[1] The meaning of "use of status or relation to duties, etc." under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Act on the Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination, which defined "sexual harassment", and the criteria for its determination

[2] Whether the concept of "using his/her status or in relation to work, etc." is identical to the concept of "using his/her status" under Article 85 of the Public Official Election Act among the requirements for sexual harassment under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination Act (negative)

[3] The case holding that even if the Do governor was found not guilty of the part of election campaign by taking advantage of his status as a public official in a criminal case violating the Public Official Election Act, the "use of his status or relation to work, etc." is not denied, which is the requirement of "sexual harassment" under the former Act on the

[1] The requirement under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Act on Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination (amended by Act No. 6915 of May 29, 2003) that defined the "sexual harassment" includes not only the case where a sexual speech or behavior was made by representing a comprehensive business relation, but also the case where a sexual speech or behavior was made by abusing authority or undermining the performance of official duties. Whether a certain sexual speech or behavior is recognized shall be determined by taking into account specific circumstances such as the relationship between both parties, the place and situation where the act was committed, the content and degree of the act, etc.

[2] The provision of sexual harassment under the former Act on Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination (amended by Act No. 6915 of May 29, 2003) and the provision of a penal provision for election campaign using the status of a public official under the Public Official Election Act differs from the legislative purport, purpose, requirements, and sanctions in the event of violations. Thus, the concept of "using his status or relation to duties, etc." among the requirements for sexual harassment under Article 2 (2) of the former Act cannot be deemed the same as the concept of "using his status" under Article 85 of the Public Official Election Act.

[3] The case holding that even if the Do governor was found not guilty of the part of election campaign by taking advantage of his status as a public official in a criminal case violating the Public Official Election Act, the "use of his status or relation to work, etc.", which is the requirement of "sexual harassment" under the former Act on the Prohibition of and

[1] Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Act on Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination (amended by Act No. 6915 of May 29, 2003) (see Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the current Framework Act on Women's Development) / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Act on Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination (amended by Act No. 6915 of May 29, 2003) (see Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the current Framework Act on Women's Development), Articles 85, 254, and 255 of the Public Official Election Act / [3] Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Act on Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination (amended by Act No. 6915 of May 29, 2003) (see Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the current Framework Act on Women's Development), Articles 85, 254, and 255 of the Public Official Election Act

[Defendant-Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Soh So-young et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

National Human Rights Commission (Attorney Kim Jong-sung, Counsel for defendant-appellee)

An intervenor;

Seoul High Court Decision 2004Nu10991 Delivered on September 16, 2005

The appeal is dismissed. All costs of appeal, including costs of participation, are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the misapprehension of legal principle

Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Act on the Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination (amended by Act No. 6915 of May 29, 2003) provides that " sexual harassment means that "any employee, employer, or worker of a public institution causes sexual humiliation or aversion by sexual speech or behavior, etc. or gives disadvantage in employment on the ground of non-compliance with the sexual speech or behavior or any other demand, etc." The requirement of "using his status or in relation to work" indicates a comprehensive work-related nature and has been repealed by the Framework Act on Women's Development as of December 29, 2005 and has been repealed since March 30, 2006; hereinafter "the Gender Discrimination Prevention Act") includes not only the case where the job or sexual speech or behavior was made by taking advantage of his/her authority, but also the case where the sexual speech or behavior is abused by abusing his/her authority or her authority and the case where the sexual behavior is recognized as being related to the work."

In addition, Article 85 of the Public Official Election Act provides that "public officials shall not engage in an election campaign by taking advantage of their status." Article 255 of the same Act provides that "The Act on the Prohibition of Gender Discrimination stipulates that sexual speech or behavior of employees of a public institution, etc. in relation to their duties, shall be deemed sexual harassment, which is a kind of sexual harassment, so that victims may file an application for correction, and shall allow male and female discrimination committees to take measures, such as recommendation for correction, publication, accusation, etc. according to their contents or stages. On the other hand, the Public Official Election Act provides that where public officials engage in an election campaign by taking advantage of their positions closely related to their duties that may affect the interests or disadvantage to the electors, the above two Acts are subject to aggravated punishment in that public officials would seriously impede the fairness of election, rather than in cases of election campaign." Even if the requirements of sexual harassment under the Public Official Election Act are simply different from those of those of the above two Acts, there is no need to interpret the concept of "election campaign" as public officials under the Public Official Election Act or the same Act.

