorney fees by applying the good-faith principle.

Although the requirements of the above two provisions are not satisfied, there exist cases where it is necessary to exceptionally restrict the claim due to excessive amount of remuneration due to information imbalance, bargaining power difference, etc. in the contract for delegation of a lawsuit. In particular, there are changes in circumstances that are unexpected to the parties following the lapse of the lawsuit following the contract for delegation of a lawsuit, and where the amount of remuneration originally agreed is deemed excessive unreasonable. In such a case, the principle of good faith can function to derive concrete feasibility by supplementing the defects in legal provisions. Restrictions on the reasonable level of attorney’s fee claims are not only consistent with the parties’ genuine intent, but also accords with the attorney’s right to claim reasonable remuneration against the mandator (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da5029, Dec. 5, 1995, etc.).

(E) A court should, as a matter of course, ex officio revise and modify the contractual terms between the parties in accordance with the good faith principle in order to promote a reasonable conclusion. However, the Supreme Court has developed the legal doctrine of limitation on attorney’s fee claims, and has determined that the application of such legal doctrine should be careful, as it is exceptional to restrict and modify the freedom of contract, and that reasonable grounds should be clearly stated in the case of restriction on attorney’s fee claims. Through these precedents, concerns arising from the application of the good faith principle to attorney’s fee claims have been resolved.

(2) In full view of the following circumstances, the lower court: (a) reduced the attorney’s fees of KRW 20 million on the ground that the Plaintiff and the Defendants unfairly excessive the attorney’s fees of KRW 38,50,000 agreed upon under a contract for delegation of a lawsuit, thereby violating the principle of good faith and equity; and (b) determined that the reduced attorney’s fees of KRW 20,000 were fully repaid and extinguished; and (c

(A) Upon delegation by the Defendants, etc., the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming State compensation against the Republic of Korea (hereinafter “the Plaintiff’s lawsuit”). Ultimately, the Plaintiff was sentenced to dismissal or dismissal judgment. The Plaintiff’s lawsuit amounting to KRW 367 million is more than 367 million, and the issues are identical between the parties, the majority, and the parties.

(B) On August 19, 2014, prior to the first date for pleading in the case filed by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff and Defendant 2 were notified by Defendant 1 that 324 of the Plaintiffs of the lawsuit filed against the Plaintiff would withdraw the delegation of the lawsuit against the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff did not resign from his/her legal representative and performed the lawsuit.

(3) However, examining the foregoing legal principles and records, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court below as it is. It is difficult to view that there are special circumstances to deem that the attorney’s fee of this case is unreasonably excessive and contrary to the principle of good faith and equity. The reasons are as follows.

(A) The retainer fee agreed upon in the instant delegation agreement is KRW 100,000 per person. The Plaintiff asserted that the said amount was equal to the amount paid by the Defendant as the attorney-at-law fee in the relevant criminal complaint case, and the Defendant first proposed to the Plaintiff. The Defendants did not go against it until the lower court.

In a lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff, the Nonparty’s embezzlement exceeding KRW 50 billion and the subsequent bankruptcy of the Korean Faculty Mutual Aid Association (hereinafter “Mutual Aid Association”) held liable for the management and supervision of the Mutual Aid Association, etc. against the Republic of Korea in relation to damages suffered by its members, including the Defendants who paid retirement allowances, etc. to the Mutual Aid Association. The cause of the lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff is that the claim amounting to KRW 367 million per person was KRW 1 million. However, it is difficult to view that the claim amount per person is unreasonable, and it is difficult to determine KRW 100,000 per person as the retainer fee per person.

(B) The lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff is not simple or easy to dispute the waiver of duties between the prosecution and the financial supervisory agency (Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service). The lawsuit period is at least one year and five months after filing the lawsuit and rendering a judgment.

(C) The Plaintiff submitted a preparatory document No. 7 and submitted a documentary evidence No. 5 in the course of the litigation, and filed an application for fact inquiry, and performed the litigation.

(D) Although the Plaintiff was ruled against the Plaintiff in the lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff, it is difficult to readily conclude that the Plaintiff’s negligence is recognized in the performance of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit, as the same applies to other attorneys who have lost the same content in the lawsuit filed by the same claimant. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit, the amount of the retainer fee may be entirely claimed in the event

(E) Meanwhile, prior to the first date for pleading of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit, the Plaintiff was notified by Defendant 1 that “324 of the Plaintiffs of the lawsuit shall withdraw the delegation of the lawsuit against the Plaintiff.” However, following the Plaintiff’s lawsuit filed on April 14, 2014, Defendant 1 ratified the Plaintiff’s lawsuit on April 22, 2014, and agreed with Defendant 2, not himself/herself, on future procedures. In light of these circumstances, it may be deemed that Defendant 1 notified the withdrawal of delegation against the intent of other Defendants, including Defendant 2, etc.

