[1] The object and scope of the court's trial in civil procedure

[2] The case holding that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal requirements of prohibiting the manufacturing and sale of the above product and claiming damages arising from the prohibition of the manufacturing and sale of the above product, the prohibition of the use, etc. of specific technology, delivery of drawings, etc., compensation for damages, and delayed payment payment, and concluded an agreement with Eul and Eul after the judgment became final and conclusive that " Eul shall faithfully comply with the remainder of the obligation to pay money pursuant to the above decision" after Eul manufactured and sold the above product, and Eul corporation again filed a claim against Eul corporation for damages arising from the manufacturing and sale of the above product with the main claim of the violation of the above obligation under the above agreement, and the violation of the prohibition of the manufacturing of the salary cutting and the prohibition of the manufacturing of the above agreement and the prohibition of compensation for damages arising from the violation of the above obligation under the above agreement, and the prohibition of the infringement of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act and the No. 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act, which are entirely different from the legal requirements of prohibiting the above infringement of the right to claim for damages arising from the preceding judgment or the above agreement

[1] The Civil Procedure Act provides, “The court shall not render a judgment on the matters not requested by the parties” as the title of “the disposal right principle.” The subject of a trial in civil procedure is specified according to the Plaintiff’s intent, and the court shall determine the matters requested by the parties only within the scope of the application.

[2] The case holding that the court below's decision that Gap corporation Eul corporation's manufacture and sale of the above product was not reported to Gap corporation while Eul corporation's manufacture and sale of the above product was provided with a drawing of the flag cutting machine product in accordance with the technical cooperation agreement with Eul corporation and Eul corporation's corporation, and Eul corporation entered into an agreement with Eul corporation " Eul corporation is exempt from part of the monetary payment obligation under the above decision and faithfully comply with the remaining obligations" after the judgment became final and conclusive, and then Eul corporation's manufacture and sale of the above product was again requested by Eul corporation for damages due to the prohibition of manufacturing the flag cutting machine and the manufacturing and sale of the above product due to violation of the technical cooperation agreement with Gap corporation, and Gap corporation's claim for damages due to the violation of the above article 1 of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act was not made for the reason that Gap corporation's violation of the above article 1 of the Fair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act was not made for the reason that the above flaging contract or the above information was not made.

[1] Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Articles 203 and 423 of the Civil Procedure Act, Articles 2 subparag. 2, 11, and 14-2(5) of the former Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (Amended by Act No. 13081, Jan. 28, 2015); Articles 2 subparag. 2 and 10(1) of the former Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (Amended by Act No. 16204, Jan. 8, 2019)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 81Meu550 Decided April 27, 1982 (Gong1982, 557), Supreme Court Decision 201Da61646 Decided May 9, 2013

1. The case where the plaintiff et al. al. (Attorneys Cho Jong-ok et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Hosung Machinery Industry Co., Ltd. (LLC, Attorneys Kim Jae-hun et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Na27475 decided July 9, 2015

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Case overview

According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted, the following facts are revealed:

A. Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are companies that manufacture and sell the flag. When the flag, which was manufactured and sold from around 1993, was problematic, the Defendant concluded a technical cooperation agreement with the Plaintiff on August 31, 1995 (hereinafter “instant technical cooperation agreement”). The content is that “the Plaintiff transferred the technology for the production of the flag to the Defendant, the Defendant pays 15% of the selling price at the manufacturing cost, and the Defendant shall not use the transferred Plaintiff’s technology when the 7-year contract expires or the contract is terminated.”

B. The Defendant was provided with 2,100 copies of the drawing for the flag cutting product from the Plaintiff in accordance with the instant technical cooperation agreement, and did not report it to the Plaintiff even if he manufactured and sold the flag cutting machine from August 24, 1995 to February 24, 1999 by ○○○ et al.

