[1] The case holding that the interruption of prescription is not effective because the party to the lawsuit claiming a cancellation of ownership transfer registration or his successor is not the party or his successor

[2] In a case where it is found that the sale after the commencement of the possession by the purchaser of the real estate is invalid, whether the nature of the possession changes into the possession by the owner (negative)

[1] The case holding that even if Gap filed a lawsuit against Byung, who is the inheritee of Eul, to cancel the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Byung, and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Byung based on the judgment, and subsequently filed a lawsuit against Byung, since the relationship with Gap's lawsuit against Byung cannot be deemed as Gap's successor as stipulated in Article 169 of the Civil Code, the interruption of prescription can not be effective between Byung and Jung, since Eul's lawsuit against Eul, which was filed against Byung, can not be seen as having been filed

[2] Unless there are special circumstances such as the knowledge that the sale and purchase of real estate becomes null and void, the person who purchased and occupied the real estate will possess it at the beginning of the possession, and the sale and purchase becomes null and void for the reason that the seller did not later have the right to dispose of the real estate, the nature of such possession does not change.

[1] Articles 168, 169, and 247(2) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 197(1) and 245 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 72Da1549 delivered on February 13, 1973 (Gong1973, 7281), Supreme Court Decision 94Da7737 delivered on June 29, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2070) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 80Da469 delivered on June 9, 1981 (Gong1981, 1398), Supreme Court Decision 92Da30375 delivered on October 27, 1992 (Gong192, 3289), Supreme Court Decision 94Da25513 delivered on December 27, 1994 (Gong195, 664)

Plaintiff 1 and six others (Attorney Lee Tae-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Hwang-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Chuncheon District Court Decision 95Na1754 delivered on July 28, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal (the grounds of supplementary appeal submitted after the deadline for submission are to the extent of supplement) are examined.

On the first ground for appeal

Article 169 of the Civil Act provides that the interruption of prescription is effective only between the parties to the lawsuit and their successors. Although Nonparty 1 (Lawsuit No. 2) filed a lawsuit against the deceased non-party 3, who is the deceased's predecessor, and received a final and conclusive judgment in favor of the defendant, the defendant is not the party to the lawsuit or his successor, and thus, the interruption of prescription cannot take effect between the above non-party 3 and the defendant. Therefore, the judgment of the court below that held the same conclusion is justifiable. The above non-party 2 revoked the registration of ownership transfer under the above non-party 3's name based on the above favorable judgment, and completed the registration of ownership preservation in the above non-party No. 2's name. Since the defendant filed a lawsuit against the above non-party No. 2 to cancel the registration of ownership preservation, the interruption of prescription has the effect of prescription between the above non-party 3 and the defendant. However, even if the defendant brought the lawsuit against the non-party No. 2, the above non-party No. 2 cannot be viewed 3 in relation with the defendant No. 2.

On the second ground for appeal

The issue is that the above non-party 1 filed a lawsuit against the non-party 4 and the above non-party 3 claiming the registration of preservation of ownership and the cancellation of the registration of transfer, and the judgment in favor of the above non-party 2, which became final and conclusive in that lawsuit, and the above non-party 3 acquired the land of this case from the non-party 1. Thus, the possession of the above non-party 3 can be deemed to be the possession of the owner. However, the above argument cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal due to the defendant's assertion that the land was left in the trial. Further, even if the defendant's assertion was viewed as above at the trial of the court below, unless there were special circumstances such as the defendant's knowledge that the sale of the real estate was invalid, it shall be deemed that the person who purchased the real estate and occupied it was possessed at the beginning of the possession, and even if it was found that the sale was null and void on the grounds that the seller did not have the right to dispose of it later, it does not change the nature of the possession (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da19694.194.6.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)