[1] The time when ownership of public facilities installed by an urban planning project executor which is not an administrative agency under the former Urban Planning Act and its site belongs to the State or local government (=the time when the project is completed)

[2] In a case where an implementer of an urban planning project, other than an administrative agency, installs public facilities as part of the implementation of an urban planning project without undergoing the procedure for acquiring rights to the state-owned land located within the urban planning zone, whether such state-owned land is gratuitously reverted to the local government

[1] Article 83(2) of the former Urban Planning Act (amended by Act No. 4427 of Dec. 14, 1991) provides that public facilities newly installed by an executor who is not an administrative agency after executing an urban planning project shall gratuitously revert to the State or a local government which will manage such facilities. Thus, upon the completion of an urban planning project, the ownership of land and facilities constituting the relevant public facilities shall be reverted directly to the State or a local government which will manage such facilities at the same time as the completion of the project, and the ownership of the relevant public facilities shall not be attributed to the State or a local government only when the notification of the tax items or the notification

[2] The provisions of Article 83 (2) of the former Urban Planning Act (amended by Act No. 4427 of Dec. 14, 191) shall apply only to the case where a project operator acquires the land necessary for the public facilities by means of a contract under private law or a public law procedure and completes the project. This does not apply to the case where a project operator has not lawfully acquired the land necessary for the public facilities and is in possession and use by the State or a local government after installing the public facilities. Such interpretation does not change because the land necessary for the installation of the public facilities is the state-owned land.

[1] Article 83 of the former Urban Planning Act (amended by Act No. 4427 of Dec. 14, 1991) / [2] Article 83 (2) of the former Urban Planning Act (amended by Act No. 4427 of Dec. 14, 1991)

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 96Da24897 delivered on April 15, 199 (Gong199Sang, 884) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 80Da3269 delivered on December 22, 1981 (Gong1982, 177) 87Meu372 delivered on July 7, 1987 (Gong1987, 1317)

The Guro-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government (Attorney Lee Tae-hun, Counsel for defendant)

Korea Transportation Safety Authority (Attorney Jeong-sik, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 98Na25339 delivered on September 29, 1998

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. The court below acknowledged the following facts as stated in its reasoning concerning the process of the construction of the road in this case and the particulars of the construction of the land in this case included or subdivided into the above road site. The plaintiff's assertion that the land in this case was reverted to Seoul Special Metropolitan City without compensation pursuant to Article 83 (2) of the former Urban Planning Act (amended by Act No. 4427 of Dec. 14, 191, hereinafter the same). In order for the land in this case to be reverted without compensation to Seoul Special Metropolitan City, the court below determined that, first of all, the project implementer should acquire the right to the land in this case to be incorporated into the above road site and complete the project, and then the project should establish the road and notify the completion of the construction after completion inspection in Seoul Special Metropolitan City, in addition to notifying the detailed contents of the land to be incorporated into the above road before the completion of the road construction project. In this case, the committee did not admit that the Korea-do Comprehensive Development Promotion Committee purchased each of the land in this case, acquired the right, or allowed the above land to be incorporated without compensation.

The former part of Article 83(2) of the former Urban Planning Act provides that public facilities newly installed by an implementer, other than an administrative agency, shall gratuitously vest in the State or a local government to manage such facilities. Thus, if public facilities are installed by the implementation of an urban planning project, the ownership of the land and facilities constituting the relevant public facilities shall be reverted directly to the State or a local government which is to manage such facilities at the time of completion of the project, and the ownership of the public facilities shall not be attributed to the State or a local government only when a notice of tax items or a notice of completion of the project is given under Article 83(5) of the former Urban Planning Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 96Da24897, Apr. 15, 199). Therefore, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine that the

However, Article 83(2) of the former Urban Planning Act applies only to the case where a project operator acquires the land necessary for the public facilities by means of a contract under private law or public law and installs the public facilities and completes the project. It does not apply to the case where a project operator installs the public facilities and uses them without lawful acquisition of the land necessary for the public facilities (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da3269, Dec. 22, 1981; 87Meu372, Jul. 7, 1987). Such interpretation does not change because the land necessary for the installation of the public facilities is the state-owned land. The judgment of the court of this case, which is pointed out in the ground of appeal, does not conflict with this decision, contrary to this case.

Therefore, the lower court’s determination that the instant land cannot be deemed to have been gratuitously reverted to Seoul Special Metropolitan City is justifiable, and the lower court’s erroneous determination as to the notice of tax items is not affected by the conclusion of the judgment, as a result, on the grounds that there is no evidence to support the lawful acquisition of each of the instant lands by the State. Therefore, all of the grounds of appeal that the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine, such as the allegations

2. The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that it had acquired the land of this case on December 19, 1993 after the date of the construction of the road on December 19, 1973, beginning with the construction of the road on the land including the land of this case and completed the construction of the road on December 19, 193, since the Seoul Special Metropolitan City and the plaintiff occupied and used the above road for the traffic of the general public, the Seoul Special Metropolitan City and the plaintiff acquired the land of this case on December 19, 193 after the lapse of 20 years from that time. Since the Seoul Special Metropolitan City occupied the land of this case without permission without permission, the possession of the Seoul Metropolitan City as to the land of this case and the possession of the plaintiff who succeeded to it shall be deemed as the owner's possession. Accordingly, the court below's rejection of the plaintiff's letter of prescriptive acquisition has somewhat different reasons, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the legal principles

3. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Zwon (Presiding Justice)