The first and second instances of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit also determined that “Although many Plaintiffs submitted the written withdrawal of the lawsuit after the filing of the lawsuit, it is difficult to view the Plaintiff as expressing his/her intent to dismiss the Plaintiff from the attorney in addition to his/her intent to withdraw the lawsuit.”

(4) Ultimately, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on limitation of attorney fees based on the principle of good faith and the concept of equity, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

The Plaintiff asserts that the lower court determined that the Plaintiff was “Defendant 1” even though the person who remitted KRW 20 million out of the retainer fee to the Plaintiff was “Defendant 1,” and that even if the Plaintiff refused Defendant 1’s request that “the Plaintiff reduces the retainer fee to KRW 20 million,” it was unreasonable for the lower court to have determined that the Plaintiff accepted the said request for reduction. All of them are disputing parts that do not affect the judgment, and that the conclusion of the judgment does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

B. The stamp fee and the cost deposit

The Plaintiff asserts that since all the Defendants are parties to a delegation contract, the obligation to pay the agreed amount under the above contract ought to be deemed joint and several liability. However, in this case, barring any special circumstance to deem that the Defendants jointly and severally agreed to pay stamp and expenses, the lower court is justifiable to have determined the obligation to pay the agreed amount as partial liability. The allegation in the grounds of appeal on a different premise is rejected.

2. Claim for damages;

The gist of this part of the grounds of appeal is that the facts related to Defendant 1’s embezzlement, breach of trust, and defamation are unlawful since the court below judged that there is no dispute between the parties or there is evidence to acknowledge it, without presenting a specific reason. However, this part of the court below’s judgment did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, even if examining the records.

3. Conclusion

The appeal on the part concerning the claim for the retainer fee and value-added tax among the judgment below is with merit, and this part of the case is reversed and remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining appeals are dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except a separate opinion by Justice Kim Shin and Justice Jo Hee-de.

4. Concurring Opinion by Justice Kim Shin and Justice Jo Hee-de as to the part related to the retainer fee and value-added tax out of the agreed amount

A. The Majority Opinion states that, on the basis of the principle of good faith or the concept of equity, the amount of attorney’s fees determined by a contract may be reduced if deemed unfairly excessive.

However, the Majority Opinion, by taking the hand of the party who does not comply with the contract, undermines the principles of private autonomy and legal stability, which are the basic principles of our civil law, and recognizes the authority to modify the contract to the court, that is, the state, reveals the problems contrary to the liberal democracy and the constitutional order that declared the market economy.

B. Specifically, for the following reasons, we cannot agree with the logic of the Majority Opinion, and we express that, based on the good faith principle or the concept of equity, the amount of attorney’s fees as agreed upon by the parties cannot be reduced.

(1) Article 10 of the Constitution provides that “All citizens shall have the right to pursue happiness.” The right to pursue happiness includes the general right to freedom of action, and the principle of private autonomy derived from the general right to freedom of action. In addition, the Constitution declares the liberal democratic basic order in the preamble and Article 4, and Article 119(1) of the Constitution declares the market economy order as the basic ideology of “the economic order of the Republic of Korea shall be based on the respect for the freedom and creative initiative of individuals and enterprises.”

The principle of private autonomy is the constitutional principle that forms the basis of market economy order. The freedom of contract, the principle of private autonomy, is the form revealed in the field of legal act, refers to the freedom to decide whether to conclude a contract, the contractual partner, and the method and content of a contract with the free will of the parties. This is based on the belief of a market economy that, in a case where the market participants search for the optimal contract terms and conditions under free competition and find out a place in which mutual agreement is reached, it would be the most reasonable and efficient decision-making method to allow the contract to be made at that point.

The contract concluded in accordance with the principle of freedom of contract should be observed, and the trust of the parties to the realization of the contract should also be protected. If the legal stability for the belief that the contract should be complied with is not ensured, the market economy order cannot be operated smoothly.

Of course, the principle of private autonomy or the principle of freedom of contract does not mean an unlimited absolute freedom. Our Constitution explicitly states that the rights, such as the exercise of property rights, may be restricted pursuant to Articles 23 and 37(2), but even so, it can be restricted by law only if necessary. The Civil Act separately and specifically provides for the grounds for invalidation of juristic acts, such as anti-social order (Article 103) and unfair juristic acts (Article 104). In addition, there is also a statutory provision that explicitly prescribes that the content of contract can be modified, such as Article 398(2) of the Civil Act providing that “Where the estimated amount of damages is unduly excessive, the court may reduce the estimated amount of damages properly.”

However, in relation to the principle of good faith, Article 2(1) of the Civil Act provides that “the exercise of rights and the performance of duties shall be in accordance with good faith” and Article 2(2) of the same Act provides that “the exercise of rights and the performance of duties shall not be abused,” and does not provide that “the exercise of rights shall not be null and void.” Therefore, the principle of good faith under Article 2 of the Civil Act and the concept of equity that are not prescribed in the Civil Act cannot be the grounds for declaring the invalidation of a contract

Nevertheless, an attempt to restrict the validity of an individual agreement by the general principles, such as the good faith principle and the concept of equity, is against the constitutional value as seen earlier.

(2) The mission of the court is to guarantee the realization of the contract entered into by the parties. A court shall protect the parties who intend to perform the contract by ordering the parties who wish to perform the contract and who wish to not perform the contract. In this case, the Plaintiff asserts that the contract should be performed in accordance with the contract, and Defendant 1 asserts that the contract should not be performed even if there are no grounds for invalidation or cancellation under the contract entered into by the parties. Under this circumstance, the lower court took advantage of the above Defendant’s hand that the contract would not be performed. The court is not faithful to its role and concluded contrary to its role.

The “principle of self-responsibility” that an individual acts in accordance with his/her free choice and decision and assumes the result thereof to another person or not, applies as it is to legal relations surrounding a contract. The parties should bear the profits or losses arising from the conclusion of the contract by themselves. The parties have entered into a contract with an intention to adjust their interests in a manner consistent with one’s own interests to determine an appropriate price, which also applies to a lawyer’s fee agreement.

An attorney-at-law does not agree to either ex officio or ex post facto reduce the agreed amount of remuneration. A client is required to pay the agreed remuneration pursuant to his/her agreement and does not incur new losses. A party’s assertion that requests the reduction of the agreed amount of remuneration without complying with the promise is no longer superior to the other party’s trust trust that the commitment is to be observed, and the good faith principle should not become a tool. The client’s behavior at the end of his/her client’s commitment to avoid paying the agreed amount of remuneration is contrary to the good faith principle.

The court should not limit the legitimate exercise of rights under a contract to the principle of good faith, but rather declare the attitude of not complying with the promise on the ground of good faith as a breach of a contract.

(3) The Majority Opinion has more serious problems as a result of the court’s failure to comply with the given vindication. It is a matter that the court directly created the right to revise the terms of the contract, which the parties have determined, without any legal basis.

The Majority Opinion states that only a part of the contractual terms are valid in light of the good faith principle and the concept of equity, and that the rest of the contractual terms are not valid. The proposition that the contractual terms ought to be fully observed is not meaningful that only a part of the contractual terms ought to be complied with. The judgment that a part of the contractual terms ought to be null and void is the same as the court amends the contractual terms entered into in fact. The court’s declaration that a part of the contractual terms is null and void by intervention in the specific contents of the contractual terms on the grounds of excessive remuneration agreed by the parties goes against the principle of private autonomy, and goes against the constitutional spirit of the Republic of Korea, which is the fundamental principle of free democracy and market economy. The declaration of the State’s

Moreover, there is no general provision that the court has the authority to modify the contract, nor there is no specific provision on the basis of attorney fees. Nevertheless, the Majority Opinion declares partial invalidation of the contract on the basis of the good faith principle and the concept of equity and declares that the content of the contract can be modified.

In light of the above, the good faith principle cannot serve as the basis for declaring the invalidity of a contract. Moreover, the idea that the content of a contract can be revised according to the good faith principle without any individual and specific legal basis is very dangerous. If the good faith principle can serve as the basis for contractual revision, there is no considerable number of provisions among the provisions of the Civil Act. This is because it is possible for a court to conclude that the good faith principle itself is reasonable.

Article 2 of the Civil Act on the principle of good faith is an abstract provision. In a specific case, when a court applies such a general provision in a specific case, it must pay attention not to be a convenient application to justify a conclusion that is clearly difficult to wait, i.e., escape from a general provision. In addition, if the principle of good faith is the major principle of the Civil Act, such principle is naturally reflected in the legislative process. However, changing the contents of rights and obligations that are clearly recognized by an individual provision of the positive law that has undergone such legislative process on the ground of the principle of good faith may cause serious confusion in the legal system and may pose a serious threat to the legal authority and legal stability. The Supreme Court has held that excluding the operation of a specific system under the law, which has already been governed by the general principle such as the principle of good faith, is likely to undermine legal stability, which is a single principle in the interpretation of the law, and thus, should be careful in its application (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da3469, May 29, 2008).

Although there is excessive amount of attorney’s fees, it is doubtful whether allowing the client to pay the entire agreed amount of fees by itself would result in an unreasonable outcome that is difficult to attend, on the ground that it does not go against social order or unfair, and thus, it cannot be deemed null and void by Articles 103 and 104 of the Civil Act. The Majority Opinion’s view that it is necessary to reduce the amount of fees simply because it is excessive, and the Majority Opinion readily deviates from the principle of good faith, thereby constituting an unreasonable legal doctrine that does not fit for the entire legal system.

