[1] The purpose of Articles 21 and 127(3) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and the scope of "confidential learned in the course of performing duties" under the above provisions

[2] The meaning of “disclosure” and “processing” under Articles 23(2) and 11 of the former Act on the Protection of Personal Information of Public Institutions that provide for punishment for unlawful acts, such as divulgence of personal information, unauthorized processing, provision of personal information for use by others

[1] Articles 21 and 127(3) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act / [2] Article 2 subparag. 3 (see current Article 2 subparag. 2 of the Personal Information Protection Act) of the former Act on the Protection of Personal Information by Public Institutions (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Personal Information Protection Act (Act No. 10465, Mar. 29, 201); Article 11 (see current Article 59 subparag. 2), and Article 23(2) (see current Article 71 subparag. 5 of the Personal Information Protection Act); Article 3 subparag. 2 (see current deleted) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Personal Information Protection Act (repealed by Article 2 of Addenda to the Enforcement Decree of the Personal Information Protection Act (Act No. 23169, Sep. 29, 201

Defendant 1 and four others

Defendant 1 and Prosecutor

Ulsan District Court Decision 2012No804 decided October 11, 2013

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal

(1) As to the violation of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

Article 21 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act provides, “No person who is or was an officer or employee of the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service shall divulge any secret which comes to his knowledge in the course of performing his duties, and Article 127(3) of the same Act provides that a person who discloses any secret in violation of the above provision shall be punished. The purpose is to protect the function of the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service, which is threatened with the divulgence of secret. As such, “confidentially known in the course of performing duties” is to protect the function of the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service, which is in fact worth protecting it as a secret in order to achieve the purpose of the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service. The mere fact that the materials held by the Corporation are disclosed outside in an improper manner without following the procedures prescribed by the Acts

Examining the record in accordance with the above legal principles, materials such as name, resident registration number, date and time of accident, details of disease, treatment period, medical care institution, disability grade, date and time of establishment of an industrial accident, insurance benefit payment, insurance benefit payment, date and time of establishment of an industrial accident, and matters related to industrial accident insurance-related medical institutions, such as the insurance benefit ledger provided by the defendants to the non-indicted labor law firm, additional injury application processing, detailed inquiry into the wage ledger, treatment of the insurance relationship, details of each workplace accident, etc. are contents of the insurance benefit ledger provided by the defendants to the non-indicted labor law firm, and it is difficult to see that such contents are leaked to the function of the State or the Korea Labor Welfare Corporation, such as the imposition and collection of industrial accident insurance premiums, the decision and payment of industrial accident insurance benefits, and the medical care and rehabilitation projects for workers suffering from occupational accidents, etc. In order to achieve the purpose of the Korea Labor Welfare Corporation.

For the same reason, the lower court was justifiable to have determined that the foregoing materials cannot be deemed as constituting “confidentials learned in the course of performing duties” as prescribed by the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. In so doing, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the concept of occupational

(2) As to the violation of the former Act on the Protection of Personal Information by Public Institutions (amended by Act No. 10465, Mar. 29, 201; hereinafter “former Act”)

Article 23(2) and Article 11 of the former Personal Information Protection Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 23169, Sept. 29, 201) provides that the former Personal Information Protection Act shall punish an act of using personal information for unjust purposes, such as divulging, processing without authority, or providing it to others (see Articles 23(2) and 11 of the same Act). “Leakage” refers to all acts of informing a person who has no knowledge thereof, and according to Article 2 subparag. 3 of the former Personal Information Protection Act and Article 3 subparag. 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Personal Information Protection Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 23169, Sept. 29, 201), “management of personal information,” which is punished by the former Personal Information Protection Act, refers to the act of inputting, storing, editing, searching, deleting, or printing information using a device with functions of transmitting or receiving information, or an agent who performs affairs related to one’s own information, does not constitute a “person” who is the other party to the provision of personal information.

Examining the records in accordance with the above legal principles, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance which acquitted the Defendants of each of the facts charged on the ground that the Defendants’ act of providing each of the data listed in the annexed list 2 of the judgment of the court of first instance and the remaining Defendants’ act of providing each of the data in its judgment against the non-indicted labor law firm, which was duly delegated by the owners of personal information included in each of the data, does not constitute a case of using personal information for unjust purposes. In so doing, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the use of personal information under

2. As to Defendant 1’s ground of appeal

Examining the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court and the first instance court, it is justifiable for the lower court to have maintained the first instance judgment, citing the reasons indicated in its reasoning, which sentenced Defendant 1 to the act of providing each data listed in attached Table 1 of the crime committed against the former Personal Information Protection Act. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the use or intent of personal information under the former Personal Information Protection Act, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice)