In a case where Gap corporation et al. smoked tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by Gap corporation et al. for more than 20 years, and the National Health Insurance Corporation that paid insurance benefits to Eul et al. for insurance benefits claimed damages equivalent to the expenses, the case holding that the National Health Insurance Corporation cannot seek damages against Gap et al., since the decrease in property or property disadvantage caused by the above expenses cannot be deemed as losses arising from tort liability, and there is no proximate causal relation between Gap et al.'s act and the expenses of insurance benefits cannot be seen as having been found.

When Gap corporation, etc. smoked for not less than 20 tons of tobacco imported, manufactured and sold by Gap corporation, etc., Eul et al., the National Health Insurance Corporation, which paid insurance benefit costs to Eul et al., sought compensation for damages equivalent to its expenditure costs against Gap et al.

In light of the provisions related to the National Health Insurance Act, the payment of insurance benefits to a medical care institution is merely the execution of funds collected or subsidized under the National Health Insurance Act, which would perform the obligation as an insurer, as stipulated under the National Health Insurance Act, and thus, the National Health Insurance Corporation incurred loss in property reduction or property damage due to the payment of insurance benefits, but it is merely an unfavorable disadvantage that the National Health Insurance Corporation should bear, at the time of establishment of the National Health Insurance Corporation, and cannot be deemed as a loss in tort liability, because it is difficult to deem that the payment of insurance benefits to the National Health Insurance Corporation did not infringe on certain legal interests and interests of the National Health Insurance Corporation. Since the payment of insurance benefits to the National Health Insurance Corporation was paid pursuant to the "insurance Insurance Act" rather than that of the tort committed by the company A, etc., it is difficult to deem proximate causal relationship between the act of the company A, etc. and the payment of insurance benefits costs, etc.,

Article 750 of the Civil Act; Articles 13, 14(1)5, 69, 77, 81, and 108(1), (2), and (4) of the National Health Insurance Act

National Health Insurance Corporation (Law Firm Namsan et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee)

K&P Co., Ltd. and 3 others (Law Firm Sejong & LLC et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

October 23, 2020

1. The plaintiff's claims against the defendants are all dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The Defendants jointly pay to the Plaintiff 53,319,53,950 won with 20% interest per annum from September 30, 2015 following the service date of a copy of the instant complaint, 15% interest per annum from the next day to May 31, 2019, and 12% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Status of the parties

1) The Plaintiff is an insurer of the health insurance under Article 13 of the Insurance Act, who performs duties such as management of qualifications for the health insurance, collection of insurance premiums, etc., management of insurance benefits, and payment of insurance benefit costs, as stipulated in each subparagraph of Article 14 of the same Act.

2) Defendant C&W Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant C&W”) is a person who manufactures and sells tobacco listed in attached Table 1, including “(product name 1 omitted),” “(product name 2 omitted),” and “(product name 3 omitted),” and “(product name 3 omitted)”, as it was established by the Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation on April 1987, and as it was changed to the current trade name on December 1989 through the Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation, while engaging in the business of manufacturing and selling tobacco, manufacturing and selling materials related to tobacco, manufacturing and selling leaf tobacco, and providing guidance for tobacco cultivation.”

3) The Defendant Subdivision-Lease Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Subdivision-Lease”) was established on March 3, 1989 and engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling tobacco, etc., and imported, manufactured, and sold tobacco listed in attached Table 2, including “(product name 4 omitted),” “(product name 5 omitted),” and “(product name 6 omitted).”

4) Defendant Brazil Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Brazil Korea”) is a company established on September 1990 and engaged in the business of importing, distributing, and selling tobacco and goods related thereto. Defendant Brazil Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Brazil Korea”) is a company established on September 2001 and engaged in the business of distributing tobacco, raw materials, tobacco-related products, etc., and is a person who imported, manufactured, and sold (product name 7 omitted), “(product name 8 omitted)” and “(product name 8)” as indicated in attached Table 3.

B. Payment of insurance benefit costs by the Plaintiff

1) Attached Table 4 - Attached Table 4 - [Attachment 4] 3,465 - (hereinafter referred to as “persons subject to this case”) are those who have smoking capacity of more than 20 - a week as those who smoked independently or in duplicate tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by the Defendants.

