In a case where the Defendant was indicted on charges of interfering with the construction work of the contractor A and the construction cooperation company B by force by blocking the front of the construction vehicle in front of the entrance at the site of the construction site of the civil and military complex construction site in Seogpo-dong, Seopo-dong, Seopo-dong, Seopo-dong, Seopo-gu, the case holding that the Defendant acquitted the Defendant on charges of obstructing the construction work of the contractor A and the construction cooperation company B

In a case where the Defendant was indicted on charges of interfering with the construction work of the construction contractor Gap corporation and the construction partner Eul corporation et al. by force by obstructing the entrance and exit of the construction vehicles in front of the entrance of the construction site of the construction site of the Gangseo-dong civil and military complex (hereinafter referred to as the "construction site") Seopo-gu, Seopo-si, Seopo-si, the case holding that the Defendant acquitted the Defendant on the grounds that his act occurred in the course of exercising the freedom of political expression, since he participated in the religious events at the construction site to express his opposing opinions, and he thought that his expression of opinion is unfairly suppressingd, and thus he acted within the meaning of the expression of opinion, and thus, the Defendant's act may be deemed to have occurred in the course of exercising the freedom of political expression, and it can not be deemed that the above act constitutes an exercise of tangible power capable of suppressing and mixing the free will of Gap corporation and Eul corporation, or that the above act constitutes a specific and realistic danger

Article 21 of the Constitution, Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act, Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Earsen

Both parties

Kim Il-ju et al.

Attorney White-ok

Jeju District Court Decision 2014Gohap677 decided October 24, 2014

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The defendant shall be innocent.

The summary of the judgment against the defendant shall be published.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant

Although the act in the facts charged does not constitute an element of the crime of interference with business, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles and misconception of facts.

(b) Prosecutors;

The punishment of the court below (1.5 million won) is too unhued and unfair.

2. Summary of the facts charged and the judgment of the court below

A. Summary of the facts charged

1) On February 10, 2014, around 17:06, the Defendant obstructed the entrance and exit of other construction vehicles in the way of blocking the front of the said (automobile registration number omitted) for about eight minutes, on the ground that, in front of the entrance of the construction site of the Jeju Civil and Military Complex Construction Project (hereinafter “instant construction project”), seven persons, such as Nonindicted Party 1, etc., opposing the instant construction project, such as Mancheon-gu, Seodong-gu, Nonindicted Party 1, etc., opposed to the instant construction project, have opened the entrance and exit from the said construction site, one of the passengers of the vehicle (automobile registration number omitted) was moved to the said (automobile registration number omitted) by Nonindicted Party 1, Nonindicted Party 1, etc., of the said construction site. On the same day, from around 17:19 to around 9 minutes, the Defendant interfered with the first part of the construction project’s name except for the name of the said Nonindicted Company 2, the contractor of the instant construction project.

2) On May 9, 2013, around 11:26, the Defendant obstructed the construction work of the victim Nonindicted Co. 6 and Nonindicted Co. 7, a cooperative company in the instant construction project, by blocking the entrance and exit of the construction vehicles for about 10 minutes in a way that they go with the intention, and continuously obstructing the entrance and exit of the construction vehicles for about 11 minutes from around 12:06 on the same day to around 12:06, and hindering the entry and exit of the construction vehicles for about 6 minutes from around 12:21 to the same method.

B. The judgment of the court below

The lower court convicted each of the facts charged on the ground that each of the acts stated in the facts charged of this case constitutes the exercise of power and the risk of obstructing the construction work of the victim company.

3. As to the interpretation of Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act

A. Interpretation of the crime of interference with business and the necessity of new interpretation

1) Articles and Supreme Court precedents

A) Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act provides that “Any person who interferes with another person’s business by means of Article 313 (referring to the dissemination of false facts and fraudulent means) or by force shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding 15 million won.”

B) The Supreme Court held that, as a constituent element of the crime of interference with business, the term “defluence” as a force that may disrupt the free will of a person, regardless of whether it is tangible or intangible, and includes assault, intimidation, social, economic, political status, pressure by the right and pressure. In reality, the victim’s free will is not necessary to control, but should be sufficiently capable of suppressing the victim’s free will. Whether it constitutes such force should be objectively determined in light of all the circumstances, such as the date and place of the crime, motive, purpose, number of persons committing the crime, capacity, mode of force, type of work, type of victim’s position, etc. (see Supreme Court Decisions 2007Do2178, Jun. 14, 2007; 2009Do5732, Sept. 10, 2009); and where a person exercises the other party’s right as a result of an act, the act cannot be deemed as exercising the right or means of interference with business, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Do1616, etc.).

C) In addition, the Supreme Court does not require the result of interference with business to actually occur, but it is sufficient that there is a risk of interference with business if there is no risk of interference with business (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Do5432, Oct. 27, 2005). Thus, the crime of interference with business is not established, and the crime of interference with business is interpreted as abstract risk crime notwithstanding its language and text.

2) In the event of the issue of freedom of expression, the need to newly interpret the crime of interference with business.

Generally, according to the aforementioned legal doctrine, the crime of interference with business is established in the event of the risk of interference with business due to all force that is likely to suppress or confuse a person’s free will. However, in a case where the Defendant’s act at issue has the nature of freedom of expression, the meaning of power should be limited, and (b) the Defendant’s act requires specific risk or damage to the victim’s duties.

The reason is to consider the importance of freedom of expression as a fundamental right in a democratic society.Second, the crime of interference with business is likely to excessively restrict fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution in light of the history and content of the provision, so it is carefully interpreted and applied. This is already reflected in various Supreme Court precedents surrounding the crime of interference with business.

The above reasons are examined in detail.

B. The meaning and importance of the fundamental right of freedom of expression

1) constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression

The freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution refers to the freedom of ideas or opinions (the freedom of expression) and the freedom of dissemination (the freedom of transmission). Traditionally, an individual is indispensable for maintaining the dignity and value as a human being, pursuing happiness and realizing the sovereignty of the people, and is the freedom of externally expressing his/her psychological freedom, such as the freedom of religion, the freedom of conscience, and the freedom of learning and arts (see Constitutional Court en banc Order 2008Hun-Ma324, Feb. 25, 2010).

The freedom of assembly and demonstration, which are a kind of freedom of expression, is a very important fundamental right that forms an essential element of the fundamental democratic order of the Constitution. The freedom of assembly has a dual constitutional function, which is an individual’s character creation and a part of democracy. The freedom of assembly, which takes human dignity and free character creation as the highest value, is also the fundamental right that contributes to an individual’s self-determination and the realization of personality. In addition, as in all other fundamental rights, the freedom of assembly within our constitutional order, which takes into account human dignity and free character creation as the highest value, is also the fundamental right that contributes to the formation of public opinion by collectively expressing one’s opinion and arguments. In addition, the freedom of assembly is an essential element that the democratic community functions along with the freedom of expression (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 200Hun-Ba67, Oct. 30, 2003).

2) The meaning of freedom of expression

If any expression is identical with a majority of opinions or there is no possibility of adverse impact on others, such expression shall not be encouraged in society without being protected by the law, or, even if it is not, at least suppressing. Therefore, the meaning of the law that protects the freedom of expression is to withhold judgment on the legitimacy of the expression, and protect the expression itself, even if it does not coincide with a majority of opinions or is likely to have a negative effect on others. This is derived from the historical experience that even a minority’s thoughts that are considered either to have been expressed or to be in danger at one time, are right after the lapse of time, and that it may either be found or accepted as a majority of opinions, depending on changes in circumstances.

Furthermore, the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution conflicts with other rights or interests, such as reputation, freedom of private life, and peace of business, in many cases. If a person protects an expressive act that does not entirely influence another person’s honor, privacy, and rights, it would be the same as not guaranteeing freedom of expression. In such respect, the limitation of freedom of expression is in line with the limitation of the number of persons with respect to the restriction of other rights or interests.

3) Establishment of limits on the freedom of expression and the protection of other legal interests

The Supreme Court has explained as follows several situations where the freedom of expression and other legal interests conflict.

① In setting the limitation between freedom of expression and protection of reputation, the criteria for review should be differentiated depending on whether the victim whose reputation is damaged by the expression in question is a public figure or a private figure, whether the expression pertains to a matter of public interest or a purely belongs to a private sphere. In the case of expression as to a matter of public and social meaning, restrictions on freedom of speech should be mitigated. In addition, whether a public official’s duties are properly carried out or not should always be subject to citizen’s monitoring and criticism. In particular, since the political party’s monitoring function on fairness in dealing with a case of violation of the Election Act, etc. with political influence is one of the important duties of a political party, such monitoring and criticism function should be guaranteed, and it should not be easily restricted unless it is a attack (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da62494, Jul. 22, 2003).

(2) An assembly or demonstration is an act that affects, or imposes pressure on, the opinion of an unspecified number of people in a common purpose and a public place by putting in action, exerting influence on, or showing power or influence on, it is inevitable to cause any inconvenience in noise or passage, etc. to deliver the opinion to many and unspecified persons participating in the assembly or demonstration, and thus, a general citizen who does not participate in the assembly or demonstration has a duty to authorize citizens to do so. Therefore, in light of the place, form, content, method, and outcome of the assembly or demonstration, if it is merely a case where damage is caused to a size that is acceptable under the social norms within the reasonable extent necessary for accomplishing the purpose of the assembly or demonstration, the illegality may be avoided as a justifiable act (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do840, Jul. 23, 2009).

(3) The collective consumer payment movement, which is an attempt to substantially reflect the consumer's preference of goods or services in the market with weapons, is originally guaranteed through Article 124 of the Constitution as part of the consumer payment movement that takes place at an appropriate time through the appropriate distribution structure in order to promote the rights and interests of the consumers who purchase or use high-quality goods or services at an appropriate price. However, in other respects, it may be possible for ordinary citizens to choose a consumer payment movement as a means to assert or safeguard a particular social, economic or political representative or to boost the value of a particular social, economic or political representative. Such consumer payment movement may not be protected in terms of the freedom of political expression guaranteed pursuant to Article 21 of the Constitution, or the freedom of general behavior inherent in Article 10 of the Constitution, even if it does not necessarily require Article 124 of the Constitution. Thus, merely because the consumer payment movement failed to meet the requirements of the consumer protection movement guaranteed pursuant to Article 124 of the Constitution, it does not constitute an act of interference with business under Article 124(1)14) of the Criminal Act.

In these Supreme Court decisions, when freedom of expression conflicts with other rights or legal interests, it can be seen that the limitation of freedom of expression is carefully set in consideration of the importance of freedom of expression.

C. History of the crime of interference with business, elements and effects of the crime of interference with business, and interpretation of the Supreme Court

1) Historical and comparative studies on the crime of interference with business

In history, the crime of interference with business under the former Criminal Act was punished by the crime of interference with business under the latter Criminal Act, and the original form of the crime of interference with business under the latter Criminal Act is French Criminal Act in 1864. Article 414 of the former Criminal Act of France in 1864 provides for punishing “a person who interferes with business by deceptive means or deceptive means with the purpose of forcing wage reduction or wage reduction, or by obstructing the free conduct of industry or labor.” Meanwhile, the amended French Criminal Act in 1884 provided for punishing “a person who interferes with business of a person who interferes with business of a person who interferes with business of a person by force” in Article 234 of the former Criminal Act. Meanwhile, Article 270 of the former Criminal Act of Japan was amended to punish “a person who interferes with business of a person who interferes with business of a person by force by force” in the current Criminal Act.

As such, the crime of interference with business by force was aimed at suppressing labor movement in France and Japan, and the crime of interference with business has been stipulated in the Korean criminal law.

The above derived and characteristics of the crime of interference with business should be referred to in interpreting the elements of the crime of interference with business in consideration of the Supreme Court’s careful application of Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act in the case of industrial action and consumer unfair trade practice as seen below.

2) The wide range of elements of the crime of interference with business and the imposition of punishment

The legal interest protected by the crime of interference with business is a human’s duties, work or business that a person continues to engage in in in the social status. Therefore, the crime of interference with business is not pure property, but a crime of protecting the freedom of personal activity, which is characterized as a property crime. However, the crime of interference with business under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act is likely to excessively restrict the fundamental rights of the people in order to protect

First of all, the concept of "compact", one of the elements of the crime of interference with business, is very broad and ambiguous, and the concept of "compact" belongs to a very broad and ambiguous type of act. Of course, as seen earlier, our precedents embody the concept of "compact" as a case law, but the concept still has a relatively broad and ambiguous general provision.

In addition, the crime of interference with business under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act is one of the types of deceptive schemes, force, etc. which are not punishable by itself. ② The statutory penalty is imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine not exceeding 15 million won, even though the risk of interference with business is established solely on the basis of the risk of causing interference with business. This is more severe than the statutory punishment for the crime of assault under Article 260 of the Criminal Act (a imprisonment for not more than two years, a fine not exceeding five million won, a fine not exceeding five million won), and the crime of intimidation under Article 283 (a punishment (a imprisonment for not more than three years, a fine not exceeding five million won, a penal detention, or a minor fine) which is heavier than the statutory punishment for the crime of interference with business under Article 136 of the Criminal Act (a punishment for interference with business under Article 137 of the Criminal Act, the form and structure of the act are similar to those of interference with business, and both of the same are heavier than the statutory punishment for the crime of obstruction with business by deceptive means

The fact that the crime of interference with business by force is likely to excessively restrict the fundamental rights of the people through the wide range of elements of the crime of interference with business, and the statutory penalty should be considered in interpreting and applying the crime of interference with business.

3) Interpretation of the Supreme Court’s crime of interference with business

The Supreme Court has limited interpretation of the elements of the crime of interference with business in cases where several fundamental rights are at issue in consideration of the above characteristics of the crime of interference with business. The representative example is related to industrial action and consumer unfair trade practice, and the contents of the Supreme Court's ruling are expressed in a simple manner as follows.

As fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, Supreme Court en banc Decision 2007Do482 Decided March 17, 201, which are specifically related to the expression of the vote contained in the main text, are fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action (so-called three labor rights, Article 33(1) of the Constitution) to improve working conditions, and the strike does not always constitute interference with business. It is reasonable to view that the employer’s free will to continue business can be deemed to be a suppression or confusion because the refusal of collective provision constitutes force, and the crime of interference with business is established only in cases where it is deemed that the employer’s free will to continue business can be deemed that the refusal of collective provision constitutes force, and that the collective provision of labor constitutes a crime of interference with business, taking into account the following factors: the freedom of expression and the collective exercise of enterprises, which are guaranteed by the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do410 Decided March 14, 2013, and the general consumer freedom of expression or the general consumer’s freedom of expression (Article 1201).

In other words, the Supreme Court limits the elements for the crime of interference with business by taking into account the fact that an act of an actor constitutes force under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act in the case of an industrial action and consumer unfair trade practice. However, in light of the nature of exercising fundamental rights, each act should not immediately be deemed as exercising fundamental rights. The above two rulings do not divide the concept of “defensiveness” as the constituent element of the crime of interference with business and the concept of “risk of occurrence of results.” However, in light of the aspect of the outcome that an act of an actor causes serious confusion or enormous damage to the business operation, the Supreme Court should consider whether the act of an actor constitutes “a threat or confusion of the user’s free will to continue the business” and determine whether the act of the actor constitutes force. In the consumer unfair trade practice, the Supreme Court should consider whether the act of the actor constitutes “the degree of disadvantage or damage suffered by the target company” and determine whether the act of the actor constitutes a threat of interference with business as a result of evaluating whether the act of the actor constitutes an actual injury.

D. If freedom of expression is at issue, interpretation of the crime of interference with business - other arguments.

1) The freedom of political expression cannot be deemed as falling short of the three fundamental rights at issue in the above Supreme Court ruling on industrial action, and the above Supreme Court ruling on consumer unfair exercise explicitly refers to the fundamental rights related to the act of unfair exercise. Therefore, the legal principles of each of the above Supreme Court ruling, which narrowly interpreted the elements of the crime of interference with business for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights, may also apply to the defendant's act at issue in relation to the exercise of the freedom of political expression. If such interpretation is not so interpreted, in a case where the freedom of general action, which is the protected legal interest of the freedom of expression and the crime of interference with business, conflicts with the freedom of expression, the freedom of expression can be unilaterally sacrifice and guaranteed only the freedom of general action, thereby resulting in the outcome of the request of the Constitution, which is the basis of the legal effect including the Criminal Act, and the means of recognition and authority. In other words, in a case where business operation is obstructed by another person, and in a case where the pros and cons for national policies may be divided, one of the parties’ view should not be applied equally based on the case where another person's business operation is interfered in the process.

2) The application of the Criminal Act to the exercise of internationally peaceful assemblies of general traffic obstruction and interference with business is continuously being brought about in line with the international human rights standards, such as the freedom of expression and week 2) stipulated in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Republic of Korea has joined and ratified, and Article 21 of the same Act.

