See Attached List of Plaintiffs (Seoul General Law Firm, Attorney Kim Jong-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Gyeonggi-do (Attorney above-at-law)

April 11, 2013

1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The defendant shall pay each of the plaintiffs as stated in the list of "the plaintiff's shares in inheritance and the amount of inheritance" in the attached list of "the plaintiff's shares in inheritance and the amount of inheritance" list of the same list with 20% interest per annum from the day after the copy of the application for modification of the claim of this case is served to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. In the Land Survey Division, the non-party 1, who has his domicile in the Neup (Seupeup 44) on July 3, 1911, stated that the non-party 1 was 708 square meters prior to the Sung-gun, Suwon-gun (Seng 1 omitted) and written as the owner in the land cadastre of the above land.

B. On December 31, 1959, the land category of the above (number 1 omitted) was changed to the bank. On February 17, 1987, the land category of the said (number 2 omitted) was divided from the said (number 1 omitted), and the land was re-divided from the said (number 2 omitted) land on November 25, 1992. The land was re-divided from the said (number 2 omitted) land; the land was then changed to the “Seong-gun-gun Sinsan Sinsan-gun Sinsan-si Ga repair” in the administrative district changed on January 1, 1989; and it was changed to the “Sesan-gun Sinsan-si Gak-dong repair”.

In addition, after the change of land category on December 4, 200, the land category was changed to a river of 1,018 square meters (number 1 omitted), a river of 1,024 square meters in the same (number 2 omitted), a bank of 1,024 square meters in the same (number 2 omitted), and a bank of 299 square meters in the same (number 3 omitted).

C. Each of the lands of this case was designated as a river on April 1, 1963 by the name of a river and a case for the designation of a section under Article 2 of the River Act (Ordinance No. 1255 of the Cabinet), and according to the Decree on Designation of a River under the proviso of Article 11 of the River Act (repealed by the Presidential Decree No. 11120 of Apr. 30, 1983), the land of this case was the site of an Osan bank, Osan bank, and Cheongsan bank (construction of 1941), which was located in the river section of the Osancheon river that was occupied by a national river. The land of this case was currently registered as an Osancheon river area under the "Mastercheon River Ledger (Master River Maintenance Master Plan)" prepared around December 12, 1979.

D. On January 14, 1994, 196, 23 May 23, 1995, Osan-si made a registration of preservation of ownership in each state’s name as of January 14, 1995 with respect to each of the land of this case (No. 1994-5, No. 1996-91, Osan-si) and (No. 2 omitted), with respect to each of the land of this case, the registration of preservation of ownership in each state’s name as of January 6, 1997.

E. Meanwhile, on October 15, 1921, Non-party 1, who is the plaintiffs' fleet, died on or around October 15, 1921, and succeeded to the property solely by Non-party 2, who is the head of family, and upon the death of Non-party 2 on July 9, 1935, Non-party 3, who is the head of family, succeeded to the property solely by the head of family, and Non-party 3 was deceased on January 28, 1998, and jointly succeeded to the property by the plaintiffs, who are the descendants of lineal descendants or lineal descendants. The process and specific inheritance shares inherited to the plaintiffs are as shown in the list of "the process of inheritance

[Ground of recognition] The absence of dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 7, 12 (including each number), appraiser's appraisal result, fact inquiry result to the head of the Seoul Regional Construction and Management Administration of this Court, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The assertion and judgment

A. Summary of the parties' arguments

(1) Summary of the plaintiffs' assertion

Each land of this case is the land under the circumstances of Nonparty 1, the plaintiffs' prior owner of the land. Since the land of this case was transferred to a river before July 20, 1971, which was the enforcement date of the former River Act (Act No. 892 of Dec. 20, 1961) prior to or late before January 1, 1962, which was the enforcement date of the former River Act (Act No. 2292 of Jan. 19, 1971), the Defendant, the river management agency, is obligated to pay compensation for losses due to the incorporation of each land of this case to the plaintiffs who are the successors of Nonparty 1, as the river management agency, pursuant to the Act on Special Measures for the Compensation, etc. for Land Acquisition into River (Act No. 9543 of Mar. 25, 2009; hereinafter "Special Measures Act").