2) The subjects of the instant case were diagnosed and diagnosed as the small cell cancer or the flat cell cancer among the pulmonary cancer (hereinafter referred to as the “instant disease”) or diagnosed as the flat-cell cancer among the pulmonary cancer (hereinafter referred to as the “pactary-cell cancer”).

3) When the instant subject was diagnosed of the instant disease from around 2003 to 2012, the Plaintiff disbursed the sum of KRW 53,319,553,950 as indicated in the Table ‘The instant case’, as follows:

Table â…§§§2,153, 35,341,953,140 won 837,270,270,272,740 won 4,707,38,070 won c,465 won c,465 won c,465 won c,319,53,950 won

4) The details of tobacco smoking history of the subject of this case, the type of disease that occurred to the subject of this case, the amount of the Corporation's charges related to the subject of this case, and the tobacco imported, manufactured, and sold by the subject of this case are as shown in the attached Table 4-Attachment 4

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap's entries in Gap's Evidence Nos. 45, 80, 89, 143, 215 (including branch numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the main defense of Defendant K&W’s main defense

A. As to the defense by a person with no legal capacity to file a lawsuit

1) Summary of the defense

The filing of the instant lawsuit is irrelevant to the scope of the Plaintiff’s business prescribed by the National Health Insurance Act. Therefore, the instant lawsuit is unlawful as it was filed by a person who has no capacity to exercise rights.

2) Determination

A) The Company’s ability to exercise rights is limited by the law that served as the basis for the incorporation of the Company and by the articles of incorporation of the Company, but acts within its purpose is not limited to the purpose itself as stipulated in its articles of incorporation, but to the acts directly and indirectly necessary for the fulfillment of that purpose (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da63236, Dec. 10, 2009).

B) Article 14(1)3 and 5 of the National Health Insurance Act provides that “management of insurance benefits” and “payment of insurance benefit costs” as the Plaintiff’s duties. However, the Plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit in order to recover damages by asserting that the Plaintiff incurred losses equivalent to the expenses incurred in relation to the payment of insurance benefits due to the Defendants’ tort. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the instant lawsuit was directly or indirectly related to the “management of insurance benefits” or “payment of insurance benefit costs.” The evidence submitted by Defendant C&C alone is insufficient to recognize that the instant lawsuit by the Plaintiff was filed in excess of the purpose or scope of duties under the National Health Insurance Act, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

C) Therefore, this part of the main defense of Defendant K&W’s ground for appeal is without merit.

B. As to the abuse of right of action

1) Summary of the defense

The Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in terms of anti-smoking movement, not for remedy for infringement of rights. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s filing of the instant lawsuit constitutes abuse of the judicial system for purposes other than remedy for infringement of rights, and thus, is unlawful.

2) Determination

The Plaintiff filed a claim against the Defendants for damages by asserting that the Defendants suffered damages from the insurance benefits costs, and as such, the Plaintiff exercise the right to indemnity under Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act. The evidence submitted by Defendant C&P alone is insufficient to recognize that the Plaintiff abused the judicial system for purposes other than the remedy for infringement of rights. Accordingly, this part of the main defense is without merit.

C. As to the defense that there is no legal interest

1) Summary of the defense

Even if the Plaintiff paid insurance benefits related to the subject of the instant case, it is merely paid out of the funds raised with tobacco charges paid by the Defendants, and thus cannot be deemed as having caused damage to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff has no legal interest in filing the instant lawsuit.

2) Determination

In the event that the Plaintiff’s primary cause of claim or conjunctive cause of claim is accepted, the Plaintiff gains legal interest to receive the amount paid with the insurance benefit cost, etc. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that there is no legal interest to bring the instant lawsuit against the Plaintiff. Moreover, whether the Plaintiff incurred loss due to the Defendants’ act constitutes the matter that should be determined within the final scope of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the main part of this part of the instant claim by Defendant K&W does not have merit

D. As to the assertion to the effect that it is unlawful because it falls under a discretionary litigation unit

1) Summary of the defense

The Plaintiff sought direct compensation as a party’s status by packing the damages suffered by the subject of the instant lawsuit as one’s own damages. As such, the substance of the instant lawsuit is unlawful as it constitutes a discretionary litigation.

