A person who has received a farmland distribution shall acquire ownership at the time of the completion of the repayment pursuant to Article 187 of the Civil Act, and even if the registration of ownership transfer has been made in the name of "B" in which the full repayment was made by the entrustment of "A" that received the farmland distribution, the ownership shall be acquired by "A" unless the distribution of farmland to "A" has been revoked.

A person who has received farmland distribution shall acquire ownership even if he/she does not pass through the registration under this Article upon completion of his/her repayment, and even if he/she has completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of B in full of the repayment fees entrusted by the person who has received farmland distribution, the ownership shall be acquired by the person A, unless the farmland distribution to the said person has been revoked.

Article 187 of the Civil Act, Article 16-2 of the Farmland Reform Act

Supreme Court Decision 4294 civilianSang1232 Delivered on May 10, 1962

Plaintiff

Defendant 1

Defendant 2 and nine others

Daegu District Court Decision 69Na286 delivered on May 7, 1970

All appeals by the Plaintiff and Defendant White Nam are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff and defendant Y Nam-nam respectively.

First, we examine the first ground for appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney.

According to the records and the judgment of the court below, the plaintiff's legal representative Kim Tae-tae at the court of first instance that did not delegate his legal representative to Cho Jong-tae at the court of first instance (the purport that the non-party Kim Young-ok delegated his legal representative to Kim Tae-tae at the level of gross area according to the intention of Kim Tae-tae), but at the pleading of the first instance court on December 13, 1968, the plaintiff's legal representative Kim Jong-ok at the hearing on the date of the 18th court of first instance that recognized the delegation of his right of attorney at the court, and stated that he denied the settlement, the plaintiff's legal representative Kim Jong-tae should be deemed to have delegated his legal representative at the court of first instance, and it is not erroneous in the judgment that recognized that there was special power to withdraw the plaintiff's legal representative, and therefore, it does not affect the plaintiff's right to the settlement of farmland, as a matter of course, even if the non-party Kim Young-tae delegated his legal representative against the will of Tae-tae, and thus, it does not affect the plaintiff.

We examine the second ground for appeal.

In this case, the judicial compromise is not null and void as stated in the explanation of the ground of appeal No. 1, and the records and the reasoning of the judgment of the court below (as to the land list No. 16 through No. 19 of the original judgment), the land of this case was farmland distributed to the plaintiff, and the land of this case was the land whose name was restored by the name of the defendant Jeon Young-chul, and the land list No. 16 of this case was the land list No. 17 under the name of defendant Lee Jong-il on May 25, 1967 is the land list No. 18 under the name of the co-defendant of the first instance court on April 28, 1967. Since the land list No. 17 of this case was the land list No. 17 of this case under the name of defendant Kim Jong-ju, and since the plaintiff had no ownership transfer registration on the above land under the name of the above defendant Kim Jong-ju, the above land list No. 10 to 60 of this case's 10 of this case's 10 and the above co-60 of this case.

Next, Defendant 1’s first point of appeal and Defendant 1’s legal representative’s first point of appeal (the court of first instance is not 3.4 persons of February 7, 1969). According to the facts established by the court below, the land in this case was originally 800 square meters before Daegu City (detailed number omitted) and its ownership transfer registration was completed due to the completion of repayment on August 8, 1955. Although the land category was changed to the site and the registration of transfer was completed on August 30, 1963, the non-party’s legal representative’s right was not assigned to Defendant 4 to the non-party (the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s right to cultivate the above land and completed the registration of the non-party’s legal representative of the non-party’s legal representative.

Defendant 1’s ground of appeal No. 2

There is no provision that the distribution is revoked because it committed an act in violation of the Farmland Reform Act prior to the completion of repayment, and there is no provision that the distribution of farmland to the deceased non-party in this case is revoked, and it is clear by the reason of the original adjudication, and there is no room to be subject to the application of Article 9.11 of the Act on Special Measures for the Adjustment of Nolonial Farmland Reform Projects implemented March 13, 1968.

The ground of appeal No. 2 by the defendant's attorney is examined.

The acquisition of ownership by the instant farmland distribution is not a acquisition of a real right to real estate by a juristic act as referred to in Article 10 of the Civil Code, but a acquisition of a real right to real estate pursuant to the provisions of law as referred to in Article 187 of the Civil Code, and a real right right claim is not an object of extinctive prescription, but the lower court confirmed that the deceased non-party was in charge of de facto farming activities to Defendant 4, and therefore, it is reasonable to discuss the issue as there is no room for the application of the legal principle

Defendant 1’s ground of appeal Nos. 3 and 4

Unless the farmland in this case was legitimately distributed to the deceased non-party and there was no procedure for revocation of distribution or new procedure for distribution of farmland against Defendant 3, it cannot be said that there was a revocation of distribution and a new disposition for distribution since the person who received distribution was corrected by mutual agreement between the parties concerned, and the record also does not contain any error of violation of the rules of evidence in the court below's decision.

The defendant's attorney's ground of appeal No. 3 is examined.

Even if Defendant 3 paid the repayment rice for the farmland of this case legally distributed to the deceased non-party, the legal effect of this payment extends to a receiver. Therefore, it is not necessary to find out who is the payer of the repayment, and as to the effect of change of the name of the farmland land list and the repayment ledger, Defendant 1’s ground of appeal Nos. 3 and 4 is explained. Therefore, there is no error in the court below’s decision.

For the above reasons, the appeal of the plaintiff and the defendant Kim Nam is without merit, and it is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Park Jae-dong (Presiding Judge)