If the ownership made for the purpose of securing such obligation in repayment of the secured obligation is demanded to cancel the registration of the entire obligation;

In a lawsuit seeking the cancellation of the ownership transfer registration in the name of the creditor who has been made for the security of a specific obligation, the court does not have a duty to exercise the right to request the cancellation of the registration on the ground of the repayment and repayment of the obligation against the plaintiff who asserts the extinguishment of the secured obligation. The debtor is entitled to seek the cancellation of the registration on the ground of the extinguishment of the secured obligation after the repayment of the secured obligation. However, the debtor cannot seek the cancellation in exchange for the repayment of the secured obligation.

Articles 372 and 536 of the Civil Act, Article 126 of the Civil Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 65Da869 Delivered on June 29, 1965, Decision 80Da3108 Delivered on June 23, 1981

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant 1 and six others

Gwangju High Court Decision 87Na120 delivered on October 18, 1988

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

As to the ground of appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney:

The court below, based on adopted evidence, recognized on July 10, 1968, the provisional registration of the right to claim ownership transfer under Defendant 1 was completed on July 10, 1968, and on July 3, 1969, according to the contents of the litigation telephone on the plaintiff and the defendant's claim established between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the above defendant was passed through the provisional registration procedure on March 3, 1969, and there was no error in the misapprehension of facts due to the violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit. According to the records of the certified copy of the register, the above principal registration is not a transfer of ownership by the certified copy of the protocol of compromise, but a sale was made. However, the court below's decision that the above principal registration was made based on the original copy of the protocol of compromise, but the plaintiff did not return 375,000 won to Defendant 1 as stated in Article 1 (1) of the protocol of compromise, and therefore, it cannot be deemed a ground for invalidation of the above registration.

In addition, the lower court’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff fully repaid the principal and interest of the secured obligation to Defendant 1, and there is no defect in the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit. Furthermore, the court does not have a duty to exercise the right of explanation as to the Plaintiff claiming the extinguishment of the secured obligation, as to whether the court seeks the cancellation of the registration due to the repayment and repayment of the obligation. In addition, in a case where the ownership transfer registration has been made in the name of the obligee for the security of a specific obligation, the obligor may seek the cancellation of the registration on the ground of the extinguishment of the secured obligation after the repayment of the secured obligation, but

The court below held that the return of the Plaintiff’s loan is not performed even after the principal registration of the transfer of ownership in Defendant 1’s land of this case was completed with a considerable period of time after the principal registration of the transfer of ownership, and later, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff’s loan was made through an implied agreement in lieu of the original performance of the above obligation, and there was no separate problem for several years until the filing of the lawsuit of this case. Such determination is nothing more than a theory of defense, and thus, even if there were errors like the theory of lawsuit, it does not affect the conclusion of the judgment. The argument is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)