2) Determination

The Plaintiff’s primary cause of action is clear to exercise the Plaintiff’s right to claim damages on the premise that the Plaintiff sustained damages from the insurance benefits costs due to the Defendants’ act. The Plaintiff’s primary cause of action is clear to exercise the right to claim reimbursement under Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act. Therefore, it is difficult to view the instant lawsuit as a discretionary action in charge of lawsuit, which is not legally allowed (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da23160, Sept. 13, 2012). Therefore, this part of the main defense of Defendant K&W’s main defense is without merit.

3. Determination as to the primary cause of the claim (the direct victim and the defendants' claim for damages)

A. Summary of the primary cause of the claim

The instant disease occurred to the subject of the instant case due to the defect of tobacco imported, manufactured, and sold by the Defendants and the Defendants’ other illegal acts, and the Plaintiff spent KRW 53,319,53,950 in total as the expenses for the insurance benefits (construction charges) in relation to the subject of the instant case. Ultimately, the Plaintiff incurred damages due to the Defendants’ tort. As such, the Defendants, as joint tortfeasor, are liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages equivalent to the expenses for the said insurance benefits.

B. Determination

As seen earlier, the Plaintiff paid KRW 53,319,53,950 in total as the expense for insurance benefits in relation to the instant disease. However, the Plaintiff’s primary cause of claim seeking damages equivalent to the above amount for the following reasons is difficult to accept.

1) In order to establish tort liability, “damage” is not only required to actually occur to the victim, but also the causal relationship between the perpetrator’s illegal act and the damage should be recognized. The term “damage” in this context refers to the infringement of legal interests protected by the law that the victim enjoyed. It cannot be deemed that the victim’s property was reduced or the victim’s property disadvantage was incurred by any act, and it constitutes tort liability only where the decrease in property or property disadvantage cannot be justified by contract or legal order, such as law. Therefore, if the victim is required to assume any decrease in property or property disadvantage by contract or law, it cannot be deemed that such decrease in property or property disadvantage is not deemed as tort liability. Furthermore, even if the victim suffered a decrease in property or property disadvantage, if it is not caused by the perpetrator’s illegal act, but merely caused by the third causal relationship between the illegal act and the damage.

In light of the above legal principles, the Plaintiff is an insurer of the health insurance supervised by the Minister of Health and Welfare (Article 13 of the National Health Insurance Act), and is legally obligated to pay insurance benefits if a medical service or recuperation arises for a disease, injury, childbirth, etc. of the insured or his/her dependent (Article 14(1)5 of the National Health Insurance Act). Furthermore, the Plaintiff collected insurance premiums from a person liable to pay insurance premiums to cover the expenses incurred in the health insurance program (Articles 77 and 69 of the National Health Insurance Act). If a policyholder does not pay insurance premiums, the State may urge the payment of the premiums and collect the premiums in the same manner as delinquent national taxes are collected (Article 81 of the National Health Insurance Act). In addition, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s performance of the insurance benefits from the National Health Insurance Act to the extent that the amount equivalent to 14/100 of the estimated amount of insurance premiums for the pertinent year was borne by the National Treasury within the scope of the annual budget (Article 108(1) of the National Health Insurance Act).

2) Article 682(1)4 of the Commercial Act provides a general provision on subrogation of an insurer. Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act provides, “Where an insured person or his/her dependent has provided insurance benefits due to an act of a third party, the Corporation shall obtain a right to claim damages from a third party to the extent of the expenses incurred in paying such benefits.” The reason for subrogation or similar provisions, such as Article 682(1)2 of the Commercial Act and Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act, is that “The insured, even after he/she has received the insurance amount from an insurer, holding and exercising the right to claim against a third party beyond the compensatory damages, would result in the insured’s benefit, and it is unreasonable for a third party, who is a liable for compensation, to exempt the insured from liability due to the receipt of the insurance amount, and thus, it would be unreasonable to remove this and vest in the insurer’s interest (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 87Meu169, Apr. 25, 1989).

