[1] Whether "no compensation shall be made for any damage caused by a violation of the statutes or any other rules" shall be whether the additional terms and conditions of the movable property insurance provide for the exemption from liability due to the situation in which the accident occurred (affirmative)

[2] The scope of application of exemption provisions due to the situation where an accident, such as unlicensed driving, occurs

[3] In a case where an employee of a lessee who was employed by the lessee for a comprehensive movable insurance without a license is damaged in the course of operating the excavation machine, whether the exemption provision on the ground of a non-licenseless driving shall be applied (negative)

[1] Article 3 (1) 2 of the Terms and Conditions of Heavy Equipment Additional Clause, which is a part of the movable property insurance, provides that "no compensation shall be made for any damage incurred in violation of the Acts and subordinate statutes or other rules" does not provide that the occurrence of the accident is not for the reason of the violation of the Acts and subordinate statutes, etc., but for the reason of the exclusion of the accident from the insurer's compensation subject to the occurrence

[2] When interpreting the exemption clause as excluding all accidents that occurred in violation of the law, etc. without any limitation on the subject matter of insurance without any limitation, a policyholder or the insured may result in failure to be protected by the insurance in accordance with the violation of law, such as without license operation of a heavy equipment operator, whose control and management does not reach his/her own, even though the accident occurred during the use of a heavy equipment. This is contrary to the legitimate interest and reasonable expectation of the policyholder, and it cannot be said that the exemption clause is unfair and considerably unfavorable to the customer. Thus, if the exemption clause is deemed to apply to the occurrence of an accident under the circumstances, such as the violation of the law of a heavy equipment operator, etc. while there is no possibility of controlling or managing the policyholder or the insured, the exemption clause goes against the principle of trust and good faith and is deemed to be null and void in light of the provisions of Article 6(1), (2), Article 7 subparag. 2, and 3, etc. of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, and thus, the exemption clause shall apply only in cases where the violation of a heavy equipment is controlled or management, or management, explicit or approval of the insured.

[3] In the event that an accident occurs in which a lessee, who purchased a comprehensive movable insurance policy by the lessee, rents the excavation aircraft to a third party with his/her employee as well as his/her pilot and assistant pilot, and his/her assistant pilot was damaged by the drilling aircraft, the insurer may not be exempted from liability pursuant to the exemption clause on the ground that the possibility of control or management of the subject-matter of the insurance is a leased article solely on the ground that the subject-matter of the insurance is a leased article, and there is no reasonable ground to determine the application of the exemption clause on the basis of the lessee, not the party to the insurance contract, and thus, the unauthorized driving is made under the express or implied approval of the policyholder or the lessee who is the insured.

[1] Article 659 of the Commercial Code, Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [2] Article 659 of the Commercial Code, Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, Article 105 of the Civil Code / [3] Article 659 of the Commercial Code, Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, Article 105 of the Civil Code

[1] [2] Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Da23899 Decided December 24, 1991 (Gong1992, 652) Supreme Court Decision 97Da19298 Decided September 12, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 3096)/ [1] Supreme Court Decision 90Da20654 Decided January 21, 1992 (Gong1992, 867)/ [2] Supreme Court Decision 93Da20313 Decided May 10, 1994 (Gong194, 1632), Supreme Court Decision 97Da38305 Decided January 23, 1998 (Gong198, 597Ha, 197)/ [305Da197979 Decided May 16, 1995]

Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Choi Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

National Lease Co., Ltd. and one other (Attorney Lee Dong-hoon, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 96Na22619 delivered on November 8, 1996

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the records, as duly determined by the court below, Defendant National Lease Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant National Lease”) entered into a comprehensive insurance contract with Defendant Military Lease Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Military Lease”) on March 14, 191, and Defendant National Lease imported two parts of an additional equipment, and delivered Defendant National Lease to Defendant Military Lease Development on August 28, 191, and on September 4, 1991, Defendant National Lease was the insured as Defendant National Lease with regard to the so-called so-called so-called “the so-called “the so-called instant so-called so-called so-called the so-called so-called “the so-called “the so-called the so-called so-called” as to the so-called “the so-called “the damages” under Article 3(1)2 of the Act and subordinate statutes, as well as the reason for the Plaintiff’s violation of the said Act and subordinate statutes, and thus, it did not constitute the insurer’s exemption from liability.”

Therefore, in view of the fact that the exemption clause of this case prescribed the exemption from liability due to the cause of accident, the court below erred in applying Articles 659(1) and 663 of the Commercial Act to interpret the exemption clause as stated in its reasoning, and further, it makes a judgment on the premise that the exemption clause of this case provides the exemption from liability due to the situation at the time of the occurrence of accident, and as seen thereafter, as long as the judgment on this part is justified, the argument in the grounds of appeal on this part is to criticize the fact that the court below rendered additionally, and thus, it cannot be accepted as it does not affect

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff's exemption clause of this case was exempted pursuant to the exemption clause of this case on the ground of the non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's without a license for mid-term operator's work site and operated it at the non-party 1's work site, which is the non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party.

In light of the records and relevant regulations, the judgment of the court below is just in holding that the plaintiff cannot be exempted from liability pursuant to the exemption provision of this case on the ground that the non-party 1's unauthorized driving was not done under the explicit or implied approval of the defendant national lease who is the policyholder or the insured, and there is no error of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

The plaintiff asserts that the plaintiff should be exempted from the exemption clause of this case in the event that the plaintiff is a leased object under the explicit and implied approval of the development of defendant members, a lessee, in light of the characteristics of the lease contract. However, no special agreement can be found regarding the leased object in the insurance contract of this case that can be interpreted as such, and the possibility of control or management of the subject-matter of the insurance is not a party to the insurance contract, but a lessee, who is not a party to the insurance contract, for the sole reason that the subject-matter of the insurance is a leased object, and therefore, it cannot be accepted.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Chang-hun (Presiding Justice)