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(영문) 대법원 1965. 7. 20. 선고 65도445 판결
[상관살해][집13(2)형,001]
Main Issues

Article 368(2) of the Military Court Act (Article 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act) "Statement of facts constituting grounds for an aggravated reduction or exemption of punishment under the law" and a statement of grounds for voluntary reduction or exemption.

Summary of Judgment

"The facts constituting the grounds for an aggravated reduction or exemption of punishment" under Article 368 (2) (Article 323 (2)) of the former Military Court Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3993, Dec. 4, 87) as the grounds to be specified in conviction refer to the facts which form the grounds for a statutory necessary aggravated reduction or exemption of punishment, and it does not constitute a case where the reduction or exemption of punishment is entrusted to the discretion of the court. Thus, the statement that the defendant voluntarily surrendered is merely the grounds for discretionary reduction under Article 52 of the Criminal Act, and does not constitute a so-called statutory reduction or exemption of punishment.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 368(2) of the Military Court Act

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant

Defense Counsel

Attorney Shin Dong-ho

original decision

The Army, High Military Court Decision 64 High Military Branch Decision 454 delivered on April 16, 1965

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The defense counsel's ground of appeal 1 and the defendant's ground of appeal 3

Article 368(2) of the Military Court Act (amended by Act No. 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act) provides that the grounds to be specified in conviction refer to the facts which form the basis of a necessary reduction or exemption of a punishment under law, and it does not constitute a case where a reduction or exemption of a punishment is entrusted to the court's discretion. Thus, the statement of fact that the defendant voluntarily surrenders to the court in this case is merely a ground for discretionary reduction under Article 52 of the Criminal Act and does not constitute a so-called statutory reduction or exemption of a punishment. Therefore, the argument is groundless.

2. The same ground for appeal shall be two persons.

The judgment of the court of first instance was reversed and self-printed, but only the criminal facts and evidence relations recognized by the court of first instance were cited by the judgment of the court of first instance, and it is clear by the original judgment that the court of first instance directly rendered the judgment with respect to the sentencing. As such, there is no reason to discuss on the premise that the original judgment also accepted the matters on sentencing in the judgment of the court of first instance, and there is no error of inconsistency in the judgment of the court of first instance with the judgment of the court of first instance.

3. We examine the defense counsel's grounds of appeal No. 3

According to the trial records of the court below, when considering the motive and overall circumstances of the crime in the last statement, there is no possibility for the defendant to not commit the crime at the time. Accordingly, in the case of the reasons that this case was destroyed and remanded two times or more by the Supreme Court, the judgment of death is too excessive, and it is stated that the judgment is too excessive, and that the judge's disposition was disturbed." Thus, even if the summary of the defendant and defense counsel's assertion was shown by records, it cannot be viewed that the defendant and defense counsel did not have a so-called possibility of excluding the establishment of the crime. Thus, the purport of the above final statement is nothing more than the assertion that there is no possibility of not guilty due to the absence of expectation, which is the reason for denying the establishment of the crime in law, and it is reasonable to view that this case is a statement about the sentencing, and therefore, it is unreasonable to criticize the judgment of the court below due to the opposing opinion.

4. The same ground for the defense counsel and the latter part of the same ground for the defendant shall be deemed four.

Even if considering the various circumstances that are conditions for sentencing based on the records, it cannot be viewed that the original sentence is too heavy, and this reason cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal by Article 432 of the Military Court Act. Therefore, the argument is groundless.

5. The same grounds for defense counsel and the former part of 1, 2 and 4 of the same grounds for appeal by the defendant shall be examined;

In comparison with the records, the original judgment was examined by comparing the records, and it cannot be viewed that the defendant's principal crime was committed in the so-called "act in the mental disorder" due to the omission of the mental fission or the mental disorder, and there is no violation of law by rejecting the argument that the defendant's principal crime was committed in the so-called "act in the mental disorder". In addition, there is no ground for appeal in accordance with Article 432 of the Appellate Court Act, which states that there is an error in the misunderstanding of facts in the original judgment, and it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal by Article 432 of

6. The same reason for the defense counsel shall be considered five.

Since the court's decision that the court's decision that the above evidence should be returned to the owner, which is a real estate seized in the original judgment, the lawsuit, coal, and ball cartridges shall be returned to the owner, it is justifiable. However, the court's decision that the above evidence should be returned to the victim, the defendant's 11 joint and several, by applying Article 380 (1) of the Military Court Meeting Act, cannot be said to have affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the appeal is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices of the Supreme Court Dog-gu (Presiding Judge) Dog-Jak and Mag-gu Mag-gu

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