Seocho 2014west 1225 (No. 28, 2015)

The interest on ship advance refund shall be deemed as damages and the order of appropriation for subrogated payment shall be designated as principal and interest pursuant to the agreement and recovered.

The ship advance refund guarantee is reasonable and collected as interest income due to the lack of the plaintiff's proof that the ship advance refund guarantee is scheduled as damages between the parties and that it does not constitute damages exceeding the payment itself.

Article 93 of the Corporate Tax Act

2015Guhap77561 Corporate tax, detailed education, and claim for revocation of disposition

○○○ et al.

The director of the tax office

December 6, 2016

February 3, 2017

1. Of the attached Table 1’s details of taxation disposition that the Defendant issued to the Plaintiffs, the respective “political tax amount” portion of the corporate tax indicated in the “tax amount” column as of October 24, 201, the business year 2011, December 30, 2014, and each business year 2012, November 18, 2014, as of October 24, 2014, as well as each of the “tax amount” column as of October 24, 2013, shall be revoked.

2. The plaintiff ○○○ corporation's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. Of the litigation costs, 1/3 of the part arising between the Plaintiff, ○○○ and the Defendant is borne by the Defendant, and the remainder is borne by the Plaintiff, ○○○○, respectively, and the part arising between the Plaintiff, ○○ and the Defendant is borne by the Defendant.

Cheong-gu Office

Disposition Nos. 1 and the Defendant’s disposition No. 240, Oct. 24, 2013, 2013, the part of the disposition No. 1, which exceeds the amount indicated in the column of each “political tax amount” among the disposition No. 1, which is stated in the list of “tax disposition No. 1,” written in the list

1. Details of the disposition;

A. Status of the plaintiffs

Around October 2, 1943, Plaintiff ○○○○○○, Inc. (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) established and operated banking business, and Plaintiff ○○○○, Inc. (hereinafter “Plaintiff ○○○”) established around September 1, 2001 and performed the duties of controlling, managing, managing, and managing ○○○, Inc. and providing financial support to subsidiaries.

B. Regarding advance refund guarantee

1) AA shipbuilding corporation, BB shipbuilding corporation, CCC shipbuilding corporation, DD shipbuilding corporation, EE shipbuilding corporation (hereinafter referred to as “stock company” in their respective names, and collectively referred to as “domestic shipbuilding companies”) was awarded a contract for the construction of vessels by FF, GG, H, II, Jl, Jl, K, K, and LL (hereinafter referred to as “foreign vessel owners”) which is a foreign corporation (hereinafter referred to as “instant shipbuilding contract”).

2) According to each shipbuilding contract of this case, a foreign vessel owner shall first pay part of the cost of the vessel to the domestic shipbuilding owner before the completion of the construction of the vessel, and where each shipbuilding contract of this case is terminated due to reasons such as breach of contract or cancellation, the domestic shipbuilding owner shall pay to the foreign vessel owner the cost of the vessel already received (hereinafter “advance”) and the interest calculated by applying a certain interest rate thereto.

3) The Plaintiff guaranteed to foreign vessel owners the obligation to pay advance and interest for domestic vessel owners (hereinafter “instant refund guarantee contract”) with the fact that, in the event that a domestic shipbuilding company violated the matters stipulated in the instant shipbuilding contract, such as failure to deliver the vessel on the fixed date, the Plaintiff paid the advance received by the domestic shipbuilding company and the additional dues (hereinafter “additional dues on refund”) equivalent to the amount calculated by applying a certain rate from the date of refund to the date of refund of advance payment.

4) In the year 2009 to 2011, the Plaintiff received a request for refund of advance payment, etc. from the foreign vessel owners in accordance with the refund guarantee contract of this case, and paid advance payment (hereinafter referred to as “the instant advance payment”) and additional dues for the refund (hereinafter referred to as “additional dues for refund of this case”) to the foreign vessel owners as shown in the attached Table 2 “the details of refund, such as advance payment.”

