In a case where Company A, who was entrusted with the management of an aggregate building, filed a lawsuit claiming the payment of management expenses against Company B by winning a favorable judgment, and the extinctive prescription for the liability for the payment of delinquent management expenses of Company B was suspended, and Company C acquired the above sectional ownership in the voluntary auction procedure, the case holding that the interruption

In a case where Company A, who was entrusted with the management of an aggregate building, filed a lawsuit claiming the payment of management expenses against Section B by winning the lawsuit against Section B, and the extinctive prescription of the liability for the payment of delinquent management expenses of Section B was suspended, and Byung acquired the above sectional ownership in the voluntary auction procedure, the case holding that the interruption of prescription also extends to Section B on the ground that C constitutes a person who succeeded to the obligation to pay delinquent management expenses

Article 169 of the Civil Act, Article 18 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings

High Cancer Co., Ltd. (Law Firm New Age, Attorney Jeon Jong-san, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Lee Dong-ju et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2014Na6287 decided October 30, 2014

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Southern District Court. The defendant's supplementary appeal is dismissed.

1. The plaintiff's grounds of appeal are examined.

The court below rejected the plaintiff's claim for interruption of extinctive prescription, on the ground that the special successor to the sectional ownership of an aggregate building has in in a quasi-joint and several liability relationship with the former sectional owner, and in the case of a quasi-joint and several liability, the grounds for interruption of extinctive prescription, such as a claim for performance against one debtor or an approval of obligation by one debtor, or the waiver of prescription interest, etc., and even if the plaintiff obtained a final and conclusive judgment upon the request for performance against the non-party who was the former sectional owner of the building of this case, the interruption of extinctive prescription does not extend to the non-party's special successor. In this sense, the successor to whom the interruption of prescription is effective under

However, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

Article 169 of the Civil Act provides that the interruption of prescription extends between the parties and their successors. Here, the parties refer to the parties involved in the interruption of prescription and are not the parties involved in the right or claim subject to prescription, and the successors refer to the persons who succeed to the right or obligation that is subject to the effect of interruption from the parties involved in the interruption of prescription after the interruption of prescription takes place, and include the general successor as well as the specific successor (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da46484 delivered on April 25, 1997, etc.).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, as to the claim for management expenses before July 4, 2010, which was determined by the court below that the prescription expired, the defendant filed a lawsuit against the non-party who was the former sectional owner before acquiring the sectional ownership of the building of this case and rendered a favorable judgment. Thus, in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the defendant constitutes a person who succeeded to the obligation to pay management expenses in arrears, which are effective in the interruption of prescription, after the interruption of prescription, and thus

Nevertheless, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to the successor under Article 169 of the Civil Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91886 Decided April 14, 2011 cited by the lower court is merely a determination as to the scope of the parties whose interruption of extinctive prescription does not extend to the other one even if one of the vicarious debtors jointly and severally liable requested the performance and received a final and conclusive judgment, and thus, the same does not affect the interruption of extinctive prescription. Therefore, it is inappropriate to regard the instant case as different.

2. We examine the Defendant’s grounds of incidental appeal.

A. As to the ground of appeal on the meaning of “owner” under Article 34 of the Management Regulations

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the plaintiff who was duly entrusted by the management body of the building of this case can claim delinquent management expenses for the building of this case, and on the other hand, according to Article 34 of the Management Rules of this case, the obligation to pay management expenses is in principle borne by the person who currently moved in and used the building of this case, but the "owner" bears the liability to pay the unpaid management expenses if there is no new tenant while allowing the new tenant to succeed to the unpaid management expenses for the building of this case. Since it is interpreted that the "owner" of this period is also included in the special successor, the defendant who is the special successor has the obligation to pay delinquent management expenses to the plaintiff pursuant to the Management Rules of this case or

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of the interpretation of the owner under Article 34 of the Management Regulations.

B. As to the ground of appeal regarding the Defendant’s assertion that the management expenses already paid by the Defendant would suffice and the Defendant’s allegation of interference with use

All of the arguments in the grounds of appeal are nothing more than the purport of disputing the selection of evidence and fact-finding belonging to the lower court’s full power as a fact-finding court, and it cannot be a legitimate

3. Conclusion

The part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The Defendant’s incidental appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices

Justices Kim Yong-deok (Presiding Justice)