3) On the other hand, special consideration is also required for a case where a private person’s business takes the character of certain official duties. The punishment of a public official who conducts official duties is subject to violence or intimidation, and the type of such act is very limited. The Criminal Act separate from the crime of obstruction of business is the purport of punishing a public official as to the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties only when he obstructs the execution of official duties by means of violence, intimidation, or deceptive scheme (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do4166, Nov. 19, 2009). Furthermore, in the foregoing purport, the Supreme Court held that the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties cannot be subject to the crime of interference of business against a public official’s act of interfering with official duties.

This interpretation of the Supreme Court should also be interpreted in interpreting the requirements for the crime of interference with business. In other words, if a specific private service is not an individual or a company's leading command, but is substantially connected to a public service, the interference with the specific private service is also considered to be the nature of the interference with the public service.

In this case, if the obstruction of business due to the exercise of the freedom of political expression interferes with private duties, but practically has the nature of obstructing the performance of official duties, the scope of “defensive force” should be interpreted narrowly, taking into account the fact that the attitude of the act of obstructing the performance of official duties is limited to assault and intimidation, and that the act of obstructing the performance of official duties cannot be applied to obstruction of business.

E. Sub-committee

In full view of the above, even if the defendant's act at issue appears to fall under the exercise of force in the crime of interference with business, if the act is of the nature of exercising the freedom of political expression, the act shall be interpreted by limiting the "act of interference with business as prescribed by Article 314 (1) of the Criminal Act" to "act of interference with business as prescribed by Article 314 (1) of the Criminal Act where a free will with respect to the continuation of business of the principal agent may be deemed to be a suppression or confusion in relation to the act of expression by the principal agent by means of an act of expression," and the part of "act of interference with business" in the above provision shall not be an abstract risk of interference with business, but at least to cause "specific, realistic,

4. Determination of the party deliberation in the instant case

A. Whether the instant facts charged was made as part of the freedom of expression

According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below and the trial court, the following facts may be acknowledged:

① From September 201 to September 201, Non-Indicted 1, etc., opposed to the instant construction, the instant construction site had been proceeding with religious events (hereinafter “unborns”). From September 201 to September 201, the said U.S. history voluntarily participates in the instant construction site by persons, who are not the believerss, females, and those who are not sexual workers, from September 201. The number of persons participating in the U.S. history is vary daily, and such persons are determined as to when they are to participate in the U.S. history. Some of the persons participating in the U.S. have moved to the place near the instant construction site and live.

② On February 27, 2014, the Defendant stated that he/she had been present in the instant U.S. company against the instant U.S. company on several occasions in addition to May 9, 2013, which was the time of the act indicated in paragraph (1) of the instant facts constituting the instant facts charged (hereinafter “instant facts charged”) and the time of the act indicated in paragraph (2) of the said facts charged (hereinafter “instant facts charged”), (a) was present in the instant U.S. company on several occasions in addition to the date on which the Defendant was present in the investigation record (the investigation record is accompanied by a photograph attached thereto, which was located in the construction site of this case, on February 11, 2014, when the instant act was committed (hereinafter “second act”).

③ In addition, according to the investigation report (Evidence No. 177 pages), the Defendant appeared at the construction site of this case from September 10, 2012 to the end of the death day of this case, and the Defendant was aware of the Defendant as the so-called “Habitual Demonstrationer” on this ground.

④ The fact that the Defendant participated in the construction site of this case on May 9, 2013. The fact that the Defendant started to prevent the front of the said employee’s vehicle on the ground that the employee, who entered the construction site of this case among the U.S. Do on February 10, 2014, moved to the chair of the U.S. Do, by entering the construction site of this case.

Comprehensively taking account of the above facts, acts Nos. 1 and 2 can be deemed as acts committed during several years’ continuous history from September 201 to express the opposition to the instant construction from around September 201. Moreover, if the Defendant did not have any intent to oppose the instant construction works, it appears that the Defendant did not have any reason to be present at the said construction site. In other words, the Defendant participated in the instant construction site in order to express his opposition to the instant construction works (the act No. 2), and had deemed that the expression of intent was unfairly restricted (the act No. 1) and carried out an act within the meaning of this paragraph. Accordingly, the Defendant’s act of Nos. 1 and 2 can be evaluated as having occurred in the process of participating in the instant construction project and exercising the freedom of political expression.

