Main Issues
[1] The meaning of "business secrets of corporations, etc." under Article 9 (1) 7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act
[2] The method of determining whether a “justifiable profit” exists to refuse disclosure under Article 9(1)7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act
[3] The case holding that the Korean Broadcasting System's "all of the execution documents by case of occasional execution expenses" does not constitute information subject to non-disclosure under Article 9 (1) 7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act
[4] The case holding that in a lawsuit seeking revocation of the decision for non-disclosure of information, the disposition agency cannot add the grounds that the information, which is the original disposition, constitutes Article 9 (1) 7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act and constitutes Article 9 (1) 1 of the same Act
[Reference Provisions]
[1] Article 9(1)7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act / [2] Article 9(1)7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act / [3] Article 9(1)7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act / [4] Article 9(1)1 and 7 of the Official Information Disclosure Act
Reference Cases
[4] Supreme Court Decision 2004Du12629 Delivered on January 13, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee
Plaintiff
Defendant-Appellant
Korean Broadcasting System (Attorney Kim Young-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 2006Nu14188 delivered on December 21, 2006
Text
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1
In light of the purpose, contents, and purport of the Official Information Disclosure Act (hereinafter “Information Disclosure Act”), a request for information disclosure cannot be deemed to constitute an abuse of rights unless there exist special circumstances such as seeking information disclosure for the purpose of inducing the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2003Du1370, Sept. 23, 2004; 2004Du2783, Aug. 24, 2006).
In the same purport, the judgment of the court below that even if the plaintiff claimed for the disclosure of the information of this case as the attorney of the non-party who was a full-time employee of the defendant, such circumstance alone does not constitute abuse of rights is justified, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to abuse of rights as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3
The purpose of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (hereinafter “Unfair Competition Prevention Act”) is to maintain sound trade order by preventing unfair competition, such as illegally using another person’s trademark, trade name, etc., and by preventing infringement of another person’s trade secrets. In addition, Article 2 Subparag. 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act provides for the prohibition and prevention of infringement as a civil remedy against infringement of trade secrets, the right to claim damages, and the right to claim for recovery of credit, etc., and the provision on criminal punishment. Article 2 Subparag. 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act provides that “the term “trade secrets,” which are subject to the regulation, have independent economic value without public knowledge, and refers to production method, sale method,
Meanwhile, Article 9(1)7 of the Information Disclosure Act provides for “Information subject to non-disclosure where disclosure is deemed likely to seriously undermine legitimate interests of corporations, etc., in order to protect legitimate interests by guaranteeing citizens’ right to know and securing citizens’ participation in state affairs and transparency in state affairs, by prescribing matters necessary for the citizen’s request for disclosure of information held and managed by public institutions and the duty of disclosure of information by public institutions.”
Considering the legislative purpose and discipline of both Acts and other circumstances, it is reasonable to interpret the "trade secret of a corporation, etc." under Article 9 (1) 7 of the Information Disclosure Act as "trade secret" under Article 2 (2) of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act and "all information on business activities that are favorable to others not being known to others" or "any confidential information on business activities" under Article 9 (1) 2 of the Information Disclosure Act.
However, Article 9 (1) 7 of the Information Disclosure Act provides that the disclosure of information shall be decided depending on whether there is a legitimate interest to refuse disclosure, even though "matters concerning management and trade secrets of corporations, etc." should be interpreted. Whether there is a legitimate interest shall be strictly interpreted in light of the legislative intent of the Information Disclosure Act, as well as the strict interpretation in light of the legislative intent of the Information Disclosure Act, as well as the more passive interpretation of other corporations, etc. with high need for surveillance by the public and high need for surveillance by the public.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the information of this case constitutes information subject to non-disclosure under Article 9 (1) 7 of the Information Disclosure Act, on the premise that "the management and trade secrets of corporations, etc.", which are information subject to non-disclosure under Article 9 (1) 7 of the Information Disclosure Act, refers to "the methods of production, sales methods, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities, which are not generally known and has independent economic value, and are maintained and managed as confidential by considerable effort," and on the premise that the information of this case is "the methods of production, sales methods, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities," and it does not have any grounds to believe that the information of this case constitutes the defendant's business tangible or intangible confidential information or is considerably infringed upon the defendant's legitimate interest if disclosed, on the contrary to the defendant's assertion, on the other hand, it is a public broadcasting company operated by the citizens who possess television TV sets, etc., which prevents arbitrary budget execution and guarantee surveillance of citizens, thereby ensuring the law and efficiency of its execution.