5) The Defendant: (a) on October 24, 2013, on the ground that the Plaintiff did not withhold the said advance payment from the domestic source income of foreign corporations as other income under Article 93 Subparag. 11 (b) of the former Corporate Tax Act (amended by Act No. 10423, Dec. 30, 2010; hereinafter “former Corporate Tax Act”); and (b) on March 2009 through October 201, the Defendant issued a disposition of collecting the corporate tax as indicated in the “the instant tax assessment amount” column (hereinafter “instant first disposition”).

(c) Credit guarantee subrogation;

1) The Plaintiff entered into a credit guarantee agreement with guarantee organizations, such as the Credit Guarantee Fund and the Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “instant guarantee organization”) to guarantee the payment of debts for individual loans (hereinafter referred to as the “credit guarantee agreement of this case”) in preparation for the debtor’s failure to repay principal and interest in the course of performing the loan.

2) The Plaintiff received 43,368,10,111 won (hereinafter “the amount of subrogated payment”) from the instant guarantee institution in accordance with the credit guarantee contract in 2008 to 2012, and accounts as being appropriated first for principal in accordance with the proviso of Article 13(1) of the Basic Terms and Conditions of Credit Transactions (hereinafter “the Terms and Conditions of this case”) as follows.

Article 13 Designation of Appropriations for Repayment, etc. by Banks

(1) Where a debtor makes the repayment, or a bank makes an offset or substitute refund under Article 10, if the whole amount of the debtor's obligation is insufficient to discharge, it shall be appropriated in the order of expenses, interest, and principal. However, the Bank may change the order of appropriation to the extent no less favorable to the debtor.

3) On the ground that there is no special agreement on appropriation for repayment between the Plaintiff and the instant guarantee institution, the Defendant: (a) deemed that the amount of subrogated payment of this case should be first appropriated for interest on the ground of Article 56 of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act or Article 479 of the Civil Act; (b) calculated the amount of subrogated payment of this case as interest income; (c) on October 24, 2013, the Plaintiffs (the business year 2008, 2009, the Plaintiff holding company due to the consolidated tax return system from October 24, 2010), and attached Form 3, as stated in the “amount of taxation” in the “amount of taxation disposition” column, imposed corporate tax and education tax for 2008 to 2012 (hereinafter “previous disposition”).

4) On July 28, 2015, the Tax Tribunal rendered a decision on July 28, 2015 that the amount of subrogated payment received by the instant guarantee agency was to be appropriated in the order of interest and principal, and that the amount of increase in the remaining bonds after subrogation was made, which was incurred in the business year to which the date of bad debt depreciation of the relevant bonds belongs, shall be corrected by

5) After that, following the Defendant’s increase or decrease in the imposition of corporate tax during the previous disposition, the amount of corporate tax for the business year 2008 was adjusted to KRW 558,105,418, the amount of corporate tax for the business year 2010,558,070,358, and the amount of corporate tax for the business year 2012 was adjusted to KRW 641,118,68,672, respectively (hereinafter referred to as “instant second disposition”).

(e) Addition, etc. of grounds for disposition;

1) In relation to the first disposition of this case, the Defendant added the grounds for disposition to the effect that the instant additional refund constitutes a foreign corporation’s domestic source income as “other income under Article 93 subparag. 11 (j) of the former Corporate Tax Act or Article 93 subparag. 10 (j) of the Corporate Tax Act, “interest income under Article 93 subparag. 1 (a) of the former Corporate Tax Act, or under Article 93 subparag. 1 (a) of the Corporate Tax Act, “other income under Article 93 subparag. 11 (a) of the former Corporate Tax Act, or under Article 9

2) In relation to the second disposition of this case, the defendant asserted that the guarantee agency of this case should have interest income in proportion to the above interest amount since it would be appropriated to the plaintiff according to the specific principal and interest amount at the time of the payment of the subrogated payment of this case.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 5 (including branch numbers for those with additional numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 9, 16, and 18, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Related statutes;

Attached Table 4 shall be as stated in the relevant statutes.

