It is necessary to increase the basic property of the Incorporated Foundation and to authorize the competent authority.

The increase of the basic property of the Incorporated Foundation is a change in contributions, so it shall take effect only with authorization from the competent authority.

Article 45 of the Civil Act, Articles 37, 38, and 39 of the Gu Residents Act

Supreme Court Decision 67Da568 Decided July 22, 1969

Attorney Park Do-won et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

National Institute of Education for School Foundation

Seoul High Court Decision 76Na3273 delivered on March 15, 1978

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal by the plaintiff's agent are also examined.

(1) As to one point:

The court below held in this case that even though the Central Institute of Education, a general foundation incorporated by the defendant, did not take a procedure for changing the contribution act, the property newly acquired through a resolution of the board of directors, is customarily incorporated into the list of property where the property is recorded in the pertinent school year at the end of each school year, and is registered with the head of the literature delivery department, thereby in lieu of the procedure for acquisition of fundamental property. In addition, since real estate as a matter of this case was incorporated into the basic property of the said foundation, the above procedure was followed.

However, it is essential to increase the basic property of an incorporated foundation, and even in this case, it shall take effect only with the authorization of the competent authority (see Articles 4 and 21 of the Act on Contribution to the Incorporated Foundation, and Supreme Court Decision 67Da568, Jul. 22, 1969). Thus, in order for the real estate acquired after the incorporation of the incorporated foundation to be a proper basic property of the incorporated foundation, the authorization of the head of the literature delivery division must be required to be obtained. The form of reporting to the Minister of literature delivery cannot be the basic property.

The decision of the court below that the land of this case is the basic property of the foundation foundation is in violation of the rules of evidence by misunderstanding the nature of the basic property of the central foundation foundation.

(2) As to the two points:

The court below held that since December 26, 1964, the land of this case was disposed of without permission from a supervisory authority under Article 28 (1) of the Private School Act after the transfer of the land of this case into an educational foundation by the central private teaching institute, which is the overall foundation of the defendant, due to the implementation of the Private School Act, and the change of organization on December 26, 1964, the land of this case was incorporated into the basic property of the defendant corporation. After the above registration, the land of this case was disposed of without permission from the supervisory authority under Article 28 (1) of the Private School Act. However, since the late December 26, 1964, the possession of the plaintiff's land of this case shall not be deemed possession frequently. However, as seen in the preceding paragraph, even before the above foundation was changed, the exchange contract was concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant regarding the land of this case where the plaintiff was not transferred the registration of ownership transfer due to the above contract and the land of this case became the basic property (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da363736, Dec. 137, 1968, 1968).

Nevertheless, the decision of the court below on the premise that the permission of the literature delivery minister is necessary in the above case is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principle on the conversion of the appearance of possession.

(3) As to the three points:

The court below held that the date on which the plaintiff delivered Eul evidence No. 4-1 (each letter) to the defendant, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have approved the ownership of the land of this case at least after the plaintiff's date, and possession after the plaintiff's date shall not be deemed to be an autonomous possession. Such judgment below is just, and there is no misunderstanding of legal principles, violation of the rule of experience, lack of reason, and violation of the fact-finding in finding evidence and fact-finding (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 76Da486, Nov. 9, 1976). Therefore, this issue is without merit.

As such, insofar as the period of prescriptive acquisition by the Plaintiff’s autonomous possession was interrupted by the Plaintiff’s approval on May 3, 1973, before the expiration of 20 years, even if there are reasons for the above grounds of appeal (i) and (ii), this appeal does not affect the judgment of the court below, and therefore, this appeal is without merit. The supplementary statement in the grounds of appeal submitted by the Plaintiff’s representative Kim Gim-bak submitted on July 20, 1978 is submitted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Therefore, the matters

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

This decision is consistent with the opinions of the involved judges.

Justices Kim Yong-chul (Presiding Justice)