[1] The case holding that the term "on-site motor company" and "on-site motor company" have acquired domestically well-knownness as another person's business mark as stipulated in Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act

[2] The case holding that the mutual "stock company's modern oil supply company" of the manufacturer and selling company of internal recreation is similar to the "mull automobile company" of the manufacturer and selling company of automobile parts, including internal recreation, which acquired domestically well-knownness as another's business mark, and is similar to the "mull automobile company" of the manufacturer and selling company of automobile parts

[3] The case holding that, with respect to the use of the trade name, which is the trade name acquired domestically well-known by the manufacturer and selling company of internal recreation as another person's business mark, and similar to the "Modern oil business of the company" and "Modern oil business of the company", the company committed an unlawful purpose to mislead the company to misunderstand the company's business with the business of modern mothers and modern automobiles

[4] The case holding that the non-exclusive license of a trademark granted by an owner of the trademark " " " " " " " " "", "HYDAI" and "HYDAI was formally granted for the purpose of earning profits by causing general consumers to confuse the business facilities or activities of "YSS" and "NS" with the trade name similar thereto, etc., and thus the use of the trademark by the above company cannot be deemed as a legitimate exercise of rights under the Trademark Act since it abused or abused the Trademark Act

[1] The case holding that in light of the company's business size, sales amount, methods of advertising and public relations activities, its expenditure amount, the period and mode of use of trade name, etc., the company's "Nan automobile stock company" and "Nanmanchis stock company" have acquired domestically well-knownness as a mark indicating another person's business as stipulated in Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act.

[2] The case holding that, in comparison with the trade name of a company engaged in the manufacture and sales business of automobile parts, including internal recreation, which acquired domestically well-knownness as a business mark of another person, and the trade name of a company engaged in the manufacture and sales business of automobile parts, etc., the portion of "on the face" is identical as its essential part, and the remaining portion of "on the face of the face" subtracting the portion of "stock company" from the whole observation is identical as its main part, and the remaining portion of "on the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the part of the company engaged in the manufacture and sales business of automobile parts, etc., and its appearance, name, and concept are extremely similar

[3] The case holding that, in light of the fact that the trade name of the manufacturer and distribution company of automobile parts, including an indoor studio, and the manufacturer and distribution company, were widely known and named in the Republic of Korea as the business marks of the company, and that the trade name of the manufacturer and distribution company of the modern studio is similar to that of the modern studio, and that the manufacturing and sale business of the modern studio is identical or similar to some of the manufacturing and sale business of the parts related to the modern studio, and that the manufacturer and distribution business of the modern studio is similar to the manufacturing and distribution business of the modern studio, and that the use of the business marks similar to the modern studio studio studio and the modern studio studio studio studio straw, which were widely known to the modern studio studio 207, which are similar to the modern studio studio 2007.

[4] The case holding that the non-exclusive license of a trademark granted by an owner of the trademark " " " "," "HYD AI" for goods used in the process of internalization from the owner of the trademark right " " " " " " " "," and "HYDAI" is formally formed for the purpose of making profits by causing confusion with the business facilities or activities of "on the part of the company" and "on the part of the company" with similar trade names, signs, etc., while the owner of the trademark right knows that each of the above trademarks was not used for internalization as designated goods, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the use of the trademark by the company is a legitimate exercise of rights under the Trademark Act since it abused or abused the Trademark Act.

[1] Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act / [3] Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act / [4] Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) and Article 15 (1) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act

Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd. and one other (Law Firm Apex, Attorneys Choi C-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Hyundai UBS Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Jung-Jin, Attorney Kim Ho-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

June 23, 2010

1. The defendant shall not use the word "on the basis of the trade name of the defendant" as the defendant.

2. The defendant will implement the procedure for cancellation of registration regarding the part of the "Nurik Coast Guard" in the corporate register (registration number No. 001626) that is kept and managed by the Suwon District Court Lee Man-cheon Registry (registration number No. 0166).

3. The Defendant is prohibited from advertising a solution using the trade name of “on-site glass” on packaging paper, packing paper, website, home shopping, etc. or manufacturing, selling, exporting, displaying, or distributing a solution using the trade name “on-site glass”.

4. The defendant shall cancel the part of "on-site glass" among finished products, semi-finished products and their packaging paper, packing containers, advertisements and other advertising materials posted on the Internet using the trade name "on-site glass" which is kept in his factory, warehouse, place of business, store, or any other similar place.

5. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 20 million won with 5% interest per annum from June 17, 2010 to August 11, 2010, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

6. The plaintiffs' remaining claims are dismissed.

7. Of the costs of lawsuit, 80% is borne by the Defendant, and the remainder 20% is borne by the Plaintiffs, respectively.