Therefore, in a criminal case against the Public Official Election Act against the Plaintiff, even though there was a final and conclusive judgment of innocence on the part that the Plaintiff carried out an election campaign by taking advantage of the status of a public official on January 25, 2002 with the Defendant’s Intervenor (hereinafter “ Intervenor”) at an interview held by the Do Governor on January 25, 2002, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff carried out an election campaign by taking advantage of his status as a public official. However, in the instant case where the issue is whether the legislative intent and requirements of the Plaintiff’s act constitute “sexual harassment” under the Act on the Prohibition of Gender Discrimination against Sexual Discrimination, it does not deny “business

citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the court below held that the interview with the plaintiff and the intervenor was conducted directly or indirectly by the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 at the request of the plaintiff during the Do Governor's work hours (name omitted). The intervenor, from April 21, 1989 to April 30, 192, the head of the Jeju-do branch office under the Jeju-do branch office under the Association (name omitted), and the head of the Jeju-do branch office under the Jeju-do branch office from April 1998 to 201, and the head of the Jeju-do branch office under the control of the non-party 2, which had no influence on the election of the plaintiff and the non-party 1, who had been holding the interview with the plaintiff during the Do governor's work hours, and there was no error in the misapprehension of legal principles regarding the interview with the plaintiff and the non-party 2, who had no influence on the members of the Do governor's work-related organizations.

2. As to the violation of the rules of evidence

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance as cited by the court below, the court below acknowledged the facts that the intervenor, after compiling the selected evidence of the judgment, visited the Jeju Do Governor's office around 15:10 on January 25, 2002 and interview with the plaintiff, visited the plaintiff on the table table for conference in the form of a rectangular type and opened the table on the plaintiff's left side of the plaintiff's meeting with 90∑ 10 on each side of the plaintiff's right and divided the conversations between the plaintiff and the left hand, the part of the intervenor's title that the plaintiff left side and left hand of the plaintiff's right side of the plaintiff's back, and the plaintiff's knished the plaintiff's hand.

In comparison with records, the fact-finding by the court below is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence, and the consultation on appeal against this cannot be accepted.

3. As to the determination on the basis of the facts not alleged by the parties

Although the Plaintiff asserted that “the Plaintiff was able to write down her kick and her finger in the clothes and her chest was taken,” the lower court simply determined that “the Plaintiff was her chest at the left chest of the Intervenor who lowered her knick,” the Plaintiff’s assertion that it was unlawful as a judgment based on the facts not alleged by the Intervenor.”

However, the issues of this case asserted that the plaintiff only engaged in the behavior to the extent that the plaintiff was aground and light against the plaintiff's two descendants are "whether the plaintiff was the plaintiff's chest," so long as such facts are acknowledged, the issue of whether the plaintiff was the plaintiff's finger, the chest was the plaintiff's finger, and whether the plaintiff was the plaintiff's finger, or the plaintiff's finger, cannot be viewed as a matter of necessity for judgment. The defendant also made the disposition of this case "the plaintiff dumbing the plaintiff's finger on the plaintiff's chest" while it is "the fact that the plaintiff dumbing the plaintiff's finger" in the disposition of this case is "the sexual speech and behavior that causes the plaintiff to feel sexual humiliation or a sense of aversion as stipulated in Article 2 (2) of the Gender Discrimination Prevention Act, and the decision of this case was made by the court below as a sexual harassment, and it was not acceptable in light of the facts that the plaintiff's action was based on the plaintiff's grounds for revocation of the disposition of this case, and the court below did not accept the appeal."

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party, including the costs of participation in the appeal. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jeon Soo-ahn (Presiding Justice)