The case holding that the attorney's fee agreement of KRW 30,582,500 is an invalid contract which is unreasonably excessive in light of the degree of actual contribution and expenses, and thus goes against the principle of good faith.

If a fee agreement of KRW 30,582,50 between a lawyer and the parties to the case is unfairly excessive in light of the degree of the efforts and expenses actually contributed, it is null and void as a contract contrary to the principle of good faith.

Article 17 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act; Article 2 (1) of the Civil Act

Plaintiff

Taean Bank of Korea

Seoul High Court Decision 70Na2426 decided November 12, 1971

All appeals by both the plaintiff and the defendant are dismissed.

Of the costs of appeal, the part arising from the plaintiff's appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff, and the part arising from the defendant's appeal shall be borne by the defendant.

The plaintiff's grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the amount of KRW 30,582,50,000, which is 30,582,500, which is paid by the original defendant as this case’s remuneration agreed upon between the original defendant and the original defendant, is unfairly excessive in light of the plaintiff’s efforts and expenses, and therefore, the above fee agreement exceeding the amount of KRW 1,50,000 at the original time is deemed invalid in violation of the principle of trust and good faith, and it does not conclude that the theory of No. 1 of the lawsuit as to No. 1 of this case’s fee null and void in law, by comparing the records of the judgment of the court below as to the amount of the remuneration in this case’

The grounds of appeal No. 1 by the defendant's attorney are examined.

As to the defendant's argument that the original judgment was formed between the plaintiff and the defendant company, that there is no dispute between the parties, and that the non-party 1 and the non-party 2, who had the defendant company's representative at the time when the plaintiff and the defendant company entered into a delegation contract with the defendant company, did not act as the liquidator at the time of the defendant company's representative, and thus the above delegation contract is revoked to the effect that the above confession is not effective to the defendant, there is no evidence to support the above confession as not only against the truth, but also as the testimony of the non-party 3 at the court of first instance and the court below, and there is no other evidence to support that the above confession was stated in mistake, and the defendant's argument can be affirmed in the original printing era and that the judgment on the evidence deviates from the scope of free evaluation of evidence. Thus, the argument is groundless.

The grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3 are examined.

In a comprehensive review of the records, the evidence adopted by the original judgment was compared with the records, thereby, the deceased non-party 4, who was the representative liquidator of the defendant company, at the time when the defendant company decided to delegate the case to the plaintiff, was appointed as the representative director of the defendant company from the time when the defendant company was incorporated to December 20, 1968, and was in charge of the affairs of the defendant company, and was in charge of the affairs of the defendant company at the time of 1949. The non-party 5, who was the representative director of the defendant company, received part of the purchase contract amount of the land as a problem in this case from the non-party 5, who was the part of the judgment, and the above land was in violation of the rules of experience as to the claim for ownership transfer registration due to sale on July 16, 1947 against the defendant company (Seoul District Court Decision 4282No. 825, Seoul District Court Decision 4282, the above non-party 4 did not have any special circumstance.

Therefore, all appeals by the Plaintiff and the Defendant are dismissed. Of the costs of appeal, the part arising from the Plaintiff’s appeal and the Defendant’s appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Kim Young-chul Kim Young-ho (Presiding Judge)