Even though the procedure for ownership transfer registration was passed through the farmland certification in the name of the deceased, the above registration cannot be deemed null and void solely on the ground that such certification is not invalid.

Even if the registration of ownership transfer was passed through the farmland certification procedure in the name of the deceased seller, such registration cannot be deemed null and void solely on the ground that such certification is not invalid.

Article 19(2) of the Farmland Reform Act, Article 186 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)

Jeju District Court Decision 69Na4 delivered on June 27, 1969, Jeju District Court Decision 69Na4 delivered on June 27, 1969

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

As to the Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff’s ground of appeal No. 1

In its explanation of its reasoning, the defendant asserted that he cultivated 277 square meters of the land in this case from June 10, 1943 until June 10, 1953, but it is not possible to recognize it, and the fact of cultivation by the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff) at the time of the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act is not recognized. Thus, the argument is nothing more than asserting facts contrary to the judgment of the original court and it cannot be adopted. The argument is groundless.

As to the ground of appeal 2

In light of the evidence adopted by the original judgment, the non-party prepared and delivered the gift contract without the plaintiff's delegation, and in light of the fact that the procedure for dividing the land in question was not based on the plaintiff's intent, the original judgment cannot be interpreted as the conclusion of the original judgment. Therefore, the argument ultimately leads to criticism of the lower court's parental authority over the determination of cooking and fact-finding of evidence and cannot be adopted. It is groundless

As to the ground of appeal No. 3

It is not acceptable by the evidence that the original judgment was based on the facts that the original judgment was based on the original judgment, and it cannot be readily concluded that there was no explanation of the reason as to the possession of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) or each circumstance that led to the occupation of the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) after that, and the argument cannot be adopted merely because it is contrary to the original judgment.

The issue is groundless.

As to the grounds of appeal No. 4, inasmuch as the seller is the deceased, and the government office certification under the name of the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) is not invalid even if the ownership transfer registration is made under the name of the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant), it cannot be deemed invalid merely because the above seller's name becomes the deceased's name, and there is no incomplete deliberation in the original judgment as to this, and according to the facts established by the original judgment, it cannot be acknowledged that the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff) occupied the land by June 10, 1943, and the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) occupied the land from 1961 to 1963, and thus, it cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal to oppose this conclusion, and even if the original judgment was completed in the first short term, even if the judgment was completed domestically, it cannot be viewed as an unnecessary part of the counterclaim's claim after the completion of the counterclaim's original judgment.

The issue is either groundless or groundless.

Therefore, according to Articles 400, 395, and 384 of the Civil Procedure Act, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

The two judges of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) the Red Net Sheet