2015Du3683 The amount of compensation increase.

1. A;

2. B

3. C.

4. D;

5. E.

6. F;

7. G.

Korea Land and Housing Corporation

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Nu23975 Decided September 15, 2015

February 18, 2016

The part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiffs is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Where multiple parcels of land are inseparably in use as a group, it is reasonable to evaluate the whole parcels of land as one parcel, and to investigate the characteristics of the land as a single unit and evaluate the whole at a single price. Here, "inseparably in use" means a case where the situation in which a group of lands is used as a group of land is in a relationship that is deemed reasonable in terms of social, economic, and administrative aspects and the formation of the value of the land (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Du824, Jul. 27, 2001; 2005Du1428, May 26, 2005).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, ① the land category of Gyeyang-gu, Yangyang-si (hereinafter referred to as “the land specified as the land category is only once) was used as the office, parking lot, maintenance site, and large skill training site of U driver training schools. On the other hand, the land category of N, P, R,O, Q (hereinafter referred to as “five lots, such as N”) was used as the site for the first and second skill training site as the miscellaneous land. The land category was used as the miscellaneous land, and M was used as the 's answer'. ② The 23m of the land and N was cancelled from the development restriction zone on June 15, 2006, and five lots, such as N, etc. (excluding 23m of the N land) and M were cancelled from the development restriction zone under Article 26(1) of the former Special Act (amended by Act No. 13638, Oct. 14, 2008).

The following circumstances, which are recognized in accordance with the facts, records, and relevant provisions, are consistent with Article 6 subparagraph 24 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Cadastral Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14568, Apr. 6, 1995; Presidential Decree No. 21881, Dec. 14, 2009; Enforcement Decree of the Land Survey, Waterway Survey and Cadastral Records Act; ② In particular, S land is already released from the development restriction zone prior to the project approval of the instant project, while most five parcels, including N, etc. and M, including N, are used as a site for the functional practice of the driving school, it is reasonable to distinguish the actual utilization of the land from the development restriction zone, which is located within the development restriction zone; ③ It is reasonable to distinguish the land category and use of the land from the development restriction zone in light of the purpose of the Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones, etc., and to distinguish the land category and use of the land from the development restriction zone.

Although some of the reasoning of the judgment below is not appropriate, the conclusion of the court below which held that the land should be separately assessed with five parcels, including S and N, and M, is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the compensation for land loss, which constitute a group of

2. As to the second ground of appeal, when assessing the amount of compensation for the expropriation and use of land, all the factors for calculation cited by the relevant statutes shall be reflected by taking into account the specific and comprehensive factors, and an appraisal report for this purpose shall state an explanation in order to ensure that the factors are specified, clearly stated, and that the content and degree of consideration by each factor can be objectively satisfied, even though the detailed part of all calculation factors are not described daily or numerically indicated in the detailed part of all assessment factors. (See, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Du2587, Jun. 6, 2013).

According to the records, (1) The court below calculated the comparative value on the ground that the appraisal report of the first instance court's AP prepared based on the calculation of the amount of compensation for losses of S land was opened from 0.50 to 0.98 on the ground that the specific factors of the AO land, which is the standard land comparison with S land, are opened from 'the land conditions'. However, there is no particular explanation on the reasons for such calculation. (2) On the other hand, in the appraisal report of the appraiser AV prepared by the court below, the comparative value of the land is 0.86 to 0.98, and the administrative conditions are 1,00 to 1.20,00 through 1.20. (3) On the other hand, according to the comparison of the individual factors as above, the unit value per square meter based on the appraisal result of the appraiser of the first instance court is 2,069,400, while the above individual factors are 1,1304 to 307,407, and 307, etc.

Examining these facts in light of the aforementioned legal principles, as long as the appraisal results of the first instance court, adopted by the court below, are not only significantly different from the appraisal results of other appraisers, but also without presenting reasonable grounds to easily understand them, it is necessary to review the validity through sufficient deliberation to adopt the appraisal results as evidence.

Nevertheless, the court below's adoption of the appraisal result by the appraiser of the first instance court is beyond the discretion of the court on adoption of the appraisal result, and based on this, the judgment of the court below which calculated S land compensation for losses is erroneous by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. As to the third ground for appeal

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that, as the Plaintiff A had changed its form and quality without permission through the suspension and packing work on the M land at least after December 1982, the compensation for the M land should be considered as “the answer, which is the situation of use at the time when the change of the form and quality was made illegally.”

The allegation in the grounds of appeal as to this is merely an error of fact-finding and examination of evidence selection and value judgment, which belong to the free evaluation of the fact-finding court. Furthermore, even after examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding change of the form and quality, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiffs is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Jong-hee

Justices Lee Sang-hoon

Justices Kim Jae-tae

Justices Park Sang-ok