(2) Summary of the defendant's assertion

Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 1, who are the names of the circumstances of each land of this case, cannot be deemed as the same person. Even if the same person is the same, each land of this case was already expropriated in accordance with the Joseon River Decree and the compensation for the owner was completed or purchased by the State since it was not reasonable for the Plaintiffs to have asserted, since each land of this case was excluded from the embankment site or exclusion from the Cheongsan bank and Cheongnam bank.

Even if it is not so, since the state has occupied each of the lands of this case in peace and openly with the intention to own them since 1941, the acquisition by prescription for each of the lands of this case has been completed after the lapse of 20 years from the date of possession. Therefore, each of the lands of this case cannot be considered as land subject to compensation as stipulated in the Special Measures Act.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

C. Determination

(1) Whether the plaintiffs' prior-party 1 and the non-party 1 are the same person who is the names of the circumstances

The above evidence and evidence No. 8-1 revealed the following circumstances, namely, ① Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 1, the plaintiffs’ preference, are identical in Korean and Chinese name; ② the address of Nonparty 1, the names of the above circumstances, and the location of Nonparty 1, the plaintiffs’ preference, are equal in so-called “Nu Eupi”; ③ the permanent domicile of Nonparty 1, the plaintiffs’ preference, is the head of Sinsan-si ( Address 1 omitted); ③ the land at the above domicile is the head of Sinsan-si ( Address 1 omitted prior to the change of administrative district: address 1 omitted); and ④ the land at the above domicile was the land under the circumstances of Nonparty 1; ④ there was no evidence to acknowledge that there was a person with the name of Nonparty 1 other than the above fact in the above Eup at the time of the land situation, the name of Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 1, the plaintiffs are the same as the same person who is the plaintiffs.

(2) Whether each of the instant lands was compensated or purchased

Since the title holder of land is the original owner of the pertinent land, if the land survey division was prepared and assessed against any group of land under the former Land Survey Order, he/she or his/her heir shall be the land owner (see Supreme Court Decisions 98Da59132, Feb. 23, 1999; 2002Da43417, May 26, 2005; 2002Da43417, May 26, 2005; etc.). However, even if Nonparty 1, who is the plaintiffs, was the same as Nonparty 1 and the same person with whom each of the instant land was assessed, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs still held the ownership of each of the instant land even at the time of incorporation of each of the instant land into the river area. On the contrary, if there are circumstances to deem that the plaintiffs' preference price before being transferred to the river area had been lost the ownership of each of the instant land, notwithstanding the entry of the land survey division, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiffs had the right to claim for compensation for damages under each of the instant land.

In full view of the evidence Nos. 10-1 through 6-6 of this Court, the fact finding results and the purport of the entire pleadings of this Court with respect to the Seoul Regional Construction Management Administration of the Republic of Korea, ① Construction of Osan bank and Cheongsan bank in 1941, and each of the land of this case (the land which was accurately divided) was incorporated into the site of each of the above banks, and Masan including the above embankments was managed by the defendant, a local government, the government, the government, and ② The Joseon River Decree, which was enforced at the time of 1941, provided that the owner of the land damaged by the river work shall be compensated for damages (Article 43). ③ Since each of the land of this case was adjacent to each of the land of this case, it is recognized that the ownership transfer registration was made due to donation or sale in the name of Cheongsan bank between 1939 and 1942 as to part of the land incorporated into the site of each of the above banks.

However, it is difficult to view that the presumption of ownership by Nonparty 1, the name of the circumstances, was reversed solely on the basis of the circumstances leading up to the construction of the Osan bank and the Cheongology bank, the provisions related to the compensation for losses by the Joseon River Order, and the fact that the land immediately adjacent to each of the instant lands was transferred to the State.

Therefore, this part of the defendant's argument is without merit.

