1. The Plaintiff, among the real estate listed in the attached list

(a) As to each of the shares of Defendant A, E, and G:

B. Defendant D shall be 3/8.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. On June 27, 1980, Defendant A, Defendant E, Defendant G, Nonparty K, and the network L completed the registration of ownership transfer based on the inheritance on October 1, 1966 as to each of 1/8 shares of the land listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant land”). Defendant D completed the registration of ownership transfer based on the inheritance on October 1, 1966 as to 3/8 shares of the instant land on the same day.

B. The deceased L was dead on October 5, 1983, and the property was inherited by Defendant C, Defendant I, the spouse of the deceased, and Defendant I and J inherited each of 1/3 shares.

C. On September 26, 2002, Defendant D completed the registration of ownership transfer based on the donation made on September 24, 2002 with respect to 1/8 shares owned by K out of the instant land.

(hereinafter referred to as “instant share”) d.

The instant land was used as the track site of the NV as of September 23, 1935, which was completed on August 6, 1937. Since the Sea from the Sea of August 15, 1945, the land was occupied and used as the railway site since the Plaintiff’s management succeeded to the possession. At present, the Plaintiff was used as the subway site near the subway station of the subway No. 4.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, deemed confessions, entries in Gap evidence 1 to 4, purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination

A. The Plaintiff filed a claim for the registration of ownership transfer against Defendant D on June 27, 200 for the completion of the prescription period for the acquisition of possession of the instant shares.

According to the above facts of recognition, Defendant D acquired the instant shares as a donation from Nonparty K on September 24, 2002.

This constitutes a case where the Plaintiff’s change in the owner during the period of occupation of the instant land, and thus, the Plaintiff cannot arbitrarily choose the starting point for acquisition by prescription for possession in relation to the said share.

(See Supreme Court Decision 94Da39987 delivered on May 23, 1995). Ultimately, Defendant D’s possession of the Plaintiff’s instant land was completed prior to the acquisition of the instant equity interest. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s acquisition by prescription after the completion of acquisition by prescription.