8. The above paragraphs 4 and 5 can be provisionally executed.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 30 million won and the amount at the rate of 20% per annum from the day following the day of service of the application for modification of the purport of the claim of this case to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. The Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff Hyundai Motor”) is a company established in around 1967 and engaged in the manufacture and sale of motor vehicles.

B. The Plaintiff Hyundai Flus Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff Hyundai Flus”) is the largest domestic company specializing in the manufacture, sale, etc. of automobile parts, including internal and non-commercial construction, and is the affiliate of Plaintiff Hyundai Flus that exclusively supplies automobile parts to the Plaintiff Hyundai Flus. In addition, Hyundai Flus are operating the Hyundai Flus Elus Elus Association from September 2001 to September 2000, and are conducting advertising and publicity activities in daily newspapers and public waves from 2000 to 2009, and the annual amount of sales in 2008 reaches approximately KRW 9.373 billion.3 billion.

C. Based on the total market value of the Korea Integrated Stock Price Index (KOSPI) on March 23, 2010, Plaintiff Hyundai Motor is first 3 in terms of Plaintiff Hyundai Motor, and 10 in terms of Plaintiff Hyundai Motor.

D. Meanwhile, from March 2004, the Plaintiff Hyundai Frans issued an outer sales product. Around June 2009, the Plaintiff’s Hyundai Frans merged with the electricity and electricity of the automobile that manufactured and sold an indoor sales system. The Hyundai Frans Co., Ltd., Ltd., Hyundai Frans Co., Ltd., Ltd. for the 2004 domestic sales net market share was approximately 12%.

E. The Plaintiff Hyundai Motor was using the designated goods as advertising words, as follows, the mark as “,” which is designated as a passenger car, passenger car, etc. (Class 12) and registered the trademark as “.”

○ Date of application / Date of registration: February 4, 2005 / December 21, 2005

○ Registration number: 40-064089-000

F. Around January 26, 2000, the Defendant was established with the trade name “TAEM Co., Ltd.” and operated the business of manufacturing and selling electrical and electronic equipment. On September 5, 2007, the Defendant changed the trade name to “MoBS,” and completed the registration of change of the trade name (U.S. District Court 01626 registration number).

G. From May 2005, the Defendant is manufacturing and selling the solution from around 2005. The Defendant uses the mark “HDUBS”, “HYD AI”, “CRUWAY”, and “NAVIKE” in the process of manufacturing and selling the solution. The Defendant marks the product on the back of the product and its packing boxes as “production cost substitute.”

H. The Defendant, while advertising and selling an in-house recreation in the Internet shopping mall, uses the phrase “Modern companies,” “on-site sentiments,” “Drway HYD AI,” and “on-site recreation,” respectively.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap's entries in Gap's 1 through 6, 8, 9, 11 through 13, 21, 22, 24, Eul's evidence 1, 5, 11 (including various numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Summary of the parties' arguments

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

1) The term “on the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the

The Defendant uses the Plaintiff’s trade name, “on the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face of the face

2) The term “on-site car” is widely recognized in the Republic of Korea as the Plaintiff’s business mark that produces and sells automobile-related parts, including an internal construction, and the term “on-site car” is widely recognized in the Republic of Korea as the Plaintiff’s business mark that produces and sells automobiles.

The Defendant’s manufacturing and selling of internal recreation would cause confusion with the Plaintiff’s business facilities or activities by using a business mark, which is similar to the Plaintiff’s trade name, “symnas” and “symnas”. This constitutes an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1(b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

3) As the trade name of the Plaintiff Hyundai Flus who produces and sells motor vehicle-related parts, the term “on-site motor vehicle” is widely recognized in Korea as the trade name of the Plaintiff Hyundai Flus who produces and sells motor vehicles.

The Defendant’s manufacture and sale of an in-house fashion using “on the face of the face of the free trade zone” and “on the face of the free trade zone” similar to “on the face of the free trade zone,” is an act detrimental to the distinctiveness or reputation of “on the face of the free trade zone,” and constitutes an act of unfair trade under Article 2 subparag. 1(c) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

4) Therefore, the Defendant’s act of using the phrase “on the face of the free will” as its trade name, and the act of manufacturing the process using its trade name, etc., shall be prohibited. The Defendant must discard an in-house fashion product, etc. using the trade name “on the face of the free will” in its custody. The Defendant is obligated to implement the procedure for registration of cancellation as to the part of “on the face of the free will” in its corporate register to the Plaintiffs.

In addition, since the defendant suffered loss from infringing the plaintiffs' business interests due to the above unfair competition acts, it is obligated to pay 300 million won and delay damages from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009, pursuant to Article 14-2 (2) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, as part of the compensation for damages to the plaintiffs.