(4) In addition, the Majority Opinion’s “amount of remuneration within the reasonable scope” refers to a serious and uncertain content that does not know that a certain extent of alternative remuneration is appropriate. The good faith principle does not present an abstract provision and at all the specific criteria for determination as seen earlier. It is practically impossible to establish specific criteria as to whether it goes against the good faith principle or the concept of equity. It is practically impossible for the Majority to set specific criteria as to whether it goes beyond the reasonable scope. The same applies to the case where: (a) the client’s ordinary relationship with the client; (b) the process of the case; (c) the process and difficulty of the case; (d) the process and difficulty of the case; (d) the degree of the case; (e) the degree of the client’s success; (e) the client’s specific interest in the case; and (e) other various circumstances revealed in the pleading; and (e) it is unreasonable to set the reasonable amount of remuneration beyond the reasonable scope; and (e) it

If the standard for the scope of reasonable remuneration is not provided, the propriety of the standard shall depend entirely on the court’s decision. In addition, it may not be said that the scope of remuneration deemed appropriate for each judge. Ultimately, the scope of remuneration that is deemed effective in a delegated contract is clearly determined by the court’s decision, and when the lower court and the lower court’s lower court’s decision are different depending on the standard for each judge, the amount of remuneration shall be finally determined by the Supreme Court’s decision. Therefore, once following the Majority Opinion, the parties cannot have an expectation that the contract will take effect in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract, even if they enter into a contract according to their own intent. In short, the contractual uncertainty may be caused by having the court’s decision on the contents of the contract clearly and clearly known to the parties in light of the language and text of the contract, resulting in an increase in legal disputes and legal disputes. A court’s perception that the amount of remuneration may be reduced by asserting the good faith principle may eventually result in the failure to perform the contract.

(5) The precedent appears to have recognized the reduction of the attorney’s fee in early fashion on the grounds of the public position and the characteristic of the market where the number of qualified minorities monopolys the market. However, the agreed fee may be considered to be excessive after entering into a contract. However, this may arise in all contracts, such as the purchase price of a sales contract and a lease contract, as well as the attorney’s fee. However, the Supreme Court did not adjust the amount of the consideration agreed based on the good faith principle in all contracts. However, the Supreme Court has recognized a relatively easy and wide range of reduction of attorney fee only under the exclusive delegation contract. If a judge makes such a judgment on the grounds that it is relatively ripe areas, then it discriminates against the attorney’s position without reasonable grounds. Although it can be deemed that strict standards can be applied by expecting to the public position and exclusive nature of a lawyer, the Supreme Court has recognized the reduction of the attorney’s fee and the trust fee of a certified judicial scrivener and an intermediary company by citing the concept of good faith and equity as well as the general doctrine of delegation.

The concern is that according to these trends, there is no guarantee that the reduction of the price will not be allowed to other contracts such as sales contract.

The State’s intervention under the market economy order should be used only as a means to supplement the economic efficiency when leaving economic activities only to the market is unable to secure economic efficiency or to resolve social problems derived therefrom by itself. The State’s intervention does not always ensure efficiency. In particular, if the State’s intervention in the freedom of contract is generally carried out through a method of specific and direct control of the relationship between payment and consideration, which is the essential part of the contract, even though there is no exceptional circumstance that cannot be justified in light of the public welfare or the concept of justice and equity, even if there is no exceptional circumstance that is not justified in light of the public welfare or the concept of justice and equity, it is fundamentally inapplicable private autonomy and thus, cannot be justified

Article 103 and Article 104 of the Civil Act clearly stipulate cases where the validity of a contract is not recognized because the contract is not contrary to social order or fair. In other words, even if the agreed price is excessive if it does not fall under this, it can be deemed that the Civil Act declares that the content of the contract should be recognized as being in accordance with the principle of freedom of contract. This is not a defect in legal provisions, but a determination by law. In such a case, if it is necessary to revise the contents of the contract in consideration of the parties’ equity, if it is necessary to do so, it cannot be resolved by preparing specific legal provisions as stipulated in the Constitution

C. Nevertheless, the lower court reduced the attorney’s fees of KRW 20 million on the ground that the Plaintiff and the Defendants breached the good faith and the principle of equity by unfairly excessive fees of KRW 38,50,000,000 agreed upon in a litigation delegation agreement, and rejected the Plaintiff’s claim on this part by determining that the attorney’s fees so reduced have been fully repaid and extinguished. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the good faith and the concept of equity, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Accordingly, the part of the lower judgment on the claim for the agreed amount of retainer fees and value-added

D. On the same ground as above, I agree with the majority opinion that the judgment of the court below should be reversed, but the reason for reversal differs, and therefore I express my separate opinion.

Justices Kim Young-soo (Presiding Justice)