C. The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant on the ground of the breach of a technical partnership agreement. On September 25, 2002, the appellate court received both the Plaintiff’s prohibition of production, sale, and consignment of the flaging season, the Plaintiff’s request for delivery of drawings, documents, etc. as stated in the attached Table 2 of the lower judgment (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s own technology”), and sentenced the Defendant to pay KRW 500 million (Seoul High Court Decision 2001Na4024, hereinafter “prior judgment”). The Defendant appealed against this, but was dismissed (Supreme Court Decision 2002Da59658, Feb. 11, 2003).

D. On March 15, 2004, the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed to be exempted from part of the Defendant’s obligation to pay money under the preceding judgment, and to faithfully comply with the remainder of the obligation under the preceding judgment (hereinafter “Agreement”).

E. From August 22, 2005 to September 1, 2012, the Defendant manufactured and sold KRW 17,824,487,048 in total, as shown in attached Table 3 of the lower judgment.

2. Progress of lawsuit and the judgment below

A. On March 15, 2004, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant as the primary cause of violation of the duty not to use the Plaintiff’s own technology under the preceding judgment or the second agreement of March 15, 2004, which sought compensation for damages due to the manufacture and sale of the attached Table 1 2 of the lower judgment, and the attached Table 3 of the lower judgment. The Defendant did not assert or prove that this part of the Plaintiff’s unique technology restricted to use in accordance with the preceding judgment is limited to the undisclosed old age or trade secret, but did not specify it. Even if the trade secret nature of the Plaintiff’s unique technology was extinguished after the closing of argument, seeking the Defendant’s permanent prohibition of use in accordance with the preceding judgment or the technical alliance contract was contrary to the legal principles as to the time limit of res judicata effect or constitutes abuse of rights, and the Defendant did not use the Plaintiff’s unique technology. The first instance court recognized the Defendant’s violation of the duty under the preceding judgment, thereby citing 15% of the total sales amount (15%).

B. both the Plaintiff and the Defendant appealed against the judgment of the court of first instance. The Plaintiff brought an appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance only on the starting date of the damages for delay in the part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and maintained the cause of the claim in the court of first instance. The Plaintiff consistently asserted that the primary claim is a claim arising from a violation of obligations under the preceding judgment, regardless of whether the Plaintiff’s inherent technology loses its validity as a patent or trade secret or not. The Plaintiff submitted the drawings provided by the Plaintiff under the name of the full bench, and specified the Plaintiff’s know-how, trade secret, etc. (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s specific technical information”), which was not publicly announced by the patent, etc., and asserted that the Defendant used it.

C. The lower court decided at the lower court that the Plaintiff selectively added a claim for prohibition pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (hereinafter “Unfair Competition Prevention Act”) and the claim for damages pursuant to Article 11. Furthermore, for the following reasons, the lower court accepted the claim for prohibition and ordered the payment of the amount equivalent to 10% of the total sales amount as the reasonable amount of damages pursuant to Article 14-2(5) of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act.

Of the Plaintiff’s specific technical information, the remainder of the information except “a structure in which the Gu room strawer is situated on the upper part of the fourth roller is not known, is an independent economic value, and is a trade secret. It constitutes trade secret. The Defendant manufactured and sold the attached 3 stud cutting machine of the lower judgment using the remainder of the technical information, excluding oil pressure equipment, air-conditioning equipment and pipes, pipes, straws location, and Belgium” among the Plaintiff’s specific technical information, with the exception of “spug equipment, pipes, straws, and Belgium.” However, the Defendant asserted that the period of prohibition of infringement has expired, or cannot be reasonably determined at any time by the time when the infringement period of the Plaintiff’s trade secret was infringed.

3. Judgment on the Defendant’s grounds of appeal

A. Whether the disposition right has been violated

The Civil Procedure Act provides, “The court shall not render a judgment on matters not requested by the parties” as the title of “the principle of disposition right.” In civil litigation, the subject of adjudication is specified according to the Plaintiff’s intent, and the court shall determine the matters requested by the parties only within the scope of application (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Meu550, Apr. 27, 1982; 201Da61646, May 9, 2013).