B. Defendant’s assertion

1) In order to indicate a “satisfy”, which is one’s trade name, on a fire-resistant product, the Defendant only marks it in a common way, and does not use it as a trademark mark of the solution.

2) On July 1, 2007, the Defendant was granted a non-exclusive license on the used goods from the HYD AI, a trademark right holder of the HYD AI, and used it as a trademark only.

3) The terms and conditions of the Plaintiffs’ goods or business marks are not widely known in the Republic of Korea. Of the terms and conditions of the Plaintiffs’ goods or business marks, the terms and conditions cannot be deemed as the essential part, and thus, the Plaintiffs’ marks and the Defendant’s marks are not similar. Therefore, even if the Defendant uses the “on-site oil” as the goods or business marks, it does not cause confusion with the Plaintiffs’ goods or business. Moreover, even if the Defendant uses the “on-site oil” as the goods or business marks, it does not impair the Plaintiffs’ distinctive character or reputation.

4) As long as the defendant's act does not constitute an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) through (c) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, the defendant does not bear the duty of prohibition or compensation as to the claim in this case.

3. The judgment of this Court

A. Whether the act constitutes an unfair competitive act

(i) The well-knownness of the business mark;

In light of the business size, sales amount, methods of advertising and public relations activities of the plaintiffs as seen above, and their expenditure amount, the period and form during which the plaintiffs used the trade name of "Nemanchis Co., Ltd." or "Nechis Co., Ltd." and the trade name of "Nechis Co., Ltd.", the trade name of the plaintiffs can be deemed to have acquired domestically well-knownness as a mark indicating another person's business defined in Article 2

2) Whether business marks are similar

Of the Defendant’s trade name, the part of “stock company” in the Defendant’s trade name, “MobS Co., Ltd.,” “MobS Co., Ltd.,” and “MobS Co., Ltd., Ltd.,” indicates the type of company, and thus, has no distinctive character. Of the Defendant’s trade name, the remainder of “MobS” consists of two words “MobS” and “S.” and “S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S. and U.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S. and U.S.S.S.S.S.E.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.S.

In addition, since the part of the Plaintiff’s Hyundai Motor Vehicle’s trade name is considered as a type of business, the part of the “motor vehicle” is deemed to be its essential part. The trade name of the Plaintiff Hyundai Flus is both the part of the “Mos,” and the part of the “Mos,” as seen earlier, and as such, the part of the “Mos” is deemed to be an affiliate of the company with the trade name of the company having the trade name of the “Mos,” under the transaction common sense, which is combined subsequent to the “Mos,” and thus, the trade name of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant’s trade name are the same as the part of the “Mos.,” (In addition, even when the overall observation is made, the trade name of the Plaintiff Hyundai Flus is deemed to be five, and its appearance, name, and concept

Therefore, the Defendant’s trade name is similar to the Plaintiff’s trade name, such as the “Moman Flus Co., Ltd.” and the “Molus Co., Ltd.”.

3) Whether confusion is confused

Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act includes not only cases where a business mark itself misleads consumers or a trader into confusion with another person's business facilities or activities, but also cases where a general consumer or a trader misleads consumers to believe that the user of a mark identical or similar to the subject of the relevant business mark is closely related to capital, organization, etc. by using a mark identical or similar to another person's business mark widely recognized domestically (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da4899, Apr. 23, 2009).

As seen earlier, in light of the following: (a) the Plaintiffs’ trade name is well known and well-known in the Republic of Korea; (b) the Plaintiffs’ trade name and the Defendant’s trade name are similar; (c) the Defendant’s business-related manufacturing and sales business of automobile parts identical or similar to parts of the Plaintiff’s Hyundai mother Business; (d) the Plaintiff’s business-related automobile manufacturing and sales business overlaps; and (e) the Plaintiff’s manufacturing and sales business is similar to the Plaintiff’s Hyundai mother Business’s manufacturing and sales business; and (e) the Defendant’s use of the Plaintiff’s manufacturing and sales business mark similar to the Plaintiff’s business mark widely known in the Republic of Korea and the Defendant’s use of the Plaintiff’s business mark in the same Internet shopping mall; and (b) the Defendant’s exclusive use of the Plaintiff’s business mark similar to the Plaintiff’s business mark in the Republic of Korea is likely to mislead the Plaintiffs and the Defendant into the Plaintiff’s business-related business-related business-related business-related business-related business-related business-related business-related business-related business-related business-related entity’s, which were widely known to the Plaintiff’s.

4) Judgment on the defendant's assertion

Where trademark is acquired in the form of a trademark for the purpose of causing confusion with another person's goods or causing confusion with another person's business facilities or activities through the use of a trademark, trade name, mark, etc., which is identical or similar to that of another person's trademark and is not intended to distinguish one's goods from the goods of another person, and where trademark is acquired in the form of a trademark for the purpose of making profits by making another person confused with another person's goods through the use of the trademark, trade name, or mark, etc., which is widely recognized in the Republic of Korea, the purpose of the application for trademark registration or the acquisition of the trademark right itself is to conduct unfair competition, and even if the trademark was in the form of exercise of right for domestic affairs, it shall not be recognized as a legitimate exercise of right under the Trademark Act because it has been abused or abused

In full view of the respective descriptions and arguments of evidence Nos. 8 and 12, the fact that the Defendant was granted a non-exclusive license on the used goods from the HYD semiconductor Co., Ltd., a trademark right holder of the HYD AI on July 1, 2007.

However, the following facts can be acknowledged by comprehensively taking account of the aforementioned evidence and the purport of all pleadings. In other words, the Defendant’s acquisition of a non-exclusive license for each of the above trademarks is a business mark of the Plaintiffs, which is widely known to domestic traders or general consumers; the lower court did not use each of the above trademarks for the designated goods as a semiconductor-specialized company; the lower court’s lower court’s non-exclusive license for each of the above trademarks was separated from the lower court in 2000 and continued to conduct a motor vehicle-related business; the lower court’s acquisition of the non-exclusive license for each of the above trademarks did not operate the previous motor vehicle-related business, even if the lower court knew that the lower court did not use each of the above trademarks for the designated goods, and was aware that the lower court did not use it for the non-exclusive license for each of the above trademarks, and thus, did not err by abusing the right under the Trademark Act or abusing it for the purpose of causing confusion with the Plaintiffs’ business facilities or profits by using a similar trade name sign.

(b) Claim for prohibition of infringement and trade name cancellation;

The Defendant’s use of the term “current Pay for Stock Companies” in its trade name when manufacturing and selling goods constitutes an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparag. 1(b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act against the Plaintiffs. As such, the Defendant’s act of mutually using the word “place rent” and the trade name “place rent” should be prohibited from advertising or manufacturing, selling, exporting, displaying, or distributing internal recreation using the trade name “place rent” (i.e., package, container, website, home shopping) or the trade name “place rent” (i., the act of using the trade name “place rent”) in packaging, packing, website, home shopping, etc.; and the Defendant is obliged to delete the portion of “place rent” in its trade name registry that is kept in its factory, warehouse, store, store, or any other similar place (i.e., the Plaintiff’s right to claim the cancellation of the trade name name registration, and (ii) the Plaintiff’s right to claim the cancellation of the trade name registration’s “place rent” (i.e., the Plaintiff’s right to claim the cancellation of the trade name registration number 60).

As above, as long as the defendant's act constitutes an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act against the plaintiffs, it shall not be separately determined whether the defendant's act claimed selectively by the plaintiffs constitutes an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) and (c) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

C. Claim for damages

As above, since the defendant intentionally committed an unfair competition act under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act and thereby infringed the plaintiffs' business interests, the defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiffs for damages caused by such act.

Furthermore, as to the amount of damages, the plaintiffs asserted that the amount of business profits earned by the defendant from selling the defendant's used company's products exceeds 300 million won. According to the evidence No. 31, the defendant's sales amount is recognized as the facts constituting 63,408,957,21 won from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008, from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007.

However, the defendant submitted a standard certificate of value-added tax (which does not distinguish between the sales of the product using the current trade name and the sales of the product using the trade name before the current trade name) and the sales status by brand (which is divided into only the number of products using the trademark and other products using the trade name) without any justifiable reason (the defendant's act does not constitute an unfair competition act and does not constitute an unfair competition act, but it does not constitute "reasonable reason for the holder to refuse to submit data" under the proviso of Article 14 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act). In light of the fact that the defendant did not present trade name, the defendant cannot calculate the amount of damages pursuant to Article 14-2 (2) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, in consideration of the fact that the defendant sold the used products before using the current trade name, and that the defendant did not have any choice but any other reasons to determine the amount of damages as the whole, the defendant should compensate the plaintiffs for the damages in accordance with the purport and the examination of evidence.

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay the above KRW 200 million to the plaintiffs as well as damages for delay at each rate of 5% per annum prescribed by the Civil Act from June 17, 2010 to August 11, 2010, which is the day following the delivery date of the application for modification of the purport of the claim of this case, as requested by the plaintiffs, and from the next day to the day of full payment, 20% per annum prescribed by the Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is justified within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed as there is no ground.

Judges Kang Young-soo (Presiding Judge) (Presiding Judge)