Where a disaster that occurred while commuting to or from work becomes an occupational accident under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act.

Article 5 subparag. 1 and Article 37(1)1(c) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Du12572 Decided September 28, 2007 (Gong2007Ha, 1685) Supreme Court Decision 2010Du184 Decided April 29, 2010 (Gong2010Sang, 1038)

Plaintiff (Attorney Lee Young-chul, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Seoul High Court Decision 2012Nu37489 decided June 21, 2013

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Unless the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act has a special provision that recognizes an accident that occurred while commuting to and from work by ordinary means and route, it cannot be deemed that a worker suffers from an occupational accident. Therefore, in cases where a worker uses the means of transportation provided by the employer or allows the worker to use a similar means of transportation to and from work in order to become an occupational accident, it cannot be deemed that the worker has been assigned to and from work, but it cannot be deemed that there is no room for choosing an accident due to the worker to commute to and from work in light of ordinary means and route, or the characteristics of work or workplace, it cannot be deemed that the worker actually reserved to commute to and from work, and it cannot be deemed that the worker has a close relation to commuting to and from work in accordance with the Supreme Court en banc Decision 201Du2789 decided May 29, 202.

In full view of the circumstances as indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the death of Nonparty 1 was not an occupational accident on the ground that it is difficult to view the instant accident as an accident that occurred while the Plaintiff’s husband provided the instant vehicle to Nonparty 1, and that it is difficult to view it as an accident that occurred while Nonparty 1 was using a means of transportation or a means of transportation that can be viewed as having provided by the employer to commute to and from work, on the ground that it cannot be deemed that the instant accident was an accident.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below are just, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Shin (Presiding Justice)