3) Meanwhile, the Plaintiff’s right under Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act is the right to claim damages against a third party against a policyholder who received the insurance benefits within the scope of expenses incurred in paying benefits (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da200028, Dec. 13, 2012). Therefore, the perpetrator may still assert the Plaintiff’s defense, such as extinctive prescription and comparative negligence, which may be asserted against the victim. However, in cases where the Plaintiff paid insurance benefits, other than the right stipulated under Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act, if it is interpreted that the Plaintiff acquires the right to claim damages as a victim, apart from the right stipulated under Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act, if the Plaintiff himself/herself acquires the right to claim damages as a victim, the perpetrator is placed in an unfavorable position that no longer claims the same defense against the Plaintiff, which directly claims the victim.

4) Meanwhile, the Plaintiff asserts that, based on the Supreme Court Decision (see Supreme Court Decision 81Meu737, Apr. 13, 1982, 1982) purporting that “if a neighboring child suspends his/her business for the protection of the victim, he/she may claim damages against the perpetrator due to the suspension of business, he/she may claim damages against the Defendants.”

However, as part of the performance of the duty to support the victim, the expenses not scheduled from the beginning will be disbursed in cases where the victim directly provided care or provided care for the victim as part of the duty to support the victim. This is difficult to view that there is a legal obligation to assume such disadvantages to the near party as a result of a decrease of the prior property or a disadvantage in property beyond the scope of the normal duty to support the victim. Ultimately, the case where the Plaintiff paid the insurance benefit expenses planned in accordance with the National Health Protection Act, etc. and the case where the Plaintiff should bear such expenses, and the above Supreme Court precedents cannot be the same.

5) In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that, based on the Supreme Court Decision (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da5472, Jan. 26, 1996) that “indirect damages, other than direct damages, caused by special circumstances, are liable only when the perpetrator knew or could have known of such circumstances,” the Plaintiff may not be deemed as direct damages, even if the amount equivalent to the insurance benefits paid by the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as direct damages, it may be deemed as indirect damages, and the Defendants are liable for compensation, as they knew or could have known that the Plaintiff was aware of the payment of the insurance benefits costs in relation to the instant disease that occurred to the tobacco smoke.

However, it is reasonable to deem that both direct or indirect damages to the direct objects presented in the above Supreme Court case are liable only when the perpetrator knew or could have known special circumstances in the case of indirect damages, on the premise that the infringement of the legal interests protected by the law that the victim had enjoyed. However, as seen earlier, even if the Plaintiff paid the insurance benefits as seen earlier, it is difficult to view that the damages have been caused by the infringement of the legal interests protected by the law that the Plaintiff had enjoyed, i.e., the damage itself, even if it is difficult to deem that the costs were paid by the Plaintiff. Thus,

6) Furthermore, insofar as it is not proved that the instant disease occurred to the instant subject persons due to the Defendants’ tort, even if the Plaintiff paid the insurance benefits costs for the instant subject persons, it cannot be deemed as an expenditure incurred by the Defendants’ tort. However, as seen earlier, it is difficult to deem that the instant disease occurred to the instant subject persons due to the Defendants’ tort, and it is difficult to deem that proximate causal link exists between the Plaintiff’s insurance benefits expense disbursement and the Defendants’ act.

C. Conclusion on the primary cause of the claim

Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot seek damages against the Defendants as the victim who directly paid the insurance benefit costs related to the subject of the instant case. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim related to the primary cause of the instant claim is without merit without any need to further examine the elements for establishing tort liability.

4. Judgment on the grounds of preliminary claim (the exercise of the right to indemnity under Article 58 (1) of the National Health Insurance Act);

A. Summary of the conjunctive cause of claim

In the event that the Plaintiff paid insurance benefits pursuant to Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act, the Plaintiff acquires the right to claim damages to a third party within the scope of the expense. Therefore, the Defendants are liable to pay damages to the Plaintiff under the said provision.

B. The premise for the determination

1) As seen earlier, the nature of the right held by the National Health Insurance Corporation under Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act is identical to that of the Plaintiff’s claim for damages against a third party (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da200028, Dec. 13, 2012). Therefore, in order to recognize the Plaintiff’s conjunctive claim, it should be proved first that the instant persons, who are the national health insurance holders, acquire the right to claim damages against the Defendants.