On March 15, 2004, the Plaintiff consistently maintained the violation of the duty under the preceding judgment or the violation of the duty under the latter agreement as the primary cause of the claim. However, as to the Defendant’s argument that “the effect of the preceding judgment is limited to trade secrets, and the use thereof is no longer restricted due to its extinction,” the Plaintiff’s specific technical information constitutes the Plaintiff’s know-how and trade secret. The prohibition on the ground of the violation of the duty under the preceding judgment or the first agreement on March 15, 2004 and the claim for damages are entirely separate objects that differ from the requirements and burden of proof under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff and the Defendant made a public attack as to the trade secret, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s claim for the infringement of the trade secret under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act is included in the claims on the grounds of the infringement

The lower judgment erred by misapprehending the principle of disposition under Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act by rendering a judgment on the matters not claimed by the Plaintiff. The Defendant’s ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

B. Whether trade secrets are recognized

(1) Furthermore, even if it may be deemed that the Plaintiff’s assertion of trade secret infringement as a selective cause of claim, the lower judgment is difficult to accept in the following respect.

(2) Article 2 Subparag. 2 of the former Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (amended by Act No. 13081, Jan. 28, 2015; hereinafter “former Unfair Competition Prevention Act”) provides that “trade secret” means any production method, sale method, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities, which are not known to the public and has independent economic value.” After that, the term “reasonable efforts” as amended by Act No. 13081, Jan. 28, 2015, as well as the term “reasonable efforts” was changed to the term “reasonable efforts”, and the phrase “maintenance of secret by reasonable efforts” was changed to the term “management secret.” Therefore, in this case, whether a claim for damages was made within the scope of prohibition against the use of trade secret under Article 16204 of the former Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act before and after the amendment of the former Act should be determined within the scope of prohibition against the use of trade secret prior to and after the amendment of the Act.

(3) We examine these legal principles and records.

(A) The Plaintiff manufactured 20 years prior to the 20th anniversary of the 20th century and exported 70 domestic companies with the Defendant. After concluding the technical cooperation agreement with the Plaintiff, the Defendant supplied 3rd Metal Co., Ltd. and the Gangwon Industrial Co., Ltd. with one set of 450t of the bar bar bar bar bar bar, and paid the Plaintiff a royalty under the technical cooperation agreement. There is no evidence suggesting that the Plaintiff and the Defendant were taking any measures to maintain the confidentiality of technical information related to the bar bar bar bar bar, such as concluding the confidentiality agreement with the buyer.

(B) The wing cutting machine is not not limited to the size of the parts, it is possible to assemble and dismantle parts for maintenance, repair, improvement, etc., and it is easy to easily understand information on the shape, such as parts and parts of the Plaintiff’s specific technical information and the shape and value of parts, as it considers the composition of the actual product, as it is not damaged even after decomposition and re-prefabricated.

(C) Other technical information described in the drawing among the Plaintiff’s specific technical information is likely to be easy reverse design in light of the nature of the duplicative cutting machines, even if the technical information, such as the ball, material, heat processing method (making quality, supposes, supposes), supposes designation, surface finishing marks, and combined precision of connection parts, etc., such technical information is not immediately recognizable like the shape. In detail, the reverse design was not required for the period and difficulty, etc.

(4) The Plaintiff did not assert any trade secret infringement as the cause of the claim until the closing of argument in the lower court, and the Defendant asserted the trade secret in the context that “the effect of a prior judgment is limited to the trade secret and its use is no longer restricted as it has been extinguished.” Therefore, it is unreasonable to deem the lack of certification as the Defendant’s liability. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff acted as the cause of selective claim, the lower court erred by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations as to whether the Plaintiff’s technical information is inconsistent with the official nature, confidentiality, and prohibition period. The Defendant’s ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

4. Conclusion

Without examining the remainder of the Defendant’s grounds of appeal and the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)