(영문) 서울고등법원 2014.9.4. 선고 2014누40472 판결

On March 8, 2013, the Defendant revoked the recognition of the process on the field driving of the digging season, and the recognition of the process on the entrustment of and restriction on recognition for the relevant one-year course, and the recognition of the process on the entrustment of and restriction on recognition for the relevant one-year course, and the suspension of qualification for vocational skills development training teachers (Grade III) for the Plaintiff B.

2. Purport of appeal

The part against the plaintiffs in the judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. ① Revocation of recognition on the part of the plaintiffs on March 8, 2013 on the part of the defendant's on-site work process for the so-called so-called so-called so-called "on-site work process", and ② Suspension of qualification for vocational skills development training teachers (Grade 3) for the plaintiff B shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning of this court's reasoning is as follows: (a) the part of the judgment of the court of first instance is written as follows; and (b) the judgment on the plaintiffs' assertion is added as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance [Provided, That the part against the defendant in the judgment of the court of first instance (as to the part of the disposition on the process of driving technicians of the so-called so-called so-called "the part of the judgment of the court of first instance" was not appealed by the defendant; and therefore, (c) the corresponding part is excluded from the part corresponding thereto).

2. Parts to be dried;

A. The second written judgment of the court of first instance " March 7, 2013." shall be written by " March 8, 2013."

(b)The following shall be added between the sixth and sixth deeds of the first instance court:

【The determination of whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion by social norms ought to be made by comparing and balancing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantages suffered by an individual due to the relevant disposition, by objectively examining the substance of the act of violation and the purpose of the public interest to be achieved by the relevant act of disposal, as well as all the relevant circumstances. In such cases, even if the criteria for punitive administrative disposition are prescribed in the form of Ordinance of the Ministry, it is nothing more than that prescribed within the administrative agency’s rules for handling internal affairs, and thus, the lawfulness of the relevant disposition should be determined in accordance with the contents and purport of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, as well as the above criteria for disposition. Therefore, it cannot be immediately said that the pertinent disposition is legitimate, but the above criteria do not conform to the Constitution or laws, or that the outcome of the application of such criteria is considerably unreasonable in light of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, it should not be determined that the Plaintiffs’ arbitrary measures in accordance with such criteria deviates from the scope of discretion or abuse of discretionary power. Furthermore, it should not be determined that the Plaintiffs’ exercise or abuse of administrative disposition is not be justified.

3. Additional determination

A. Summary of the plaintiffs' assertion

The plaintiffs are merely engaged in the practice of ‘on-the-job training' only for those who wish to use the waiting time of the ‘on-the-job training' training due to the active demand of trainees using the instant facilities, and there is no additional benefit for the plaintiffs, and as long as the instructors on-the-job training are guiding the driving of on-the-job instructors on-the-job training and do not concurrently hold two lessons, the plaintiffs cannot be deemed to constitute a violation of the training contents recognized to the extent that they would violate the purpose of the training.

B. Determination

In light of the following circumstances, i.e., the facts cited earlier and evidence, etc., (i) G, who was in charge of providing counseling services at the instant facility prior to the instant disposition, stated that “at the time of counseling for those who wish to participate in the training, there is a fact that he/she could use the atmosphere during the on-site training,” and (ii) Plaintiff B, the representative of the instant facility, could not proceed with the training, and if there is a trainee, he/she could not obtain a certificate of qualification for the on-site training, and it is reasonable to consider that the Plaintiffs were recruited to the extent that they would have violated the purpose of providing counseling for some instructors at the time of providing counseling services (see subparagraph 4). Moreover, it seems reasonable to consider that the Plaintiffs’ assertion that there was a change in the content of the training at the time of providing counseling services at the time of conducting the on-site training at the instant facility to the extent that they would not be recognized as a violation of the content of the training at the time of providing counseling services at the time of the Plaintiff’s on-site training.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim concerning the part against the plaintiffs in the judgment of the court of first instance is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion. Thus, all appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed.