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(영문) 대법원 1968. 12. 6. 선고 67도1112 판결
[공문서위조·공문서위조행사·사기·군용물횡령][집16(3)형,068]
Main Issues

(a) Cases where the defendant does not make any judgment on his/her self-denunciation statement;

(b) The case which held that the composition of the full bench shall not be deemed to violate Article 33 of the Gun Council Act.

(c) Cases holding that the judge before the remanding judgment was not erroneous by participating in the case as a judge after remanding.

Summary of Judgment

A. In the case of a judgment on a defendant who is the Army lieutenant-grade, the presiding judge shall not violate Article 33(1) of the former Military Court Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3993, Dec. 4, 87) in a case where the inquiry division is composed of a judge, a judge, a judge, the Presidential Decree on the Army; the Presidential Decree on the Army; and a certified judicial scrivener.

B. Even though the presiding judge of the original court prior to the remanding judgment participated as the presiding judge of the original court after the remanding, Article 48 of the former Military Court Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3993, Dec. 4, 87) and Article 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act cannot be deemed to be violated.

C. The grounds for reduction and exemption of punishment under Article 368(2) of the former Gun Council Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3993, Dec. 4, 87) mean only the grounds for reduction and exemption, and the grounds for voluntary reduction and exemption, such as the number of persons, are not included herein.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 33(1) of the Military Court Act; Article 368(2) of the Military Court Act; Article 48 of the Military Court Act; Article 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Reference Cases

64Do126 delivered on May 12, 1964

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and one other

Defense Counsel

Attorney Kim Yong-do

original decision

The Army, High Military Court Decision 284 delivered on July 14, 1967, July 22, 1967, Supreme Court Decision 67 High Military Port284 delivered on July 22, 1967

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal (the grounds of supplementary appeal for the receipt of January 16, 1968 are subsequent to the lapse of the period of supplemental appellate brief, and such grounds of appeal are not timely filed) and Defendant 2’s grounds of appeal.

1. Examining the evidence in light of the records at the time of the first instance judgment maintained by the lower court, the lower court cannot be deemed to have erred in violation of the principle of evidence judgment, violation of the rules of evidence, and incomplete deliberation in recognizing each criminal facts of each case against the Defendants. Moreover, it is justifiable that the lower court acknowledged the crime of fraud against the victim's knicke under the Defendant Park Young-young based on the evidence, and that the facts of the unlawful disposition of the Defendant's knicke under the Criminal Procedure Act constitute the crime of embezzlement. According to the lower judgment, the lower court did not render a judgment on the premise that the prosecutor appealed against the first instance judgment as to the Defendant'

2. In this case, the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the theory of lawsuit, and there is no argument in the appeal by the defendant Park Young-young as to this point since the court below's regular confession under the premise that the defendant Park Young-ho prepared and possessed the 50 tons of the pulmonary ammunition in advance at the time and place of the judgment of the court of first instance, for the purpose of exercising a false document (Evidence No. 1) stating that the regular confession of the defendant's 50 tons of the pulmonary ammunition in the future of the 7th post base commander of the 7th post base commander, and it is legitimate that the signature under the name of the chairman of the Cho Young-ho was forged.

3. According to Article 368(2) of the Military Court Act, even if the defendants voluntarily surrendered after the crime of this case, when there is a statement of facts constituting the legal grounds for the reduction or exemption of punishment, the decision may be made clearly, but the reason for the reduction or exemption of punishment referred to in this Article refers to only the necessary reasons for the reduction or exemption of punishment (see Article 52(1) of the Criminal Act). In the case where the reduction or exemption is voluntarily made like the case of the number of persons voluntarily, it shall not include the case (i.e., Supreme Court Decision 64Do126, May 12, 1964). Thus, even if the defendants did not make any judgment on the self-denunciation of the defendants, it shall not be deemed a violation of the Supreme Court precedents, and the fact that the court below's sentencing is too large, and it does not constitute a legitimate ground for appeal as it does not constitute a case as prescribed in Article 432 of the Military Court Act.

4. According to Article 33(1) of the Military Court Act, in principle, a judge, except for a judge who is a certified judicial scrivener, shall be a person of the same rank or higher than the defendant. Thus, in the case of defendant 1, who is the Army Superintendent, the court below can be seen as constituting a judge of the Military Court, the Superintendent of the Military Court, the Kim Jong-soo, the Superintendent of the Military Court, and three certified judicial scriveners. Thus, the court below cannot be deemed as violating Article 33 of the Military Court Act, and there is no ground for appeal by defendant 1 as to this point.

5. Even if the judge of the original court prior to the remand judgment of the previous Supreme Court concerning the instant case was involved in the case after the remanding, it cannot be viewed as a violation of Article 48 of the Military Court Act and Article 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, all arguments on this point are groundless.

All of the arguments are without merit, and each of the appeals is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges pursuant to Article 437 of the Military Court Act.

The presiding judge of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) of the Red Marins (Presiding Justice)

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