Therefore, in accordance with the legal principles set forth in Paragraph 3(e) above, we examine the first and second acts.

B. Determination as to No. 1 act

1) First, according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, the following facts are acknowledged.

A) During the instant construction site that is initiated by Nonindicted Party 1, etc. in the Bocheon-si, etc., the U.S. S. S. company is proceeding at 11:00 a.m. a day and proceeding at 16:00 a.m..., the instant construction site is carried out. As such, the vehicles seeking access to the above construction site during the U.S. company cannot immediately enter the construction site.

B) On the instant construction site, the police stationed at the construction site and waiting to enter the construction site during the U.S. is increased, if the vehicle is waiting to enter the construction site during the U.S. construction period, the vehicle will be allowed to enter the road by moving the participants in the U.S. on the first hand. If the vehicle is not increased, the police will not participate in the progress.

C) The Defendant, immediately before the instant construction site, participated in the history of Non-Indicted 1’s presence before the entrance. At the time, the number of persons who participated in the U.S. was eight, and the police observed them. However, the number of vehicles seeking to get out of the construction site of the instant case was unfolded and increased to the construction site. At that time, the number of the workers was moving to Nonindicted 1, who was going out from the string of the string fishing vessel.

라) 위 미사에 참여한 사람들은 경찰에게 의자를 옮긴 근로자가 공소외 1 신부에게 폭력을 행사하였으니 현행범으로 체포, 처벌하여 달라는 취지로 항의하였다. 경찰은 의자를 옮긴 근로자에게 “손댔다가 어떻게 하려고 그럽니까?”라고 말하였을 뿐 아무 대응도 하지 아니하다가 위 미사에 참여한 공소외 1 신부 등 사람들을 의자째 들어 옮겨 차량이 이 사건 공사현장에 출입할 수 있도록 하였다.

E) The Defendant continued to resist the employee moving to another vehicle, and the said employee again demanded the said employee to go to the new part of Nonindicted Party 1, in the future of the other vehicle. However, the said employee did not comply with the demand. Accordingly, the Defendant was in front of the said vehicle with the indication of a port, and some of the astronomical girls and girls were in front of the said vehicle, together with the Defendant (the act No. 1). After about eight minutes, the police called the Defendant to go to the direction behind the Defendant. The Defendant again intending to continue to go to go to the port at the entrance of the construction site of this case (the act No. 1) in front of the road (the act). After nine minutes, Nonindicted Party 1 told the Defendant that the new part of Nonindicted Party 1 came to come to go to the Defendant, and the Defendant took the way to respond to this.

2) Whether the Defendant exercised power

In light of the above legal principles, the following facts are as follows: ① the Defendant was standing or standing in front of the vehicle, and did not move to the use of cars or other equipment; ② the Defendant did mixed act; ② the number of persons driving the construction work does not reach the number of persons driving the construction work in consideration of the size of the construction site even when the number of persons driving the deceased was combined; ③ the police was waiting to keep all the circumstances at the time and to take measures to prevent interference with the construction work due to unsatis, etc.; ④ the passage of the Defendant was about 17 minutes if the Defendant was waiting, ④ the entry of the vehicle is resumed by the police, ⑤ Article 158 of the Criminal Act intends to ensure the peace of religious activities by providing a provision punishing those interfering with towing; ② the Defendant’s religious activities by Non-Indicted 1, a new assistant of the U.S. Jindo, with the aim of interfering with the religious activities of Non-Indicted 1, who is the executor of the construction work, is difficult to view that the act constitutes a free will of the instant corporation.

3) Whether there was a risk that is specific, realistic, and disregarded as an act No. 1

In the case of the investigation report submitted by the prosecutor (in the case of the attachment of the amount of loss to the construction company due to interference with the construction work), it is difficult to recognize that Nonindicted Company 2 suffered the above loss due to the first act by simply dividing the labor cost and equipment cost invested at the construction site of this case by 10 hours during February 10, 2014, which is the first act of the instant construction company.

Furthermore, in light of the degree of the progress of the instant construction project, the duration of the Defendant’s act as seen earlier, lack of specificity of the work specifically obstructed at that time, etc., it is insufficient to recognize that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone caused a specific and practical danger to the construction subject’s work as the first act, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise.

