Whether the act of a telecommunications business operator entering into a contract for the use of mobile phone services and allowing another person to use it ultimately constitutes “the case of providing telecommunications services provided by a telecommunications business operator for another’s communications use” prohibited by the main sentence of Article 30 of the Telecommunications Business Act (affirmative)

Telecommunications Business Act No. 1, 2, 6, and 9, Article 30, and Article 97 subparag. 7

Defendant

Defendant

Seoul Northern District Court Decision 2013No188 decided May 3, 2013

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 2 of the Telecommunications Business Act provides that "telecommunications" in this Act means transmission or reception of codes, words, sounds, or images by wire, wireless, optical, or other electronic means; "telecommunications facilities" means machinery, apparatus, lines, or other facilities necessary for telecommunications; "telecommunications services" means mediating another's communications or providing telecommunications facilities for communications with another's communications using telecommunications facilities; and "user" means a person who has entered into a contract for the use of telecommunications services with a telecommunications business operator to receive telecommunications services; and Article 30 of the Telecommunications Business Act provides that no person shall intermediate another's communications or provide such services for communications with another's communications, using telecommunications services provided by the telecommunications business operator (Article 4). However, the same does not apply to cases where a user allows a third party to use his/her mobile phone to use it to the extent that it is not repeated with a third party (Article 30 of the Telecommunications Business Act).

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, it is justifiable for the lower court to reverse the first instance judgment that acquitted the Defendant on the ground that the instant facts charged were guilty, and to have rendered a conviction. In so doing, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules or by misapprehending

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)