Chuncheon District Court-2014-Gu Partnership-4311 ( November 06, 2015)

Review Division 2013-144 ( December 31, 2013)

(as in the first instance judgment), the amended tax invoice shall be issued within the limit of the value of supply actually supplied.

(As in the judgment of the first instance) If the value that was not supplied to the revised tax invoice issued by reason of termination of contract, etc. is included, the portion on the value not supplied shall not be included in the value of the revised tax invoice

Article 16 (Tax Invoice)

(Chuncheon)Revocation, etc. of disposition to refuse to refund value-added tax, 2015Nu1224

AAAA Corporation

BB Director of the Tax Office

Chuncheon District Court Decision 2014Guhap4311 Decided November 6, 2015

January 23, 2017

February 13, 2017

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant's disposition rejecting the application for the refund of value-added tax of KRW 82,171,300 against the plaintiff on May 30, 2013 and the disposition imposing penalty tax of KRW 35,88,70 against the plaintiff on February 2, 2012 shall be revoked.

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning for the court’s explanation on the instant case is the same as that for the first instance judgment except for the following modifications. As such, it shall be accepted pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act (generally, in a lawsuit seeking revocation of tax imposition, the burden of proving the facts subject to taxation in light of the empirical rule in the course of a specific lawsuit is deemed to have the imposing authority. However, if the facts alleged in the facts alleged in light of the empirical rule in the course of a specific lawsuit, it cannot be readily concluded that the pertinent taxation disposition is an illegal disposition that fails to meet the taxation requirement unless the other party proves the circumstances that the pertinent facts in question are not eligible for application of the empirical rule (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Du6604, Feb. 22, 2007). In light of the text and text of the subcontract and settlement agreement between the Plaintiff andCC Construction, it is reasonable to deem that the amount payable prior to the construction contract is the amount equivalent to the existing obligation ofCC Construction.

2. Parts to be corrected;

The part "the nature of the issuance of tax invoices on June 30, 2012" in paragraph 3.b. (2) of the judgment of the court of first instance (from the 13th to the 14th 10th th st th st th th th th th th th th th th th th

“2) The nature of the issuance of the tax invoice dated June 30, 2012

The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that “the tax invoice was issued as of June 30, 2012 with respect to the progress payment incurred from the implementation of each of the instant subcontracting projects from April 2012, and such payment is not a tax invoice for advance payment, regardless of its title.” However, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by comprehensively taking into account the facts acknowledged prior to the witness testimony and the overall purport of the pleadings, it is reasonable to deem that the tax invoice issued by the Plaintiff as of June 30, 2012 is not a tax invoice for advance payment, but a tax invoice for advance payment. Accordingly, the Defendant’s imposition of penalty tax for reducing the sales amount stated in the tax invoice as of June 30, 2012 from the sales amount in the first half of 2012 and adding the sales amount in the year 2012 is legitimate.

A) On June 30, 2012, the tax invoice prepared by the Plaintiff on June 30, 2012, stating that “in advance payment for the items” is “pre-payment for the items”, and in relation toCC Construction, it seems that it prepared and issued an advance payment request.

B) Furthermore, the Plaintiff issued a tax invoice on June 30, 2012 and received the price therefrom from the Plaintiff on August 2, 2012. Moreover, the Plaintiff’s first written claim (Evidence No. 6-3), the inspector of the completed portion of the construction work (Evidence No. 6-4), and the electronic tax invoice (Evidence No. 6-5) based on the first written claim for completed portion of the construction work (Evidence No. 6-4) are identical with each other. This is a circumstance supporting that the tax invoice as of June 30, 2012 is a tax invoice for advance payment.

C) In this regard, the Plaintiff asserts to the effect that it is merely an erroneous statement as a non-legal professional or non-tax professional. However, in light of the meaning of advance payment ordinarily used in the construction industry, it is difficult to readily understand such assertion by itself.

D) In addition, the Plaintiff alleged to the effect that the Plaintiff had already been paid the amount of money due to considerable weather in the process of the subcontracted construction work from April 2012 to June 30, 2012. However, there is insufficient evidence to deem that the Plaintiff had been performing the subcontracted construction work prior to the preparation of the subcontract document (Evidence B-3-3) on May 20, 2012, as well as insufficient evidence to deem that the Plaintiff had been performing the subcontracted construction work, and also, it is difficult to believe that the said one-time request for construction work and the completed construction work are inconsistent with the inspector.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.