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(영문) 대법원 2000. 2. 11. 선고 99다47525 판결
[부당이득금반환][공2000.4.1.(103),667]
Main Issues

[1] The requirements to be applied by analogy to a provision of expression agency under the Civil Act

[2] The case holding that the provision of expression agency under the Civil Act does not apply by analogy on the ground that there is no justifiable reason to believe that the forged bill is genuine, in case where there is no paper tape attached to the paper used by the printing method in the stamp image on the issuer's stamp image of the counterfeited bill with face value of 3 billion won, and where the bill paper was removed from the book on the bill book without being the so-called fibibib "cib" in the face of the bill

Summary of Judgment

[1] In order to apply by analogy the provisions of the Civil Act concerning representation of a bill to the above Article, it is insufficient to believe that the other party has the right to act a bill against a forged person or that the counterfeited person has actually committed the act of a bill in question, and there is a justifiable reason for reliance on such belief. Such justifiable reason can be affirmed if it seems reasonable to believe that there is a valid act if it is common by objectively observing various circumstances in existence at the time of the act of a bill, and it is reasonable to believe that there was a valid act if there is a valid act. However, even though there are circumstances under which it would be doubtful of the authority of the forged person or the authenticity of the act of a bill in question, it is difficult to say that there is a justifiable reason for reliance on the other

[2] The case holding that the provision of expression agency under the Civil Act does not apply by analogy on the ground that there is no justifiable reason to believe that the forged bill is true, in case where there is a paper tape attached to the stamp image of the issuer of the forged bill with a face value of KRW 3 billion in face value and the bill book was removed from the book of the bill without being the so-called "cibibib", and where no confirmation is made to the issuer

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 126 of the Civil Code / [2] Article 126 of the Civil Code

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da3994 delivered on June 11, 1991 (Gong1991, 1906), Supreme Court Decision 93Da21521 delivered on May 27, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 1814), Supreme Court Decision 98Da27470 delivered on January 29, 199 (Gong199Sang, 366)

Plaintiff, Appellee

Chungcheongnam-gu Seoul District Court Decision 201Na11448 delivered on May 2, 201

Defendant, Appellant

Korean Comprehensive Finance Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Kim Jong-hwan et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 98Na49267 delivered on June 18, 1999

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the ground of appeal on the burden of expression representation

In order to be applied by analogy to Article 35 of the Civil Act, it is not sufficient that the other party believe that the other party has the authority to perform the act of a bill, or that the other party is genuinely engaged in the act of a bill. As such, there is a justifiable reason to believe that there is a valid act if it seems natural to objectively observe various circumstances at the time of the act of a bill and to believe that there was a valid act in ordinary. However, even though there are circumstances under which it is reasonable to suspect the authority of the forged party or the authenticity of the act of a bill, if the bill itself does not investigate and confirm the existence of such authority or the intent of the other party, it is difficult to conclude that there is a justifiable reason to believe that the other party has a legitimate reason (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da27470, Jan. 29, 199).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the non-party representative of the plaintiff company forged the Promissory Notes in the name of the plaintiff company by converting the representative director's seal affixed to the Skkife tape in the authentic bill issued by the plaintiff company into the Skife tape and attaching the Skife tape as it is in another promissory note form. According to the records, the above Skife method using Skife tape can be known that employees of the defendant company is a subordinate method in correcting the due date of the Promissory Notes. Thus, the defendant should have been aware that the Skife tape is attached to the part of the issuer's seal of the Promissory Notes in this case. Thus, the defendant should have examined and confirmed the issue of the Promissory Notes separately with regard to the plaintiff company's issue or issue of it

Therefore, as long as the Defendant neglected to investigate and confirm such fact, it cannot be said that there exists any justifiable reason to believe that the Promissory Notes in this case were genuine. This is more so more so in view of the fact that the face value of the Promissory Notes in this case is KRW 3 billion or less and that the Promissory Notes in this case does not ordinarily become the so-called apex, when removing the Promissory Notes in the Promissory Notes in this case.

In the same purport, the court below is justified in holding that the legal principles on the acquisition of the Promissory Notes in this case are not applicable by analogy to the company of the plaintiff since the court below did not make any inquiry or confirmation in the fact that the promissory Notes in this case did not exceed the par value of the Promissory Notes in this case, and contrary to ordinary cases, it did not scarf tapes are attached to the issuer's seal image part, and unlike ordinary cases, it did not see it. There is no error in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence or the misapprehension of the legal principles on the expression agency, as otherwise pointed out in the ground of appeal

2. As to the ground of appeal on offsetting negligence

The fact-finding or determination of the ratio of comparative negligence in a damage compensation case due to a tort falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of a fact-finding court unless it is deemed that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da17267, Jul. 25, 1995).

Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, in recognizing the Plaintiff’s liability for damages as an employer against the Nonparty’s employee by forging or withdrawing the Promissory Notes in relation to the performance of its business, and thereby causing damage equivalent to the discounted amount to the Defendant, the court below is justified in limiting the Plaintiff’s liability for damages by 70% of the Plaintiff’s liability for damages based on the Defendant’s mistake as the ground for offsetting negligence, which did not inquire or confirm the Plaintiff’s company, and it is not deemed that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. Therefore, there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of the legal principles as to comparative negligence as otherwise

3. As to the ground of appeal on the authority to approve the payment of bills

Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the non-party's rejection of the defendant's assertion that the non-party's rejection of payment obligation of the non-party is against the principle of no opinion or the principle of good faith, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the legal principles as to the right to approve payment of the non-party's payment of the non-party's payment of the non-party's payment of the non-party's payment of the non-party's payment of the non-party's payment of the non-party's payment of the non-indicted 1.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant who is the appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice)

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