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(영문) 대법원 1993. 7. 13. 선고 93누1855 판결
[유기장업영업정지처분취소][공1993.9.15.(952),2305]
Main Issues

Where a person who has obtained permission under the Public Health Act operates a speculative business, the person entitled to take administrative disposition, such as revocation of permission

Summary of Judgment

Even in cases where a person who has obtained permission under the Public Health Act is deemed to engage in speculative business under Article 2 of the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc. Act by establishing and using an apparatus which is likely to cause speculative spirit, such as mechanical slot machines, unless the commissioner of a district police agency separately obtains permission under the same Act, he/she shall have the authority to revoke permission or suspend business for such business operations, etc. to the head of a Si/Gun/Gu, who is the person having the authority to take administrative disposition under the Public Health Act, and is not the commissioner of

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 2(1)1(f), 4(1), 12(2)3(a), and 23(1) of the Public Health Act; Article 2(1)1(d), 4(1), 21(1), and 21(2) of the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc. Act; Article 3 of the Regulation of Speculative Acts, Etc. Act;

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 92Do2375 delivered on February 9, 1993 (Gong1993, 1027) 93Nu7877 delivered on July 13, 1993

Plaintiff-Appellee

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant-Appellant

The head of Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 92Gu9267 delivered on December 11, 1992

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the plaintiff's act of speculative business is illegal since it is reasonable to view that the plaintiff's act of speculative business constitutes a game facility or machine under Article 2 (1) 1 (f) and Article 12 (2) 3 (a) of the Public Health Act, since it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff's act of speculative business is likely to attract speculative spirit under Article 2 (1) 1 (d) of the Act on the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc., and the plaintiff's act of speculative business should be deemed to have been done. Meanwhile, according to Articles 4 and 21 of the Act on the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc., it is stipulated that the local police agency has the authority to permit the business of speculative business and to cancel the permission or to suspend the business of the above business, which is operated by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the authority to cancel the permission and to suspend the business of the local police agency.

(2) However, even in cases where a person who originally obtained permission under the Public Health Act is recognized to have engaged in a speculative business under Article 2 of the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc. by installing and using an apparatus which is likely to attract speculative spirit, such as mechanical slots, etc. thereafter, unless the commissioner of the district police agency separately obtained permission under the same Act, the authority to cancel permission or suspend his/her business, etc. against such business is still held by the head of the Si/Gun/Gu, who is the administrative disposition authority under the Public Health Act, and Article 3 of the Addenda of the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc. (amended by Act No. 4407 of Nov. 30, 191) is not the commissioner of the district police agency. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Addenda of the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc. (amended by Act No. 4407 of Nov. 30, 199), which is a regulation on speculative acts before the full revision, is the purport that the commissioner of the district police agency considers the permission of speculative acts under the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc.

In light of the above legal principles, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the authority of administrative disposition, unless the court below did not have the authority to suspend the business of the plaintiff for the above business, and there is a reason to point out the objection.

(3) Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the lower court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Choi Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)

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