3. Whether the first disposition in this case is lawful

(1) Notwithstanding the main sentence of Article 98 (1) 3, the main sentence of Article 93 subparagraph 1 (a) and items (b) and (j) of the former Corporate Tax Act, and Article 132 (10) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 2257 of Dec. 30, 2010), disposal of the foreign corporation as income under Article 98 (1) 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act which applies to the disposal of withholding taxes for 209 through 2010 shall be deemed to belong to the foreign corporation: (1) Payment of insurance money, compensation or damages (hereinafter referred to as "domestic source income") received from the foreign corporation under the name of its domestic corporation for the business year under Article 93 subparagraph 11 (a) and (b) of the former Corporate Tax Act or other domestic place of business under the conditions that the tax office provides personal services or assets located in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as "domestic place of business under Article 93 (116 (j) of the former Corporate Tax Act);

(b) Whether it falls under domestic source income;

The refund of this case should be deemed as the damages paid in relation to the "ship in violation of the shipbuilding contract" as seen below. Thus, even if the advance payment of this case constitutes a tangible asset as the "property under construction" of the foreign vessel owners, it cannot be deemed as the damages paid in relation to the advance payment of this case.

Therefore, the instant additional refund does not constitute a foreign corporation’s domestic source income under Article 93 subparag. 11 (a) of the former Corporate Tax Act or Article 93 subparag. 10 (a) of the Corporate Tax Act.

(c) Whether it falls under domestic source income;

Foreign vessel owners are not carrying on any business in Korea, and there is no evidence to deem that foreign vessel owners provided human services to domestic vessel owners or other persons related to shipbuilding in Korea. Moreover, a vessel under construction by a domestic shipbuilding company is owned by a foreign vessel owner, and thus cannot be deemed as the assets of a foreign vessel owner. Thus, the instant additional payment on refund cannot be deemed as an "economic benefits provided in relation to assets in Korea," and the instant additional payment on refund cannot be deemed as income similar to the instant additional payment on refund.

Therefore, it is difficult to view that the instant additional payment on refund constitutes a foreign corporation’s domestic source income under Article 93 subparag. 11 (j) of the former Corporate Tax Act or Article 93 subparag. 10 (j) of

(d) Whether it falls under domestic source income;

Article 16 (1) of the former Income Tax Act citing subparagraph 1 (a) of Article 93 of the former Corporate Tax Act or subparagraph 1 (a) of Article 93 of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9897 of Dec. 31, 2009) or Article 16 (1) of the Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9897 of Dec. 31, 2009) lists each type corresponding to interest income under subparagraphs 1 through 12 (or 11) and states that "in the nature of consideration for use of money as income under subparagraph 13 (or subparagraphs 1 through 12 (or 11)" includes "in the nature of consideration for use of money as income under subparagraph 12 (a) of Article 93 of the former Corporate Tax Act" as well as subparagraph 1 (a) of Article 93 of the former Income Tax Act. In order to fall under such interest income, it must be similar

The advance payment of this case is that foreign vessel owners paid part of the ship price in advance, taking into account the expenses incurred in building a ship, and the additional payment of this case is merely compensation following the cancellation of each shipbuilding contract of this case. Therefore, the additional payment of this case does not premised on a transaction seeking profits from operating money, such as a lending of money. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the advance payment of this case constitutes a domestic source income of foreign corporations under Article 93 subparagraph 1 (a) of the former Corporate Tax Act or Article 93 subparagraph 1 (a)

(e) Whether it falls under domestic source income

1) In a property right contract, if a penalty or indemnity received due to breach or termination of a contract is merely a compensatory amount for damages equivalent to the original payment or actual property damages, it cannot be deemed that it constitutes a new income or other income. However, if a penalty or indemnity has been paid in excess of this, it shall be subject to income tax (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Du3942, Apr. 9, 2004; 2008Hun-Ba79, Feb. 25, 2010). Such legal principle equally applies to Article 21(1)10 of the former Income Tax Act (Amended by Act No. 9897, Dec. 31, 2009) or Article 21(1)10 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (Amended by Act No. 12852, Dec. 23, 2014; Presidential Decree No. 20130, Apr. 13, 2014).

