2012Nu2087 Revocation of a disposition, etc. to refund training fees

A Stock Company

The Head of Seoul Regional Employment and Labor Agency

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2011Guhap37114 decided December 8, 2011

October 11, 2012

October 25, 2012

1. All appeals filed by the plaintiff and the defendant are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.

1. Purport of claim

The Defendant’s disposition to collect training costs of KRW 259,430 against the Plaintiff on August 8, 201, and ② the restriction on payment from August 14, 2008 to August 13, 2009 and the disposition to collect training costs of KRW 450,070,890 accordingly, shall be revoked (the Plaintiff withdrawn from the appellate court the part of the claim to revoke the disposition to additionally collect additionally collect training costs of KRW 259,430 on August 8, 2011 among the instant lawsuit).

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiff;

The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiff shall be revoked. The defendant shall revoke the disposition to recover training costs for the development of vocational skills of 259,430 won against the plaintiff on August 8, 2011.

B. the Defendant;

The part of the judgment of the first instance against the defendant shall be revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the above revocation shall be dismissed.

1. Details of the disposition;

This Court's explanation is identical to the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance except for the following reasons. Thus, this Court's explanation is accepted in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Parts of pented parts)

○ The second 7th page " January 7, 2008" is called " June 12, 2008".

Pursuant to Article 24 of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 9316, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter the same shall apply), "as soon as possible" in paragraph 11 of the second paragraph shall be added.

01.(2)-(3)-(2)-(3)-(4)-(2)-(2)-(3)-(4)-(2)-(3)-(4)-(2)-

(2) On August 8, 2011, the Defendant rendered a disposition as indicated below against the Plaintiff on the ground that “A” and “A” were “an illegal means during the period of departure from Korea” (the Defendant issued a corrective order against the Plaintiff regarding the instant curriculum, but this does not conflict with the Plaintiff, excluding this in the table below).

A person shall be appointed.

2. Whether the dispositions Nos. 1 and 3 among the dispositions in the instant case are legitimate

(a) Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

This Court's reasoning is as follows: (a) in addition to the "Related Acts and subordinate statutes of this judgment" in the "Related Acts and subordinate statutes of the court of first instance"; (b) in the part of 2.c. (3) (the 11-3) among the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance; (c) in the judgment of the court of first instance, the plaintiff's new argument and the judgment of the defendant's argument are the same as the corresponding part of the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance (the 5th half to the 10th end) except for the addition as stated in paragraph (c).

B. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

1) The plaintiff's assertion

The Defendant recognized that the Plaintiff was unjustly paid training costs on the ground that B and C did not meet the requirement of completion of the attendance rate of 80%, but the completion requirement of meeting the attendance rate of 80% is without legal basis. Thus, the first and third dispositions based on this premise are unlawful.

2) Determination

According to Article 27 of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 41 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22269, Jul. 12, 2010), the Minister of Labor may subsidize expenses incurred in the training. According to Article 24 (3) of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers, Article 22 (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, Article 8 (1) 4 and Article 22 (1) 4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers, and Article 41 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22269, Jul. 12, 2010); Article 24 (1) 4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers; Article 22 (1) 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers; Article 40 of the former Regulations on the Requirements for Vocation and Training.

In light of this, the defendant's completion standard that the defendant's attendance rate is more than 80% is the requirement for the payment of training expenses under the above provision and there is a legal basis. Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion to this different purport is without merit.

B. Judgment on the defendant's argument

1) The defendant's assertion

In light of the fact that it is difficult for the Defendant to detect illegal receipt of workplace skill development training costs subsidies by employers, it is necessary to establish punitive sanctions such as the Enforcement Decree of the instant case in order to restrain an employer’s illegal receipt of and demand for workplace skill development training costs, the instant enforcement decree provisions cannot be deemed null and void because they violate the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution.

2) Determination

In full view of the evidence evidence Nos. 14 and 15 and the purport of the entire argument, the business owner’s workplace subject to subsidies for workplace skill development training costs in 2010 has reached 122,309, and the total amount of subsidies for workplace skill development training costs paid in 2011 can be recognized as constituting approximately KRW 424.657 million. In light of the above, it is presumed that it is not practically easy to detect illegal receipt of subsidies. However, considering the above, considering the various circumstances cited in the first instance judgment (the last sentence of the first instance judgment No. 8th to the last sentence of the first instance judgment), the provision of this case is deemed null and void because it violates the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution. Thus, the defendant’s argument cannot be accepted.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, since the disposition No. 3 of this case is unlawful, the plaintiff's claim seeking its revocation is justified, and the plaintiff's claim seeking its revocation shall be dismissed as it is without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, and the appeal of the plaintiff and the defendant is dismissed as all of the grounds for appeal.

The assistant judge of the presiding judge;

Judges Gangseo-gu

Judges Cho Young-soo

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.