C. Judgment on the second act

1) First, according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, the following facts are acknowledged.

According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below, at around 11:26, May 9, 2013, the defendant moved to a roadside for the vehicle traffic on around 11:26, the following facts: (a) around 10 minutes before the entrance of the construction site of this case; (b) around 10 minutes after the police at the time moving the above six persons to the side of the road for the vehicle traffic; (c) around 12:06 on the same day, the vehicle passed after the lapse of 11 minutes; (d) the police moved to the roadside for the vehicle traffic; (e) the person participating in the construction site of this case after the lapse of 11 minutes; and (e) the person moving to the roadside for the vehicle traffic on around 12:21 on the same day; and (e) the person moving to the road after the lapse of 12:21 on the same day; and (e) the police continues to move to the above place; and (e) the person moving to the road and the construction site.

2) Whether the Defendant exercised power

In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the following facts are considered: (a) the defendant was living in a way that he was seated with his will, and did not move out by sound or power using power; (b) the number of persons driving together with six persons does not considerably fall short of the number of persons driving the construction; (c) the above persons did not use tools or equipment other than a simple strawet, and do not resist when he was seated with his will to enter a vehicle; (d) the time when the defendant was seated with his will, was 27 minutes in total, even under the charges themselves; (c) the defendant et al. repeateded his seat in front of the other entrance; and (d) the time when the defendant et al. did not have a vehicle to enter the construction site before the other entrance; and (v) the police at the time when the defendant was seated, it is difficult to see that the defendant did not cooperate with the non-indicted corporation as the type of the defendant corporation 2, as it does not interfere with the exercise of the right to enter the construction site.

3) Whether there was a risk that is specific, realistic, and disregarded as a second act

Furthermore, considering whether there was a risk to obstruct the instant construction work as a second act, it is insufficient to recognize that the materials submitted in light of the degree of the instant construction work’s progress, the continuance time, attitudes, etc. as well as the degree of the instant construction work’s progress, etc., have caused a specific and realistic danger to the instant construction work subject as a second act. There is no other evidence to

D. Sub-committee

Ultimately, it is difficult to view that the facts charged against the defendant are proven beyond a reasonable doubt only with the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below and the court below. Therefore, even though the court below should have rendered a verdict of innocence on the ground that there is no proof of a crime pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, it should have been pronounced guilty on the ground of its reasoning. The court below erred in the misapprehension of facts, which affected the conclusion of the judgment,

5. Conclusion

Thus, since the defendant's appeal is well-grounded, the judgment of the court below is reversed under Article 364 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act without examining the prosecutor's argument of unfair sentencing, and it is again decided as follows.

Judgment of innocence

The summary of the facts charged in the instant case is as indicated in Article 2-A(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. This constitutes a case where there is no proof of a crime for the same reason as indicated in Articles 3 and 4 above, and thus, the Defendant is acquitted pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the summary of the judgment is announced in accordance with Article 58(2)

Judge Lee Jin-hee (Presiding Judge)

1) Every person has the right to have an opinion without interference. 2. This right includes the right to pursue, receive and deliver all kinds of information and ideas, regardless of border, through oral, written, or printed forms of art, or by any other means chosen by himself/herself. 3. The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be subject to special duties and responsibilities. Accordingly, the exercise of such right may be subject to certain restrictions, provided that the restriction is provided by law and is limited only to cases where it is necessary to respect the rights or credit of others: (a) the respect for national security or public order or the protection of public health or morality:

2) The right to a peaceful assembly is recognized in Article 21. The exercise of this right shall be subject to law and shall not be subject to any limitations other than those necessary in a democratic society for national security or public safety, public order, public health or morality or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.

3) On June 7, 2013, the first announcement of the content of the investigation (htp:///www.Wings/www.Yings/Wings/130290) on the controversy over the major human rights of the Republic of Korea of the United Nations Special Reporting Center for the Vindication of Human Rights of the Republic of Korea (UNFCCC) on June 7, 2013, a national report submitted by the Republic of Korea in the deliberation of the United Nations Convention on the Convention on the Rights of the Republic of Korea on October 2015, a list of the subjects related to the national report submitted by the Republic of Korea in the deliberation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Republic of Korea on January 29, 2016, and a special report on the freedom of peaceful assembly and association by the United Nations Conference on the Rights of the Republic of Korea on January 29, 2016.