In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below's interpretation of "business secrets of corporations, etc." under Article 9 (1) 7 of the Information Disclosure Act to the same meaning as "business secrets" under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act cannot be deemed reasonable, and the information of this case constitutes "business secrets" under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. However, there is room to view that the information of this case constitutes "business secrets of the defendant, etc.," but it is difficult to recognize that the disclosure of the information of this case is likely to seriously harm the defendant's legitimate interests. Thus, the court below's rejection of the
3. As to the fourth ground for appeal
Article 20(2) of the Information Disclosure Act provides that "the presiding judge may, if deemed necessary, peruse and examine the information submitted without having the parties involved in the request for disclosure, in a closed manner." A fact-finding court shall, if deemed necessary in light of the nature of the relevant information, the relationship between evidence of the relevant case, etc., have the authority to receive information on the request for disclosure, and peruse and examine it in a closed manner pursuant to the above provision. However, barring any special circumstance, the fact-finding court shall not be deemed to have the same obligation. The first ground for
4. As to the fifth ground for appeal
In an appeal litigation seeking the revocation of an administrative disposition, a disposition agency may add or modify other reasons only to the extent that the original reason and basic factual relations are recognized to be identical, and the existence of basic factual relations in this context shall be determined based on whether the grounds for disposition are identical in basic social facts in terms of the same fact before legally assessed the grounds for disposition. The reason for interpreting that it is not allowed to claim grounds for disposition on the grounds that are different from the basic factual relations are not recognized is to realize the substantial rule of law and protect the other party's trust in the administrative disposition by guaranteeing the other party's right to defense of the administrative disposition. The purport of the additional or modified grounds are to realize the substantial rule of law and protect the other party's trust in the administrative disposition by guaranteeing the other party's right to defense of the administrative disposition. The additional or modified grounds are not clearly stated in the original disposition, but have already existed at the time of the disposition, and the other party has already been aware of such fact (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du12629, Jan. 13,
Article 9(1)1 of the Information Disclosure Act provides information that is classified as confidential or non-disclosure information pursuant to other Acts or orders delegated by other Acts, and subparagraph 7 of Article 7 provides information that is related to the management and trade secrets of corporations, organizations, or individuals and that, if disclosed, may seriously undermine the legitimate interests of the corporations, etc. as information subject to non-disclosure. The legislative intent of Article 9(1)1 of the Information Disclosure Act differs from the fact that is the requirement of non-disclosure. The legislative intent of Article 9(1)1 of the Information Disclosure Act is to protect the legitimate interests of the corporations, etc. by respecting the confidentiality or non-disclosure. The legislative intent of Article 9(1)1 of the Information Disclosure Act is to prevent the divulgence of trade secrets of the corporations, etc., and protect legitimate interests by preventing the leakage of trade secrets of the corporations, etc., so it is not only the basis and purpose of the first disposition, but also the content, scope, and requirements different from those of the first disposition after the fact that the defendant asserts that there exists a new ground under Article 9(1)17 of the Information Disclosure Act.
In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the information of this case, which is the initial disposition ground of this case, constitutes information subject to non-disclosure under Article 9(1)7 of the Information Disclosure Act, and that the information of this case, which is the additional disposition ground, constitutes information subject to non-disclosure under Article 9(1)1 of the Information Disclosure Act, is identical in light of the basic point of view, since the social facts that form the basis of such disposition, are not identical. Thus, the addition of the disposition
5. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Kim Young-ran (Presiding Justice)