Plaintiff 1 and two others (Attorneys Jeong Nam-hee et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Gyeonggi-do (Attorney above-at-law)

November 20, 2015

Suwon District Court Decision 2013Guhap15164 Decided December 4, 2014

All appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant shall pay to each of the plaintiffs 260,425,90 won with 5% interest per annum from the day following the day of service of a copy of the claim of this case and the application for modification of the cause of the claim of this case until the day of the judgment of this case and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

1. Quotation of the first instance judgment

The reasoning for this Court’s reasoning is that the reasoning for this Court’s explanation is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the addition of the judgment of this court as to the assertion that the Plaintiff added or re-emphasized in this case, and thus, this Court cited it as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation

2. The further determination of this Court

A. Whether the Defendant occupied the instant land without permission

(1) The plaintiffs' assertion

In light of the fact that the land closure business trip with respect to the land of this case does not state any content on the register under the parcel number of the land and the registration office, the telegraph of the name registry office, which is the telegraph of the name registry office, does not belong to the registry office in the area of 6.25 columns, it is clear that the registry office from the beginning does not exist with respect to the land of this case.

Therefore, in around 1934, when the Joseon General Colon commenced possession of the land of this case, only the Land Survey Division existed. The Land Survey Division, which managed the Land Survey Division, shall be deemed to have been aware that Nonparty 1, who is the plaintiffs, was the owner of the land of this case through its statement. Nevertheless, unless there is any evidence from the fact that the Shipbuilding General Co., Ltd. commenced to lawfully acquire and occupy the land of this case from the plaintiffs, such as Nonparty 1, etc., it shall be deemed to have commenced possession of the land of this case without permission, which is owned by others.

(2) Facts of recognition

[Reasons for Recognition] A1-1-3, A13-3, A14, A15-1-5, A16-1-2, A17-1-3, B-2, and B-name registry offices, each fact-finding result, as a whole, the purport of the pleadings.

㈎ 이 사건 토지에 관한 구 등기부는 현재 존재하지 아니하고, 관할 등기소인 광명등기소에 의하여도 그 부존재의 이유가 무엇인지(즉, 당초부터 부존재하였는지, 존재하였다가 멸실되었는지) 확인되지 아니한다. 한편, 이 사건 토지에 관한 구 토지대장은 당초 작성되었다가 6·25 전란 등으로 멸실된 사실이 확인된다.

㈏ 이 사건 토지 및 인근 토지들에 관한 토지폐쇄색출장(접수번호순으로 편철된 구 등기부를 손쉽게 찾기 위하여 지번 순으로 구 등기부의 책·장 번호를 기재한 장부)의 이 사건 토지 지번 부분에는 구 등기부에 관한 아무런 기재 없이 공란으로 되어 있다.

㈐ 이 사건 토지를 포함한 광명시 인근의 토지에 관한 구 등기부 등 지적공부에 대한 보관 및 관리는 6·25 전란 당시 영등포등기소의 관할이었다가, 관할이관 등을 통하여 현재의 광명등기소로 이관되었다. 대법원은 6·25 전란으로 멸실된 등기부의 회복을 위하여 3차에 걸쳐 회복등기 신청 기간을 고시하였는데(대법원 고시 44, 45, 48호), 위 영등포등기소는 관보상의 멸실 회복 대상 등기소로 기재되어 있지 않다.

(3) Determination

㈎ 관련 법리

If the nature of the source of possessory right of real estate is not clear, the possessor is presumed to have occupied the real estate in good faith, peace, and public performance by his own will, and such presumption applies likewise to the case of possession by the State or a local government, which is the managing body of the cadastral record, etc. However, in a case where it is proved that the possessor occupied the real estate owned by another person without permission, even though it is well aware of the absence of the legal requirements such as a juristic act which may cause the acquisition of ownership at the time of commencement of possession without permission, barring any special circumstances, the possessor shall be deemed not to have rejected the ownership of another person and not to have the intention to possess it, and thus, the presumption of possession with the intention to own is broken (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da28625 delivered on August 21, 199

Meanwhile, even if the State or a local government is unable to submit documents concerning the procedure for acquiring the land claiming the completion of prescriptive acquisition, it cannot be readily concluded that the State or a local government occupied the land with the knowledge that there was another person registered in the cadastral record, etc. on the cadastral record, etc. on the ground that the cadastral record, etc. was lost in the form of 6.25 pages or did not exist for any other reason. In light of the purpose and purpose of occupation, where it is deemed that the possibility that the State or the local government lawfully acquired the ownership after undergoing the procedure for acquiring the public property at the time of the commencement of occupation can not be ruled out, it is difficult to view that the State or the local government has proved that it occupied the land without permission by being aware of such circumstance without the legal requirements for acquiring the ownership, and it cannot be said that the presumption of the autonomous possession of the land is reversed solely on the ground that the State or the local government failed to submit the documents concerning the procedure for acquiring the ownership (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2005Da33541, Dec. 27, 2008, 2007

㈏ 구체적 판단

Examining the facts and relevant legal principles as seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the State occupied the instant land without permission for the following reasons cannot be accepted.

1) (Land Number 1 omitted) In the case of land, it is confirmed that the former registry exists (A12-1) and the parcel number of the land closure business trip is the official blank of matters concerning the former registry (A14). The mere fact that no entry is made in the former registry on the land closure business trip is insufficient to readily conclude that the former registry on the relevant land was not prepared from the beginning.

