In a case where a temporary teacher was appointed without meeting the requirements for appointing temporary teachers at the time of enforcement of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 1990), the nature and validity of such appointment contract

The former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 190) allows a private school teacher to be appointed on a conditional basis, and there was no provision concerning temporary teachers. Therefore, if a teacher fails to meet the requirements for employment of temporary teachers despite the absence of the requirements for employment of temporary teachers, it shall be deemed that the school juristic person has appointed them on a conditional basis pursuant to the same Act, and the part on which the term of employment is determined under the above employment contract shall not be deemed null and void by the provisions of education-related statutes, such as the Private School Act on the guarantee of the status

Article 56 of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of April 7, 1990)

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 243 (Gong1989, 407) and 91Ma97 (Gong1991, 1589) and 90Da13260 (Gong1616, May 14, 1991)

Plaintiff 1 and 3 others, Attorneys Lee Dong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellee

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1 and 3 others

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na11324 delivered on June 19, 1991

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. Judgment on the plaintiffs' attorneys' grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 3

The court below acknowledged that at the time when the plaintiffs are appointed as instructors of the defendant driving school, they agreed to appoint the plaintiffs as one year between March 1, 1989 and February 28, 1990 between the plaintiffs and the defendant driving school, and that the defendant notified the plaintiffs of dismissal on February 16, 1990, and determined that the above dismissal notice was merely a confirmation or declaration of termination of employment relationship with the expiration of the above employment term, and therefore, it did not infringe the plaintiffs' rights.

If the relevant evidence is examined by comparing it with the records, the above recognition judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of law as to the facts contrary to the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence, or the misunderstanding of the legal principles as to Article 56 of the Private School Act or disciplinary proceedings, and there is no reason to discuss.

On February 14, 1989, Supreme Court Decision 87Meu2243 Decided February 14, 1989, concerning the case where a person who is qualified as a teacher is appointed as an instructor without a fixed period of time and thus makes the same person work as a teacher. Thus, it is not appropriate to invoke the plaintiffs in this case where the term of appointment is determined and appointed.

2. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2

The former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 190) which was enforced at the time when the defendant appointed the plaintiffs is allowed to appoint temporary teachers on condition of private school (the proviso of Article 56(1)). Since the amended Private School Act did not provide for temporary teachers such as Article 54-4 of the amended Private School Act and Article 32 of the Public Educational Officials Act, even if the defendant appointed the plaintiffs on condition that it did not meet the requirements for appointing temporary teachers on condition that it did not meet the fixed number of teachers, it shall be deemed that the defendant appointed them on condition under the same Act. Thus, the part of the appointment contract between the defendant and the plaintiffs which set the term of appointment cannot be deemed null and void by the provisions of education-related Acts such as the Private School Act for guaranteeing the status of teachers, such as the theory of lawsuit (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Da13260, May 14, 191).

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)