(a) Judicial effect of a juristic act in violation of Article 48 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (Law No. 2654)

(b) Where a transfer agreement becomes null and void due to a violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act, whether the delegation of authority of attorney is null and void;

A. Article 48 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (Law No. 2654) is a compulsory law, and a juristic act aimed at acquiring profits provided for in Article 48 of the same Act is itself of anti-social nature and its judicial effect is denied.

B. A, who is not an attorney-at-law, shall take part in the litigation case from Eul who is a party to the lawsuit and take part in the litigation case of Eul on behalf of Eul, such as appointing an attorney-at-law under the expense and responsibility of Eul, and even if a transfer agreement which is to take part of the subject matter of lawsuit is null and void because it goes against the Attorney-at-law Act, the invalidity shall be limited to the agreed part, and the delegation part of the attorney-at-law who is not the agreed part of the attorney-at-law shall not be deemed null and void. Thus, if Gap did not actually pay the attorney-at-law fees, then Eul shall still bear the obligation to pay the attorney-at-law appointed by Eul

A. Article 48 and Article 78 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (Law No. 2654) Article 103 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 78Da213 delivered on May 9, 1978; Supreme Court Decision 70Da1250 Delivered on September 17, 1970

Attorney Park Jong-chul, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant 1 et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 85Na2932 delivered on July 8, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the first ground for appeal:

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, when the plaintiff and the non-party who represented the defendant on April 4, 1980 agreed to divide and transfer 1/2 shares of the real estate of this case to the plaintiff when each lawsuit was pending at that time between the plaintiff and the non-party who represented the defendant on April 4, 1980, all expenses incurred in the above lawsuit shall be covered by the plaintiff's contribution. In the case where the plaintiff and the defendant win the lawsuit, each of the above litigation cases shall be covered by the plaintiff's contribution. The defendant shall not participate in the above lawsuit, and if it is necessary to bring a new lawsuit in addition to the above litigation, the documents and the judgment necessary to perform the above lawsuit shall be executed under the name of the defendant. The documents and the judgment necessary to perform the above lawsuit shall not be kept by the plaintiff and cannot be cancelled until the execution procedure of the agreement on the apportionment of litigation costs is completed. In light of the records, the above fact finding by the court below is justified and it shall not be found to be unlawful in the misconception of facts by the rules of evidence.

In addition, the above transfer agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is just in the judgment below that the plaintiff, who is not an attorney-at-law, shall act on behalf of the defendant, such as the appointment of an attorney-at-law under his expenses and responsibility to act on behalf of the defendant in favor of the defendant, and as a result, it would be contrary to Article 48 of the Attorney-at-law Act (Act No. 2654), which was enforced at the time when the defendant transferred 1/2 shares of the real estate of this case from the defendant, and the above legal act for the purpose of acquiring profits provided for in Article 48 of the Attorney-at-law Act (Act No. 2654), which was enforced as a mandatory law, has the nature of anti-social and is denied legal effect (see Supreme Court Decision 78Da213, May 9, 1978). It is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the above legal interpretation. All arguments are

2. On the second ground for appeal:

Even if a transfer agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is null and void as it goes against the Attorney-at-Law Act, its invalidation shall be limited to the part of the price agreement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 70Da1250, Sept. 17, 1970); and the delegation part of the authority to appoint an attorney, not the part of the price agreement, cannot be deemed null and void; therefore, in this case where the plaintiff did not actually pay attorney fees, the defendant still bears the obligation to pay the attorney fees to the attorney appointed by the plaintiff under the name of the defendant pursuant to the above agreement, and therefore, the defendant cannot be said to have obtained the benefit of removing the payment obligation

Although the reasoning of the judgment below is somewhat insufficient, the conclusion that the defendant did not gain any benefit is justifiable, and there is no error of misconception of facts or erroneous interpretation of law as to unjust enrichment, such as theory of lawsuit. There is no ground for argument.

3. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yellow-ray (Presiding Justice)