2) Since the Land Survey Division is a public book stating only the original acquisition of ownership of the pertinent land, the Land Survey Division alone cannot be determined by the Land Survey Division. Even if the Land Survey Division was aware of the existence of the title holder of the circumstances in the land survey injury at the time of commencing the occupation of the instant land, insofar as the existence of the former register concerning the alteration of rights or its contents are not verified (the loss of the former register may arise from various causes other than 6.25 degrees in the process of undergoing the alteration of the ownership), it is difficult to readily conclude that the Plaintiff occupied the said land without permission even if it was aware of the title holder as the owner of the said land.

3) It is sufficiently suspected that the land adjacent to the instant land (number 1 omitted), (number 2 omitted) was normally purchased by the State in 1933 in connection with the construction of the bank (including the Category A12, 13, 17, and the number of branches), and that the Joseon General had purchased the land adjacent to the instant land through lawful procedures for the bank construction between 1932 and 1934.

4) Considering such circumstances, the various compensation provisions of the Joseon River Order, the developments leading up to occupying the instant land and the purpose of occupation, etc., the possibility that the Maritime Affairs and the Maritime Affairs Association lawfully acquired the ownership of the instant land according to the procedure for acquiring the property for public use cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the State’s possession of the instant land is proven to have been occupied without permission.

B. Whether the plaintiffs can exercise the right of compensation under the Act on Special Measures against the defendant

(1) The plaintiffs' assertion

On June 1, 1964, the instant land was incorporated into the Anyang River Area and owned by the State. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ preemptive rights were lost, thereby acquiring a claim for compensation for losses under the Act on Special Measures for the Compensation, etc. for Land Incorporated into Rivers (hereinafter “Special Measures Act”).

Even if the acquisition by prescription of possession by the State was completed around December 31, 1954 and the plaintiffs' preemptive rights based on the ownership of the land of this case cannot be exercised against the State after the completion date of the acquisition by prescription, the plaintiffs' preemptive rights can be exercised against the defendant regardless of whether or not the completion of the prescription of possession by the State is based on the Act on Special Measures, not on ownership of the land of this case. Furthermore, since the ownership of the land of this case was reverted to the State on June 1, 1964, the right to claim ownership transfer registration following the completion of the prescription of possession by the State has already been extinguished or formally existed, the exercise of the plaintiffs' right to claim compensation cannot be excluded on this basis.

(2) Determination

㈎ 부동산에 대한 취득시효가 완성되면 점유자는 소유명의자에 대하여 취득시효완성을 원인으로 한 소유권이전등기절차의 이행을 청구할 수 있고 소유명의자는 이에 응할 의무가 있으므로, 이러한 의무를 지는 소유명의자는 취득시효가 완성된 점유자에 대하여 그 소유권에 기한 권리를 행사할 수는 없다( 대법원 1993. 5. 25. 선고 92다51280 판결 , 대법원 1995. 6. 9. 선고 94다13480 판결 참조).

㈏ 특별조치법 1조 는 ‘이 법은 보상청구권의 소멸시효 만료로 인하여 보상을 받지 못한 하천편입토지 소유자에 대한 보상(···중략···)에 필요한 사항을 규정함을 목적으로 한다.’고 정하고 있는바, 특별조치법은 그 소유 토지가 하천에 편입되어 국유화됨에 따라 하천법 등에 근거한 손실보상청구권을 취득하였으나 이러한 손실보상청구권의 존재나 취지를 알지 못하여 이를 행사하지 못하던 중 그 청구권의 소멸시효가 완성된 자들을 구제하기 위한 것이다. 이러한 입법목적과 제정 경위에 비추어 보면, 특별조치법은 토지가 하천구역에 편입되어 국유화됨으로 인하여 정당한 소유권을 잃게 되는 자의 권리를 구제·보호함에 그 취지가 있다고 할 것이므로, 그 소유 토지가 하천구역에 편입되어 국유로 되었을 당시 이미 국가에 대하여 그 소유권에 기한 권리를 주장할 수 없었던 사정에 있던 자는 특별조치법이 당초 보호대상으로 예정하고 있던 범위에 포함된다고 보기는 어렵다. 따라서 원고들의 선대가 특별조치법상의 요건을 형식상 충족하여 그 보상대상에 해당한다 하더라도 위와 같은 특별한 사정이 있는 경우에 해당하므로 그 손실보상청구권의 행사는 제한된다고 보아야 한다.

㈐ 이 판결이 원용하는 제1심판결의 이유에서 인정한 바와 같이, 유수지, 하천부속물의 부지 등으로서 이 사건 토지는 1964. 6. 1. 하천구역에 편입되어 국유화된 것인데, 그 이전에 늦어도 1954. 12. 31. 무렵에는 국가의 이 사건 토지에 관한 점유취득시효가 이미 완성되어 있었다.

㈑ 그렇다면 원고들의 선대로서는 1954. 12. 31.부터는 국가에 대하여 이 사건 토지의 소유권에 기한 권리를 행사할 수 없게 되었다고 할 것이므로, 그 이후 1964. 6. 1.에 이 사건 토지가 하천구역으로서 국유로 되었다 하더라도 이를 이유로 특별조치법에 의한 손실보상청구권을 행사할 수는 없다고 할 것이다.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court of first instance that dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as above is justifiable, and all appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing plaintiffs.

Judges Lee Jae-hoon (Presiding Judge)