2) However, the Plaintiff asserts that the subject of the instant case has acquired the Defendants the right to claim damages under product liability, the right to claim damages due to ordinary tort, and the right to claim damages due to the violation of the Consumer Protection Act or the Framework Act on Consumers. Therefore, it first examines whether each of

C. Whether liability for damages under the Product Liability Act is recognized as 6)

1) Whether product liability is established due to design defects

A) The plaintiff's assertion

(1) The hazards of tobacco mainly result from tar ingredients of tobacco smoke, and the toxicity of tobacco is due to nicotine in tobacco, and there is a reasonable alternative design capable of producing relatively safe tobacco such as removing or lowering the hazards or addiction of tobacco in a way that completely removes or reduces tar and nicotine in tobacco, but there is a design defect not adopted (the first argument about the design defect).

(2) During the process of importing, manufacturing, and selling tobacco, the Defendants used various additives in order to ensure the tobacco smoking and the degree of absorption of nicotine, and to increase the smoking amount (e.g., increase of smoking), used additives, etc. to reduce the aversion of tobacco by reducing nicotine-specific stimulative and strings and adding them (e.g., increase of toxic toxicity) so as to make Smoking easily addicted to tobacco (i.e., increase of toxic toxicity), and the additives used as above are chemicals that are toxic in itself or may cause toxic properties to the human body at the time of combustion. Accordingly, the Defendants’ use of additives in manufacturing tobacco constitutes design defect (the second assertion as to the second design defect).

(3) 7) The design method of applying the tent to the cigarette is to increase the addiction of the tobacco by making the Smoking person mistake the hazards of the cigarette by making the smoke single and lightly feel the smoke smoke, and increasing the number of smoke as soon as possible, which constitutes a design defect (the third assertion on the design defect).

B) Determination

(1) Relevant legal principles

(A) Design defect means a product’s failure to adopt a reasonable alternative design that could have reduced or avoided damage or risk if the manufacturer had employed a reasonable alternative design (Article 2 subparag. 2 of the Product Liability Act).

(B) Generally, a manufacturer or seller of a product must manufacture a product with safety within the expected range in light of the current technical level and economic feasibility, etc. In light of the structure, quality, and performance of the product, and the user is liable for tort liability in the event of damages to the user due to any defect not equipped with safety. Of such defects, the so-called design defect refers to the case where the product is not safe because the manufacturer did not adopt a reasonable alternative design even if damage or risk would have been reduced or avoided if the manufacturer would have employed a reasonable alternative design. The issue of whether there is a so-called design defect should be determined in light of social norms, comprehensively taking into account various circumstances such as the characteristics and use of the product, the user expectation of the product, anticipated risks, users’ awareness of the risks, the possibility of avoiding risks by the user, the possibility of avoiding risks by the alternative design and the relative advantages and disadvantages of the adopted design and the alternative design (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da22092, Apr. 10, 2014).

(2) Whether to recognize design defects

In light of the above legal principles, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to acknowledge that the tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by the Defendants is a design defect, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise. In light of the following circumstances, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to acknowledge that the tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by the Defendants is a design defect.

(A) Taking into account the fact that smoking leaves are the inherent characteristics of tobacco smoke to inhale smokes, the tobacco smells vary depending on the quantity of nicotine and tar contained in tobacco smokes, the tobacco consumer selects and smokes tobacco having a good smell or flame, and the tobacco consumer cannot obtain such effects if removing nicotine in order to smoke by intent of the pharmacological effect such as stability, etc., and it is not easy to set an appropriate nicotine level to the extent that the smoke is not addicted due to such characteristics of tobacco, even if there is a way to completely remove nicotine or tar, or even if it is possible to reduce the quantity of nicotine or tar contained in tobacco, it cannot be viewed as a design defect itself. The first design defect cannot be viewed as a design defect in the context that the Defendants failed to adopt a reasonable alternative design to reduce damage or risk caused by smoking (the first design defect).

(B) The Plaintiff asserted that the Defendants used the pH concentration of tobacco smoke to manufacture tobacco in order to enhance nicotine’s absorption rate, but there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge this (the second design defect claim i).