(3) Whether the acquisition by prescription is completed

Furthermore, we examine whether the acquisition by prescription due to the above possession has been completed around 1961, the transfer of each of the lands of this case to be transferred to river areas by the Defendant who occupied each of the lands of this case in peace and public performance from around 1941 to 20 years as the management agency of Osancheon as seen above.

① If the nature of the source of possessory right of real estate is not clear, the possessor is presumed to have occupied the land in good faith, peace, and public performance with his/her own intent under Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, and such presumption applies likewise to cases where the State or a local government occupies the land, which is the managing body of the cadastral record, with the knowledge of the absence of legal requirements, such as a juristic act which may cause the acquisition of ownership at the time of the commencement of possession and other legal requirements, barring special circumstances, the possessor shall be deemed not to have the intention to reject another’s ownership and to possess it. Thus, the presumption of possession with the intention to own shall be deemed to have been broken (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da28625, Aug. 21, 1997). Meanwhile, even if the State or a local government fails to submit documents concerning the procedure for the acquisition of land for acquisition of the prescriptive acquisition, it cannot be readily determined that the State or a local government has occupied the land without permission and entered into the State’s legal procedure.

② Each of the lands of this case is classified as a site for an Osan bank and an Cheongnam bank constructed by the Joseon General Department in around 1941, and is now classified as a site for an Osan bank and a site for an Cheongnam bank. The facts, including Osan bank and Cheongcheon bank, have been managed by the Defendant, a local government. According to these facts, it is presumed that the State (in the case of the piracy, the Joseon General Department) has occupied each of the lands of this case in a peaceful and public manner from 1941 to 1941 as the intention to own each of the lands of this case, since 1941.

③ Furthermore, it cannot be readily concluded that the State occupied each of the instant lands without permission solely on the ground that there is no cadastral record, etc. on each of the instant lands with the knowledge that the State had separate owners of each of the instant lands. In view of the fact that the bank site adjacent to each of the instant lands was purchased by the State in 1939 and 1942, the circumstance that the State occupied each of the instant lands or the purpose of occupation, and the compensation provision for losses of the Joseon River Order, it cannot be ruled out that the Maritime Affairs and the Maritime Affairs Association lawfully acquired the ownership of each of the instant lands according to the acquisition procedure of public property. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that the Defendant’s possession of each of the instant lands was proven to have been occupied without permission. Accordingly, even if the Defendant did not submit the documents on the acquisition procedure of each of the instant lands, the presumption of autonomous possession of each of the instant lands cannot be deemed to have been reversed solely on such ground, and with respect to each of the instant lands, the acquisition by prescription was completed by around January 196.

④ Meanwhile, in the case of the acquisition by prescription, ownership is acquired by registering pursuant to Article 245(1) of the Civil Act. Thus, inasmuch as there is no evidence to acknowledge that the State completed the registration of ownership transfer on each of the instant land before January 1, 1962, the enforcement date of the former River Act, the acquisition by prescription shall be deemed to have been owned by the Plaintiffs’ prior to the completion of the acquisition by prescription, regardless of the completion of the acquisition by prescription.

However, upon the completion of the prescriptive acquisition of real estate, the possessor may file a claim against the nominal owner for the implementation of the procedure for ownership transfer registration on the ground of the completion of the prescriptive acquisition, and the nominal owner is obligated to comply therewith, so the nominal owner with such obligation cannot exercise his/her right based on the ownership against the possessor for whom the prescriptive acquisition has been completed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Da51280, May 25, 1993; 94Da13480, Jun. 9, 195). Therefore, even if the Plaintiffs’ right to claim compensation based on the ownership was established against the prior owner by the enforcement of the former River Act, even if the Plaintiffs, who were in the position of implementing the procedure for ownership transfer registration for the completion of the prescriptive acquisition against the State at the time, cannot exercise the said right to claim compensation based on the ownership against the Defendant who occupied and managed each of the of the instant land at the time with the delegation of the State, and the above assertion by

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment List, etc. of the Plaintiffs]

Judges Lee E-Ba (Presiding Judge)