[1] Whether it is subject to value-added tax even where contingent or temporary goods are supplied in relation to the main business

[2] Whether Article 6(4) of the Value-Added Tax Act applies to a case where goods are supplied on condition of interim payment before and after the closure of business

[1] According to the provisions of the Value-Added Tax Act and the Enforcement Decree thereof, where an entrepreneur delivers or transfers goods due to contractual or legal grounds, all the goods are subject to the assessment of value-added tax unless there is a special provision that taxes are exempted or non-taxation, and the entrepreneur’s main business is not the supply of goods, etc. continuously and repeatedly, but the supply of goods, etc. which are contingent or temporarily related to the main business is subject to the assessment of taxes. As long as the supply of goods, etc. falls under the supply of goods, etc. under the Value-Added Tax Act, the supply is for the continuous maintenance and expansion

[2] Where goods are supplied under interim payment conditions after closure of business, such goods are treated as remaining goods at the time of discontinuance of business by an entrepreneur according to the time of supply, and there is no room for application of Article 6(4) of the Value-Added Tax Act.

[1] Articles 6 and 7 of the Value-Added Tax Act / [2] Articles 6(4), 9(1)2 and (4) of the Value-Added Tax Act, proviso to Article 21(1)4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Nu6221 delivered on July 28, 1992 (Gong1992, 2591), Supreme Court Decision 95Nu8225 delivered on October 13, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3826) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 92Nu8323 delivered on October 13, 1992 (Gong1992, 3174) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 89Nu7283 delivered on February 27, 1990 (Gong190, 821), Supreme Court Decision 89Nu4574 delivered on July 24, 1990 (Gong190, 1809)

Plaintiff

The Director of the North Korean Tax Office

Gwangju High Court Decision 94Gu4737 delivered on July 7, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the provisions on the relationship between the Value-Added Tax Act and the Enforcement Decree thereof, where an entrepreneur delivers or transfers goods due to contractual or legal reasons, it shall be subject to the taxation of value-added tax, unless there is a special provision that taxes are exempted or non-taxation, and the entrepreneur’s main business is not the supply of goods continuously and repeatedly, but the supply of goods contingent or temporarily related to the main business is subject to the taxation. As long as it falls under the supply of goods, etc. under the Value-Added Tax Act, it shall be subject to the taxation regardless of whether the supply is continuously maintained and expanded, or for liquidation, reorganization, or discontinuance of the business (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Nu6221, Jul. 28, 1992; 92Nu8323, Oct. 13, 1992; 95Nu825, Oct. 13, 1995).

Meanwhile, in principle, where the transfer of goods is not required under the Value-Added Tax Act, the time when the goods are made available is deemed to be the time of supply for the goods (Article 9(1)2 of the Value-Added Tax Act), and where goods are supplied on condition of interim payment, the time each payment is made shall be deemed to be the time of supply: Provided, That where the time of supply for the goods supplied on or before the closure of business arrives after the closure of business, the time of such cessation of business shall be deemed to be the time of supply (Article 9(4) of the Value-Added Tax Act, Article 21(1)4 and proviso of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act), and where goods are supplied on or after the closure of business, it shall be deemed to be the time of supply for the goods (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Nu6221, Jul. 28, 1992; 95Nu825, Oct. 13, 1995).

On June 1, 1989, the court below completed the registration of ownership transfer of the above building on June 10, 198 as legally determined by the plaintiff, and acquired the above building of this case on June 1, 198, and was engaged in the leisure business and the real estate leasing business, and the lease term of this case was 230,000,000 won until May 31, 1992, and the monthly rent was 7,700,000 won and the monthly rent was 90,000 won, and the above site and building were 2,50,000 won on June 26, 1991 to the non-party 1, 200,000 won on June 26, 200, 2000 won on which the above lease contract was concluded to the non-party 2,50,000 won on June 19, 209.

In addition, since the transfer of the above building by the Plaintiff constitutes a case of the supply of goods under interim payment conditions before and after the closure of business, it is treated as a "goods remaining at the time of discontinuance of business" under Article 6 (4) of the Value-Added Tax Act, and there is no room to apply this provision.

The Supreme Court Decision 90Nu4785 delivered on February 22, 1991, 90Nu4785 delivered on February 22, 1991, is different from this case, and it is not appropriate to invoke this case. There is no reason for this argument.

2. The defendant's disposition of this case was based on Article 21 (1) 2 of the Value-Added Tax Act, since the plaintiff filed a final return on the tax base and tax amount of the 1st taxable value-added tax in 192 and omitted part of the reported tax base and tax amount, and the defendant corrected the original final return, and the defendant cited Article 21 (1) 2 of the Value-Added Tax Act as the grounds for correction (see Evidence A) as the grounds for correction of the disposition of this case (see Article 21 (1) 4 of the Value-Added Tax Act). However, as the court below pointed out the plaintiff's wrong statement as the grounds for the disposition of this case, it is just that Article 21 of the Value-Added Tax Act was cited as the grounds for the disposition

In addition, the defendant deemed that the transfer of the plaintiff's above building constitutes a case where the plaintiff supplied goods by legal and contractual reasons, and thus, the tax disposition of this case was issued, and the remaining goods after the business is discontinued, such as the theory of lawsuit, and thus, it was not taxed by deeming it to be supplied to the plaintiff. Thus, there is no contradiction between the original defendant's disposition of this case and the reasoning of the judgment. There is

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)