Ownership of land by a person who loses Korean nationality under the former Nationality Act;

Despite the provisions of Article 16 of the former Nationality Act (Act No. 16, Dec. 20, 1948), even if the non-party was a person who lost Korean nationality by acquiring Japanese nationality on March 1, 1955, it cannot be deemed that the non-party loses Korean nationality as a matter of course after the lapse of one year period since the person who lost Korean nationality should transfer Korean nationality to a national of the Republic of Korea, in light of the purport of the provisions of Article 6 of the former Foreigner's Land Acquisition Act (Act No. 42, Apr. 1, 1925), and Articles 7 and 8 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, which was enforced at the time of voluntary disposal or auction after the expiration of that period.

Article 6 of the former Foreigner's Land Acquisition Act (Act No. 42 of April 1, 1925), Articles 7 and 8 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Foreigner's Land Acquisition Act, Article 16 of the former Nationality Act (Act No. 16, Dec. 20, 1948)

Attorney Jung-young, et al., Counsel for the plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant of the deceased non-party non-party

Plaintiff Intervenor 1 and 3 others

[Defendant-Appellant] Kim Jong-sik, Attorney Lee Jin-tae et al.

Seoul High Court Decision 78Na296,297,298 decided August 25, 1978

The appeal shall be dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The grounds of appeal No. 1 by the legal representative of Plaintiffs 1, 4, 5, 6, 2, and 3 are examined. The grounds of appeal by the legal representative of Plaintiffs 1, 5, 6, 2, and 3 are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, even if the intervenor 1 was a person who lost the nationality of Korea by acquiring the nationality of Korea through voluntary naturalization in Japan on March 1, 1955, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of the former Nationality Act (Law No. 16, Dec. 20, 1948), the court below held that the intervenor 1 held the ownership of the forest of this case and sold it to the defendant on January 28, 195, which was enforced at the time of the special law relations with the former Nationality Act (Act No. 42, Apr. 1, 1925), and Articles 7 and 8 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Foreigner's Land Act (the intervenor 1 of the above plaintiff assistant), who lost the nationality of Korea (the plaintiff assistant 1) shall transfer the ownership of the land to the citizen of the Republic of Korea after the lapse of one year period of time, and held that the plaintiff 1 had the ownership transfer registration of the forest of this case to the non-party 1, a legitimate trust registration of this case.

The court below acknowledged that the plaintiff 1's assistant intervenor 1 terminated the trust contract of the forest of this case against the above deceased non-party as above, and it clearly states that it does not intend to acquire ownership of the forest of this case on the ground of the termination of the trust contract of this case, but rather, it does not intend to acquire ownership of the forest of this case. Thus, the court below's independent opinion that the plaintiff 1's assistant intervenor 1 should obtain permission from the Minister in accordance with the foreigner's land laws and regulations in the original judgment is without merit, in the case where the plaintiff 1 newly purchased ownership of the forest of this case, or where only the title trust of the land is terminated, the plaintiff 1 should obtain permission from the Minister under the foreigner'

The Supreme Court ruling pointing out the purport as alleged by the plaintiffs does not seem to be appropriate for the instant case, rather than for the Plaintiff’s Intervenor 1 claiming the registration of ownership transfer for the forest land of this case in his future.

The grounds of appeal No. 2 are examined.

However, the court below reviewed the facts that the defendant purchased the forest of this case from the intervenor 1 who supported the plaintiff 1 on January 28, 1958 and paid the price in full, and compared to the records, it is legitimate to find facts at the time of the original trial, and it cannot be deemed that there is a mistake of facts or an incomplete hearing in violation of the rules of evidence

Nos. 23 and 24 (Voluntary Statement and Statement) of the lower court is deemed to be unlawful and unreasonable, and there is no need to specifically state the reasons why the evidence No. 25 (Statement and Statement) was not believed. Moreover, the lower court did not appear to have rejected the evidence, including that the lower court did not have any counter-proof.

There is no reason to argue that the court below's whole right to evidence preparation and fact-finding is returned to the court below.

The plaintiff 7's grounds of appeal are examined.

The issue is that the deceased non-party, who was the party to the lawsuit, sold the forest of this case to the defendant, and the defendant only paid only part of the price and made no intention to pay the remaining price. As such, the deceased non-party was notified the defendant that he would cancel the contract of forest of this case on the ground of nonperformance of obligation, and the judgment in favor of the above deceased non-party became final and conclusive, and it is reasonable to accept that the defendant's request for retrial is illegal, such as the theory of lawsuit, even though it does not correspond to the grounds for retrial. Therefore, this is merely a criticism against the judgment accepting the defendant's request for retrial, and it is not a legitimate ground for appeal as to the judgment of the court below.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Hah- Port (Presiding Justice)