(다) 담배 제조에 첨가제를 사용한 것이 설계상 결함에 해당하는지 여부에 관하여 보건대, 피고들이 제출한 증거들 및 변론 전체의 취지에 의하여 인정되는 다음과 같은 사정들, 즉 ① 암모니아, 피리딘, 메틸아민, 디메틸아민, 히드라진, 포름산, 초산 등 많은 성분들이 담뱃잎에도 포함되어 있는 점, ② 향료를 포함한 첨가제가 있는 담배가 첨가제가 없는 담배보다 더 위험하다거나 담배의 흡연행태나 흡연량, 흡입량에 차이를 유발한다고 인정하기 어렵고, 담배에 일반적으로 사용되는 첨가제들을 혼합하여 그 사용작용을 평가해 보아도 담배 연기의 독성이 증가되지 않는 것으로 보이는 점, ③ 특히 피고들이 담배를 제조하면서 첨가제를 사용한 것이 설계상의 결함에 해당한다고 인정하기 위해서는 첨가제를 사용하지 않은 담배를 합리적인 대체설계로 볼 수 있어야 할 것인데, 세계보건기구(WHO) 담배규제기본협약의 제4당사국 총회 가이드라인(을나 제47호증)에는 ‘특정 성분을 제거하거나 감소시킴으로써 담배의 매력을 감소시키는 것이 담배 제품이 건강에 덜 해롭게 된다는 것을 의미하지는 않는다.’고 되어 있고, 미국암학회(American Cancer Society)는 ‘일부 담배가 화학물질이나 첨가제가 없고 100% 면화성분으로 말렸다고 선전되어 판매되고 있으나, 이러한 담배들이 다른 담배보다 더 건강하다거나 안전하다는 증거가 없고 그렇다고 생각할 근거가 없다.’ 등의 연구결과를 발표하기도 한 점, ④ 담배에 첨가되는 대부분의 성분은 동물실험 결과 역효과가 관찰되지 않았고, 유해하지 않은 것으로 보고되었다는 연구결과가 존재하기도 하는 점, ⑤ 담배 첨가제로 알려진 성분의 약 98%는 미국 식품의약품안전청(Food & Drug Administration, FDA)이 식품첨가제로 승인한 것이거나 FDA가 일반적으로 안전하다고 평가한 GRAS(Generally Recognized As Safe) 목록이나 FEMA(미국 향료제조회사협회, Flavor and Extract Manufacturer’s Association) 목록에 포함되어 있는 물질이고, 나머지 2%도 다른 정부기관의 승인을 받았거나 규제적 승인대상이 되지 않거나 일반적인 식품항목으로 간주되는 것인 점, ⑥ 개별 첨가제와 관련하여, 원고는 코코아나 카페인으로부터 발생하는 테오브로민이 기관지 확장 효과가 있어 인체에 유해하다고 주장하나, 담배의 첨가제로 사용되는 코코아의 양과 코코아에 함유되어 있는 테오브로민의 양을 감안할 때, 흡연 시 발생하는 테오브로민에 의한 기관지 확장 효과가 발생한다고 인정할 만한 증거가 부족한 점, ⑦ 원고는 첨가제로 사용되는 설탕이 연소를 하면서 생성되는 아세트알데히드가 담배의 의존성을 강화시킨다고 주장하나, 담배 연기 내의 아세트알데히드는 첨가물로 사용된 당분이 연소되는 경우에 발생하는 것이 아니라 주로 천연 잎담배에 포함된 셀룰로스 등의 다당류(polysaccharide)가 연소하면서 생성되는 것으로서 첨가된 설탕에 의하여 아세트알데히드가 더 많이 생성되어 유해성을 증가시킨다는 것이 객관적으로 확인되지는 않은 점(을가 제84호증), ⑧ 오히려 설탕의 열분해 산물에 대한 분석 결과 아세트알데히드는 검출되지 않았거나 극미량 존재하는 것으로 나타나기도 한 점(을가 제85호증), ⑨ 담배에 설탕을 일반첨가량보다 훨씬 많은 양인 10.5% 첨가한 후 담배 연기 중 아세트알데히드를 분석한 결과 설탕 무첨가 담배에 비하여 유의적인 차이가 없었다는 연구결과도 존재하는 점(을가 제86호증), ⑩ 네덜란드 보건당국의 2002년 보고서에는 ‘담배 연기의 아세트알데히드가 인간에게 직접적으로 강화 작용을 하는 성질이 있는 것은 아니다. 담배 연기의 아세트알데히드가 두뇌에 도달한다는 증거가 없다.’고 기재되어 있기도 한 점 등에 비추어 볼 때, 원고가 제출한 증거들만으로는 피고들이 담배를 제조함에 있어서 첨가제를 사용함으로써 담배의 유해성 내지 중독성을 발생 또는 증가시켰다거나 나아가 담배를 제조함에 있어서 첨가제를 사용하지 않는 것이 보다 안전한 합리적인 대체설계에 해당한다고 인정하기에 부족하다(두 번째 설계상 결함 주장 관련 ⅱ).

