[1] Point of starting the statute of limitations for a doctor's claim for medical expenses (=the time of termination of open medical treatments)

[2] The case holding that the extinctive prescription of a claim for medical expenses cannot be deemed to run from the date of discharge or the date of termination of the above lawsuit solely on the ground that a patient filed a lawsuit against the hospital for damages due to medical malpractice after being hospitalized for a long time due to a surgery after the surgery

[3] Whether approval can be granted as a ground for interrupting extinctive prescription before the interruption of extinctive prescription period (negative)

[4] The case holding that it does not constitute an approval of the interruption of extinctive prescription, even though the contract concluded that "if admission fees or other charges are delinquent, no objection is raised against the legal measures of the hospital"

[5] Whether a doctor can claim medical expenses only when a doctor's disease is treated as a result of treatment (negative)

[6] The case holding that even if a patient's disease was not treated as a result of an operation and remaining after the surgery, a doctor may claim medical expenses for the surgery and expenses for the treatment performed to recover the symptoms or prevent the aggravation of the symptoms after the surgery was made

[7] Whether recognizing a doctor's violation of his/her duty of explanation at the same time constitutes a breach of reason for recognizing the claim for medical expenses (negative)

[1] In the case of "claim for Medical Treatment" under Article 163 subparagraph 2 of the Civil Code, unless otherwise stipulated, it is reasonable to interpret that the period during which each of the expenses required for the relevant medical treatment arrives and the extinctive prescription is in progress whenever each of the expenses is completed. Even in the case of long-term hospitalization, unless otherwise stipulated, the extinctive prescription shall not be deemed to run from the time of discharge, since there is no obstacle in claiming medical treatment for the patient during the hospitalization unless there is any other special agreement.

[2] The case holding that even if a patient received long-term hospitalization after surgery and filed a lawsuit against the hospital for damages due to medical malpractice, such circumstance alone does not obstruct the patient in claiming medical expenses against the patient, it cannot be deemed that the extinctive prescription of the medical expense claim will run from the discharge or from the termination date of the above lawsuit

[3] Approval as the ground for interrupting extinctive prescription is established by expressing that an obligor who is the party to the benefit of prescription recognizes the existence of the right, so it shall be allowed only after the interruption of the extinctive prescription period, and even if prior approval is granted, it shall not be interrupted, and it shall not be allowed for an obligor to recognize the existence of the right in advance.

[4] The case holding that even if the contract was concluded with the medical treatment agreement that "if the admission fee or other charge is delinquent, no objection shall be raised against the legal measure of the hospital", it cannot be deemed that the existence of the medical treatment debt that has not yet occurred at that time was approved in advance.

[5] The medical treatment obligation owed by a physician to a patient is not an obligation to achieve the same result as the treatment of a disease, but an obligation to take necessary and appropriate measures for treatment in light of the current medical level with the fiduciary duty as a result of the performance of the care for a patient, i.e., the obligation to take necessary and appropriate measures for treatment in light of the current medical level. Thus, even if the patient fulfilled the above duty of care,

[6] The case holding that as long as a doctor performed necessary and appropriate medical treatment measures in light of the current medical level with the duty of due care of a good manager for the treatment of a patient, this is based on the medical treatment obligation and even if the patient's disease remains after the surgery, the medical treatment expenses can be claimed, and as long as the legacy cannot be viewed as due to the doctor's negligence in treatment, the medical doctor cannot be deemed to be responsible for the loss or damage caused thereby, the medical doctor can also claim expenses for the treatment for the recovery of the symptoms or the prevention of aggravation after the legacy was made.

[7] If a doctor's violation of the duty of explanation is recognized, the claim for medical expenses cannot be viewed as a violation of each other even if the doctor determined that the doctor fulfilled his/her duty of care as a good manager according to the principal place of the obligation

[1] Articles 163 subparag. 2 and 166(1) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 163 subparag. 2 and 166(1) of the Civil Act / [3] Article 168 subparag. 3 of the Civil Act / [4] Article 168 subparag. 3 of the Civil Act / [5] Articles 681 and 686 of the Civil Act / [6] Articles 681 and 686 of the Civil Act / [7] Article 394(1)6 of the Civil Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 97Da47675 delivered on February 13, 1998 (Gong1998Sang, 748) / [5] Supreme Court Decision 85Meu1491 delivered on December 13, 198 (Gong1989, 88), Supreme Court Decision 92Da15031 delivered on July 27, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2381)

Jeonnam University Hospital (Law Firm 21st century General Law Office, Attorneys Jeon Jae-il et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 and two others

Gwangju High Court Decision 2000Na3551 delivered on June 29, 2001

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each party.

1. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal

A. As to the first ground for appeal

The extinctive prescription shall run from the time when a right occurs and the right can be exercised. Accordingly, the extinctive prescription shall not run during the period in which the right can not be exercised. However, the term "when the right can not be exercised" refers to the grounds for disability in the exercise of the right, for example, the non-performance of the term or condition, etc., such as the passage of the period, for instance, the right holder's personal circumstance or lack of legal knowledge, etc., and thus, the existence of negligence does not affect the progress of the prescription (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 65Da775, Jun. 22, 1965; 80Da2626, Jan. 19, 1982; 84Nu572, Dec. 26, 1984).

In addition, Article 163 subparag. 2 of the Civil Act provides that, unless otherwise stipulated, the statute of limitations shall be interpreted to run from the discharge of a patient since the due date for each of the expenses required for the relevant treatment arrives at each time the individual treatment is completed (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da47675, Feb. 13, 1998). In a case where a long-term hospitalization is provided, unless otherwise stipulated, the statute of limitations shall not be deemed to run from the discharge of a patient since there is no impediment in claiming medical expenses for the patient during the hospitalization unless otherwise stipulated.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that Defendant 1 suffered from verteburology and pelvis surgery on March 29, 1990, after Defendant 1 received verteburology and pelvis surgery, and had been hospitalized at the Plaintiff hospital for eight years from the date of discharge on December 5, 1998. The Defendants filed a lawsuit against the Plaintiff hospital for compensation for damages caused by medical malpractice, and that the lawsuit was concluded on December 21, 199. However, such circumstance alone does not interfere with the law in claiming medical expenses against the Defendants, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the extinctive prescription of the instant medical expense claim is to run from the discharge of Defendant 1 or from the date of termination of the said lawsuit, and therefore, it cannot be viewed that the statute of limitations has expired for more than three years under Article 163 of the Civil Act due to the period of short-term prescription from the date of filing the lawsuit in this case. Accordingly, the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to medical expenses.

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Since approval as a ground for interrupting extinctive prescription is established by expressing that an obligor who is a party to the right to benefit of prescription recognizes the existence of such right, it is possible only after the interruption of extinctive prescription begins and even if prior approval is granted, it shall not be interrupted, and it is not allowed for an obligor to recognize the existence of such right in advance.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below held that even if the Defendants agreed to the effect that "in the event that admission fees and other specifications are delinquent, they will not raise any objection to the legal measures taken by the Plaintiff hospital," and thus, it cannot be deemed that the existence of the liability for the medical treatment expenses of this case, which have not yet occurred at that time, was approved in advance. It is just and justified in accordance with the above legal principles, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the approval as a ground for suspending the extinctive prescription, or in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the approval as a ground for suspending the extinctive prescription

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that even if Defendant 1 asserted that Defendant 1’s obligation for medical expenses was extinguished by prescription while being hospitalized, it cannot be viewed as violating the good faith principle. The judgment of the court below is justified and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the good faith principle, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

2. Judgment on the Defendant’s grounds of appeal

A physician’s obligation to treat a patient is not an obligation as a result of the performance of the same result as the treatment of a disease, but an obligation to take necessary and appropriate measures for treatment in light of the current medical level, namely, the obligation to perform the duty of due care as a good manager for the treatment of a patient. Therefore, even though the patient fulfilled the above duty of care, the medical expenses can be claimed even if the disease was not treated (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da15031, Jul. 27, 1993).

According to the facts duly established by the court below, the defendants filed a lawsuit claiming damages against the plaintiff hospital, but the plaintiff hospital did not have any negligence in the treatment. However, since the plaintiff hospital was unable to give sufficient explanation to the defendants about the contents, necessity, and anticipated risks of occurrence, the plaintiff hospital did not lose the opportunity to choose whether to perform the above operation and was unable to exercise its right to self-determination, the court sentenced the defendants to pay a solatium amounting to KRW 80 million as consolation money. Thus, if the plaintiff hospital performed necessary and appropriate medical measures in light of the current medical level with the duty of care of a good manager for the recovery of the defendant 1, the treatment of the plaintiff hospital is based on the medical obligation, and if the plaintiff hospital did not treat the defendant 1's disease but left after the aftermath of the surgery, the plaintiff hospital can claim medical expenses for the treatment, and as long as the aftermatha cannot be deemed to have been caused by the plaintiff hospital's negligence in the treatment of the plaintiff hospital, the plaintiff hospital cannot be viewed to be responsible for the recovery of expenses incurred after the plaintiff hospital's loss.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that held to the same purport is just and acceptable, and even if it acknowledges a doctor's violation of the duty of explanation, it cannot be deemed that the doctor fulfilled his duty of care as a good manager according to the substance of the medical treatment obligation, and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the doctor's duty of care, or in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds for appeal, or in the misapprehension of facts against the

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Son Ji-yol (Presiding Justice)