A. Whether a soldier’s officer, such as a commander’s accommodation, constitutes facilities necessary for military purposes (affirmative), and whether the land within the scope necessary for the use of the official residence constitutes “when military necessity becomes unnecessary” (negative)

(b) The case holding that it is insufficient to view that the part of the land becomes unnecessary for military purposes solely on the ground that the lodging place of a commander is located within a certain distance from a military unit;

C. In a case where part of the requisitioned land has become unnecessary for military purposes, whether a repurchase right is granted to the whole requisitioned land (negative)

A. In light of the special characteristics of the military, such as the fact that there is a great need for soldiers to live in the military as well as in the vicinity of the military in preparation for an emergency, and that there is a lot of military personnel above the sergeants who frequently move the workplace according to the military operations plan. In the case of a large scale of military units, military officers, such as the commander’s lodging house, are one of the necessary facilities for military purposes, barring any special circumstances, land within the scope necessary for the use of official residences as above, cannot be deemed as falling under “when there is no need for military purposes” as a matter of course.

B. The case holding that even if the head of a unit’s accommodation is located in a somewhat long distance from a military unit, such circumstance alone is insufficient to deem that the part of the land was unnecessary for military purposes.

(c) It cannot be deemed that a repurchase right has been created on the whole land subject to requisition, as a matter of course, on the ground that part of the requisitioned land has become unnecessary for military purposes.

Article 20 (1) of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisitioned Property

(a) Supreme Court Decision 88Meu3249 delivered on November 28, 1989 (Gong1990, 129) (Gong129) 90Da17538, 17545 delivered on December 10, 1991

Plaintiff 1 and 16 others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee

Korea

Seoul High Court Decision 90Na22983 delivered on November 23, 1990

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendant regarding the remaining part against the Plaintiffs except Plaintiff 1 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

Plaintiff 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 shall be dismissed.

The costs of appeal between the plaintiff 1 and the defendant shall be assessed against the defendant.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the Army (number 1 omitted) occupied and used the portion of the land (number 2 omitted) other than the portion of the land (number 2 omitted) located in the 61,288 square meters of the land (hereinafter "communication loan site") including the requisitioned land of this case, among the communications lot site on November 13, 1979, 1,112 square meters (one copy of the land listed in the attached list) from the above communications unit at a significant distance from the above communications unit to the official of the second military training unit of the Army located in the above unit, and that there was no need to establish a new military training site of the above 20th military commander or the heir of the above land for the above 20th military training site, and there was no need to establish a new military training site of the above 10th military commander or the heir of the above land for the above 2nd military training site, and there was no need to reduce the number of the above land, which is the residents and the heir of the above military unit.

However, in light of the special characteristics of the military, such as the poor housing situation in the vicinity of the military, there is a high need for soldiers to live in the military or in the vicinity of the military in preparation for an emergency, and there is a lot of military soldiers or more who use the residences such as the official residences from time to time in accordance with the military operations plan, and in light of the special characteristics of the military, such as the poor housing situation in the vicinity of the military station, the official residences such as the office accommodation of the commander of this case can be considered as one of the facilities necessary for military operations. Thus, land within the necessary scope for the use of the official residences as above cannot be deemed as a case where the military necessity is naturally, and even if the above official residences are located within a somewhat long distance from the military unit, such circumstance alone is insufficient to deem that the part of the land in this case becomes unnecessary for the military purpose, and thus, the repurchase right of this case cannot be deemed as a whole land for the plaintiffs.

Therefore, the court below's determination that the plaintiffs acquired the right to repurchase on the whole of the communications site of this case merely because the official physician of this case had an official capacity on the land indicated in the attached list, which is part of the land of this case, and although the defendant currently uses it, the official physician of this case did not adjoin the military unit, is erroneous in the misapprehension of the purport of Article 20 (1) of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisition Property, or in the misapprehension of the law of law of lack of reason, and therefore, it is reasonable to discuss this issue as it affects the judgment.

2. Plaintiffs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 filed an additional appellate brief after the end of the period for filing the appellate brief in this case, and thus, they cannot be dismissed.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant as to the land indicated in the annexed list shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the court below, and the defendant's remaining appeal shall be dismissed, and the costs of appeal shall be borne by the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)