(ii) the facts of recognition

A) The shipbuilding contract entered into between AA and EE provides for the refund of advance payment under Paragraph 5, and the amount paid by the buyer to the shipbuilding company before the ship delivery is an advance payment to the shipbuilding company. If the buyer rejects the ship in accordance with the terms and conditions of this contract, or the buyer terminates, cancels, or withdraws the contract as permitted under the terms and conditions of this contract, the shipbuilding company shall refund the total amount received in advance from the buyer to the buyer within 30 days after the rejection of the relevant interest, and the refund interest rate shall be calculated at 7% per annum from the date when the shipbuilding received the advance payment to the date when the refund was made by the telegraph to the date when the refund was made by telegraph, and both parties understand that the payment of interest is scheduled to pay damages due to the cancellation of this contract and is not a compensation.

B) The shipbuilding contract entered into between BB and F is an advance payment for the amount that the buyer has paid before the ship delivery to the shipbuilding company. In the event that the ship is refused by the buyer, or the buyer cancels or withdraws under the terms and conditions of this contract, including the return of the shipbuilding company, this contract shall be terminated, cancelled, or withdrawn under the terms and conditions of this contract: .. The shipbuilding company shall refund the advance payment received before the delivery to the buyer; .. the refund interest rate shall be calculated on a yearly basis from the date when the shipbuilding company received the advance payment to the date when the refund was refunded to the buyer; .. .. . . . . the Parties shall exempt both parties from all their obligations, responsibilities, etc. under the contract where the shipbuilding company refunds the buyer at a rate of 7% per annum from the date when the shipbuilding company received the advance payment to the date when the refund was made to the buyer. . . . .” The Parties agree to apply this contract and each provision to English law

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, the evidence as seen earlier, the entry of evidence Nos. 8, 9, 29, 31, and the purport of the whole pleadings

3) The legal nature of the instant additional dues on refund

In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the instant additional payment on refund constitutes damages paid due to the cancellation of a contract on property rights, in addition to the purport of the entire arguments as seen earlier.

① The governing law on the payment of the advance payment and the refund of advance payment due to the cancellation of each shipbuilding contract of this case is English law (see the main text of Article 25(1) and the proviso of Article 31 of the International Judicial Law). Under a shipbuilding contract entered into between AA and EE, the legal nature of the additional payment on the refund of this case is not "responding to restore the legal nature of the ship to its original state under English law," but "liquated laateds" which mean an estimate to compensate for damages. According to the shipbuilding contract entered into between BB and F, if advance payment and interest are refunded, a foreign vessel owner is fully exempted from both parties' obligations and responsibilities. Thus, the foreign vessel owner is not entitled to claim additional damages against the domestic vessel owner in receipt of advance payment and additional payment on the refund of this case. If it is deemed that the legal nature of the additional payment on the refund of this case is nothing more than the restoration of the legal nature of the additional payment on the refund of this case.

(3) In light of the nature of the shipbuilding agreement in which the shipbuilding period is required for a long period and both a shipbuilding company and a shipowner are obliged to pay the higher cost, there is a need to set up compensation for damages in order to ensure predictability in future disputes that may arise in the shipbuilding agreement and to resolve difficulties in proof.

④ The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that the instant refund guarantee contract is independent of the instant shipbuilding contract, separate from the instant shipbuilding contract. The Plaintiff is obligated to pay the instant advance payment and additional dues to a foreign vessel owner upon the receipt of a request from a foreign vessel owner due to the fulfillment of the requirements set forth in the said guarantee contract, and the Plaintiff is not directly related to the shipbuilding contract and cannot invoke domestic shipbuilding’s defense. Thus, the instant additional dues cannot be deemed as a penalty or damages. However, according to the terms of the instant shipbuilding contract and the refund guarantee contract, the Plaintiff is liable to pay advance payment and additional dues on the premise of the violation of the obligations set forth in the instant shipbuilding contract. However, as the Plaintiff concluded a guarantee contract to recognize the violation of the obligations of the domestic shipbuilding owner upon the fulfillment of certain requirements set forth in the said guarantee contract, it is only impossible to invoke the domestic shipbuilding’s defense as a result.

