[1] The scope of compensation for damage and the criteria for determining the degree of contribution in a case where the king has contributed to the expansion of damage due to aggravation of damage caused by accidents

[2] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which calculated the lost income on the basis of the remaining labor ability of the accident due to the king, in case where the victim was killed due to an accident, without considering the degree of contribution to the whole injury and death of the king

[1] Where the victim contributed to the occurrence of the victim's occurrence of a specific injury or the prolonged period of medical treatment, further expansion of the period of injury or death after the treatment is completed, it is reasonable to bear the part corresponding to the victim's total damages in accordance with the degree recognized as contributing to the occurrence of all or the result of death, including the specific injury, from the perspective of fair burden of damage. In determining the degree of contribution to the whole or death of the victim, it is not necessarily necessary to accurately determine the amount of contribution to the victim's total injury or death, but it is reasonable to reasonably determine the amount of contribution to the victim's whole injury in medical science in light of all the circumstances, such as the cause and degree of the king as shown in the oral argument, the correlation between the king and the entire injury, the treatment process, the age, occupation and health conditions of the victim, etc.

[2] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which calculated the lost income based on the assessment of the remaining labor ability at the time of the accident due to the aftermath of the first accident, on the ground that the king was not fully examined to contribute to the entire injury and the cause of death due to the second accident, in case where the victim suspected of loss of labor ability due to the aftermath of the second accident and having been suffering from the second accident due to blood pressure and the aftermath of the first accident, which was caused by the second accident, was killed

[1] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da39320 delivered on May 22, 1992 (Gong1992, 1965), Supreme Court Decision 93Da180 delivered on April 9, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 1368), Supreme Court Decision 94Da1517 delivered on November 25, 1994 (Gong195Sang, 82)

Plaintiff and the deceased Nonparty 1’s litigant et al. (Attorneys Park Im-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Yoon-soo et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 94Na26225 delivered on October 21, 1994

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant as to lost income shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul District Court. The defendant's remaining appeal shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal as to the dismissal of the appeal

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

According to the records, the deceased non-party 1 suffered bodily injury from the accident of this case, etc., and thereby suffered bodily injury from the accident of this case, and it cannot be found that there is no error of law such as theory of litigation. The argument is without merit.

On the second ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the above deceased's remaining work ability should be deducted from the actual income of the deceased, on the ground that the aftermath disability before the accident of this case contributed to the cause of the death of the above deceased, and that the aftermath disorder before the accident of this case contributed to the death of the above deceased. The degree of contribution of the above deceased's aftermath disability before the accident of this case only contributed to the death of this case, and it is not a nature to be deducted from the actual income, and it is not a nature to be deducted from the actual income. In addition, in calculating the lost income of the above deceased under the premise that the plaintiff's work ability as the deaf repairer was remaining at 51% as of May 30, 192 due to the permanent aftermath disability as alleged by the defendant at the time of the accident of this case, it is based on the remaining 51% labor ability remaining after deducting the daily work ability due to the aftermath disability of this case.

However, the judgment of the court below, which seems to be in calculating the lost income of the deceased based on statistical income, is nothing more than calculating the income earned at the time of the deceased's accident, and it cannot be deemed that taking into account the deceased's king evidence. Accordingly, if the king evidence of the victim of a traffic accident has contributed to the occurrence of a specific injury or the prolonged period of treatment, further expansion of treatment or death after treatment, it shall be reasonable in terms of the fair liability for damages, in accordance with the degree that king was deemed to have contributed to the occurrence of the whole injury or death, including the specific injury, if the king evidence of the victim of the traffic accident has aggravated in competition with the accident.

In addition, the court does not necessarily have to make an accurate determination of the degree of contribution to the whole or death of kings, but can reasonably make a determination by taking into account all the circumstances, such as the cause and degree of kings as shown in the pleading, the correlation between kings and all injuries, treatment progress, the victim’s age, occupation, and health conditions (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da39320, May 22, 1992; 93Da180, Apr. 9, 193; 94Da1517, Nov. 25, 1994).

According to the first diagnosis document (Evidence No. 3) prepared by Nonparty 2 of the deceased on November 8, 1992, the first diagnosis document (Evidence No. 3 of the above deceased) was written on November 8, 1992. The first diagnosis statement was written on November 19, 192 that the first diagnosis of the deceased was called 'self-explosion cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral chyecephal chine - cerebral typhism - typhism.' The medical records (Evidence No. 4) of Nonparty 2 of the above deceased were written to the above deceased. However, it is difficult to view that the first instance court's first diagnosis report was made to the head of the North University Hospital Hospital of the first instance, and that the first instance court's first instance court's second diagnosis report was included in 90% of the symptoms of the above deceased's cerebral chyetrophal tyeopic tyeine.

If so, the court below should have tried more to determine whether the above deceased had a high blood pressure prior to the accident of this case, and if the court below found that the above deceased had a high blood pressure as a result of the examination, the court below should have tried to determine whether the above deceased had a high blood pressure, and there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the degree of contribution of the deceased, or by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the degree of contribution of the first accident and the death of this case through an appraisal, etc., as a whole, whether the above high blood pressure and the first accident of this case contributed to the whole injury of the deceased and the cause of the death of this case. (Unless special circumstances exist, the degree of contribution to the high blood pressure and the degree of contribution to the second accident of this case shall not be added up, respectively.)

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant as to the lost income shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the court below, and the defendant's remaining appeal shall be dismissed without merit. The costs of appeal as to the dismissed part shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)