4) As to whether the instant refund constitutes “money received in excess of the damages on the payment itself, which is the terms and conditions of the previous contract”

In light of the following circumstances revealed in light of the purport of the entire arguments as seen earlier, it is insufficient to recognize that foreign vessel owners suffered losses from the payment itself that is the original contract terms of the shipbuilding agreement of this case. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the additional payment on refund of this case constitutes money paid in excess of the above damages.

① As seen earlier, the instant additional refund was scheduled to compensate for damages that may be incurred to a foreign vessel owner due to the domestic shipbuilding owner’s failure to perform the instant contract. As such, the foreign vessel owner is not required to prove that the domestic vessel owner actually suffered damages due to the domestic vessel owner’s failure to perform the instant refund contract in addition to the occurrence of the requirements stipulated in the instant refund guarantee contract in order to receive the additional refund payment, and that the damages incurred. The Plaintiff paid the additional refund without ascertaining the damages incurred to a foreign vessel owner.

② Foreign vessel owners are not obliged to submit data to know the payment itself under the instant shipbuilding contract, i.e., the damage incurred from the failure to build or deliver a vessel, and the amount of the damage.

③ Even if foreign vessel owners shared financial costs to pay the instant advance payment, such financial costs cannot be deemed as included in the cost of the instant shipbuilding agreement, apart from the amount corresponding to the necessary cost. The Plaintiff asserted that foreign vessel owners paid other costs in the course of concluding and implementing the shipbuilding agreement, but there is no assertion or proof as to the specific cost expenditure.

5) Therefore, the instant additional payment on refund constitutes a foreign corporation’s domestic source income under Article 93 subparag. 11 (b) of the former Corporate Tax Act or Article 93 subparag. 10 (b) of the Corporate Tax Act, and thus, it cannot be deemed unlawful.

4. Whether the second disposition of this case is legitimate

(a) Whether interest income has accrued;

1) The plaintiff's assertion

Since the Plaintiff appropriated the subrogated payment paid by the instant guarantee institution to the principal in accordance with the terms and conditions of this case, there was no interest income (in the case of subrogated payment, even if the guarantee institution was designated as being appropriated for the interest during the same business year, so long as it was treated as being appropriated for the principal in the same business year, the interest income cannot be recognized in accordance with the principle of fixed

(ii) the facts of recognition

A) In the instant credit guarantee contract, the guarantee limit is set by the guarantee limit, and the guarantee agency of this case, upon occurrence of a guarantee accident, has made the principal obligation corresponding to the guarantee limit and the amount of interest, etc. paid by the Plaintiff on behalf of the Plaintiff.

B) The Plaintiff claimed to the instant guarantee agency for the performance of the guaranteed obligation, and claimed the amount of principal, interest, and expenses divided. The instant guarantee agency also paid the Plaintiff the amount of the subrogated payment, specifying the amount of principal, interest, and expenses divided.

C) After receiving a subrogation, the Plaintiff issued to the instant guarantor the certificate of subrogation (hereinafter referred to as the "certificate of subrogation in total as to the amount of subrogated payment in this case") indicating the type of payment, principal, amount of interest, and detailed calculation of interest (period, number of days, interest rate, etc.).

[Grounds for Recognition] The facts without dispute, the evidence as mentioned above, the statements in Eul evidence Nos. 11 through 13, the △△ Fund, △△ Fund, AA Foundation, BB Foundation,CC Foundation, D Foundation, and EE Fund, and the purport of the whole arguments and arguments

3) Determination

The terms and conditions of this case provide that if the obligor’s repayment falls short of the obligor’s full repayment, it shall be appropriated in the order of expenses, interest, and principal, but the bank may change the order of appropriation within the extent no less favorable to the obligor. If the proviso to the above terms and conditions is applied and the bank is able to change the order of appropriation, it must be the case falling under the main text of the above provision. However, the main text is interpreted that the payment is made in part of the obligation, and it is not made between the obligor and the obligor and the designation of appropriation was made, and thus, it is interpreted that the payment is made in the order of appropriation of the expenses, interest, and principal as in the order of appropriation under Article 479(1) of the Civil Act. Accordingly, the provisions of the

In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the instant subrogation payment was appropriated according to the agreement between the Plaintiff and the instant guarantee institution and the designation of the instant guarantee institution at the time of the payment of the subrogated payment (hereinafter “instant appropriation of performance”). Accordingly, the portion appropriated to the interest income should be included in the calculation of interest income, in light of the agreement between the Plaintiff and the instant guarantee institution and the purport of the entire pleadings.

① There is no agreement or designation of appropriation between the Plaintiff and the primary debtor. However, since the instant guarantee agency guaranteed the Plaintiff’s obligation to the principal debtor in accordance with the instant credit guarantee agreement, it should be deemed that there was a duty and right to make reimbursement in subrogation of the principal debtor, and that the said guarantee agency was delegated with all the affairs related to subrogation, including the payment by subrogation, in full.

② As seen earlier in the course of repaying the amount of subrogated payment, the Plaintiff filed a claim for the performance of the guaranteed obligation by classifying the principal, interest, and expense items. The instant guarantee organization also repaid to the Plaintiff by classifying the principal, interest, and expense items. After paying the amount of the principal, interest, the amount of interest, and the details of calculation of interest (period, number of days, interest rate, etc.) paid by the Plaintiff, the certificate of subrogated payment in this case was issued to the instant guarantee organization. Such series of procedures can be deemed to have been consistent with the Plaintiff and the instant guarantee organization’s intent of appropriation for the amount of subrogated payment in order, or at least the said guarantee organization expressed its intent of appropriation for designation.

③ Under the terms of the instant credit guarantee agreement, the guarantee limit for the principal guaranteed by the instant guarantee institution to the Plaintiff is stipulated, and the relevant interest, etc. are included in the scope of guarantee. A guarantee institution is obligated to repay the principal within the guarantee limit and interest thereon, and it is necessary to express its intent to appropriate the details of reimbursement in accordance with its duty. Any other content can not be evaluated as completing the obligation of subrogation in relation to the Plaintiff and the principal obligor. As such, Article 13 of the Terms and Conditions of Guarantee for Non-bank Loan Guarantee (Evidence No. 4-1) of the Seocho Fund provides that “The sum of the following amounts” under paragraph (1) is determined as the guarantee obligation, and unless otherwise stipulated, the amount of each subparagraph should be discharged as the guarantee obligation, and it is difficult to accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that there is no interest in the order of payment in the total amount.

④ Although the instant guarantee institution fully performs the guaranteed obligation under a credit guarantee contract, the payment on behalf of a part of the principal obligation is performed by subrogation, which leads to the problem of satisfaction of the principal obligation. As seen earlier, the instant guarantee institution has the obligation to pay the principal obligation by subrogation and the right to pay the principal obligation, so the payment on behalf of a principal obligation must be made as part of the principal obligation. As such, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the payment on behalf of a principal obligation does not occur due to the full performance of the guaranteed obligation. Rather, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the payment on behalf of a principal obligation does not occur. Rather, in light of the entire performance of the guaranteed obligation, the payment on behalf of a principal obligation is deemed to have been made only by the principal obligation and subordinate obligation (the principal, interest, and expenses within the guarantee limit) specified in the guarantee contract ( there is no room to be appropriated for the other principal of a principal obligor whose principal

⑤ The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that, in the event the primary debtor himself/herself has fulfilled his/her obligation, the guarantee agency is disadvantageous to the primary debtor if the guarantee agency has performed the obligation compared with the appropriation of the principal in accordance with the terms and conditions of this case. However, this is only a result arising from the terms and conditions of a credit guarantee contract and it cannot be deemed unfair to change the economic burden of the primary debtor accordingly. The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that there is no difference between the Plaintiff’s corporate tax burden and the case where the principal is preferentially appropriated, and thus, there is no difference between the Plaintiff’s corporate tax burden and the Plaintiff’s payment of the principal, but even if so, it is difficult

6. The Plaintiff asserts that corporate tax is imposed on net income, and the amount returned after the Plaintiff loaned funds does not exceed the original amount of the loan, and even if it was exceeded, it cannot impose corporate tax on the ground that there was interest income equivalent to the amount exceeding the above income amount on the ground of satisfaction of payment. However, in calculating corporate tax, there is a distinction between the amount of gross income and deductible expenses, and it is necessary to calculate income in accordance with the provisions of the item, and on the premise that the amount of principal and interest is clearly distinguishable, it cannot be assessed as to the occurrence of income by aggregating the amounts of principal and interest without distinction.

(b) The binding force of decisions made by the Tax Tribunal;

1) The binding force of the ruling shall only extend to the judgment on the specific grounds of illegality such as the order of the ruling and the recognition and judgment on the requisite facts that form the premise thereof, i.e., the determination on the previous disposition, even if the previous disposition was revoked by the ruling, it does not conflict with the binding force of the ruling to conduct the previous disposition for reasons different from the previous disposition. Here, whether it is the same reason or not should be determined depending on whether it is an unlawful reason as to the previous disposition, and whether it is a reason recognized as identical in the basic factual relations (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du7705, Dec. 9, 2005).

2) On July 28, 2015, the previous disposition rendered by the Tax Tribunal rendered a decision that "if the amount of subrogated payment received by the instant Guarantee Agency was corrected to be appropriated in the order of interest and principal, the increase in the remaining claims after subrogation was made, the tax base and tax amount were added to deductible expenses in the business year to which the date of the bad debt depreciation of the relevant claims belongs and the correction thereof was made".

The above decision of the Tax Tribunal stated that if the remaining claims are increased after subrogation due to changes in the details of appropriation for the amount appropriated by the plaintiff, the amount should be included in the deductible expenses in the business year to which the date of the bad debt depreciation of the pertinent claim belongs. However, although there is a difference between the increased amount of the remaining claims in the disposition of this case and the increased amount of the remaining claims due to the appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of the plaintiff, the basic factual basis is the same in that the remaining claims are increased due to appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of the plaintiff, unlike the details of appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of appropriation of payment of this case, it is reasonable to view that the above decision of the Tax Tribunal is binding

3) Therefore, the guarantee agency of this case should include the increased amount of remaining bonds after subrogation in the business year to which the date of bad debt depreciation of the pertinent bonds belongs, as a result of appropriation of specific principal, interest, and expenses.

(c) Justifiable tax amount;

Whether a disposition is lawful is determined depending on whether it exceeds a legitimate amount of tax. The parties concerned may submit objective tax bases and materials supporting the amount of tax until the closing of arguments in the trial court. When the amount of tax to be imposed lawfully is calculated based on such materials, only the portion exceeding the legitimate amount of tax should be revoked. However, if not, the entire amount of the taxation disposition should be revoked, and in such a case, the court does not have the duty to calculate the legitimate amount of tax to be imposed actively by its authority (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Du622, Sept. 10, 2015). In this case, the materials submitted by the parties by the time of the closing of arguments cannot be calculated on the sole basis of the materials presented by the parties by the time of the closing of arguments, so

Therefore, among the disposition No. 2 of this case, each part exceeding the amount stated in the "political tax amount" column should be revoked.

5. Conclusion

The claim of the new financial holding company of the Plaintiff, a new financial holding company, shall be accepted on the grounds of the reasons, and the claim of the Plaintiff, a new financial holding company, shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remainder