(D) In light of the fact that there is a result of the study that the cigarette’s paper of tobacco is a week 8 adopted to reduce nicotine and tar quantity in the tobacco smoke inhaled by the Smokingr, and that there is a risk of disease such as waste cancer in the case of a tentr (Article B and No. 51 through No. 53), etc., it is insufficient to recognize that the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs alone is insufficient to recognize that the use of a tentr method in the manufacture of tobacco constitutes a design defect (the third design defect claim).

2) Whether product liability due to a defect in indication is established

A) The plaintiff's assertion

In manufacturing and selling tobacco with hazard and addiction, the Defendants did not properly implement a reasonable warning indication prescribed in the Product Liability Act, such as (i) simply adding a warning phrase to the effect that tobacco is harmful to health without including specific information on the harmfulness and toxicity of tobacco; (ii) adding a warning phrase to the effect that tobacco is harmful to health; or (iii) marking a warning phrase to the effect that the tobacco is harmful to health without including specific information on the harmfulness of tobacco; or (iv) marking a warning phrase to the effect that the tobacco is harmful to health; or (v) marking a warning phrase to the effect that it is not properly perceived that its harmfulness and toxicity are serious. Therefore, the Defendants are liable for damages under the Product Liability Act due to a defect in its indication.

B) Whether the defect was found in the indication

(1) Relevant legal principles

If a manufacturer, etc. fails to provide reasonable explanation, instruction, warning, or any other indication that could have reduced or avoided damage or risk caused by the product, then the manufacturer, etc. may be held liable for the tort against the defect in the indication. Determination as to whether such defect exists shall be made in light of social norms by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, such as the characteristics of the product, ordinary usage mode, user expectation of the product, foreseeable risks, user awareness of the risks, and the possibility of avoiding risks by the user (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da22092, Apr. 10, 2014).

(2) Specific determination

(A) A person who manufactures and sells tobacco as indicated in the attached Table 5’s relevant statutes shall put a warning of the risk of smoking on tobacco. However, in the process of manufacturing and selling tobacco, there is no dispute between the parties that the Defendants performed the duty of marking as stipulated in the aforementioned relevant statutes.

(나) 위 인정 사실에다가 앞서 든 증거, 을가 제7, 87 내지 95호증, 을나 제63호증의 각 기재 및 변론 전체의 취지를 종합하여 인정할 수 있는 아래와 같은 사정들, 즉 ① 담배는 우리나라에 1600년대 초에 전래되어 그 무렵부터 건조한 담뱃잎을 태워 그 연기를 흡입하는 방식으로 소비되어 왔고, 이러한 담배의 소비방법은 피고들이 담배를 제조하기 이전부터 행하여진 점, ② 담배가 전래된 무렵부터 흡연이 건강에 해가 될 수 있다는 측면과 정신적ㆍ신체적으로 일정한 유용한 기능을 할 수 있다는 측면, 즉 담배의 폐해와 효능에 관한 논란이 계속되어 온 점, ③ 외국에서는 흡연과 폐암 등의 관련성에 관하여 1950년대부터 다수의 역학적 연구결과가 발표되었고, 1962년에는 영국왕립의학회가 흡연의 위험성에 관한 정부 차원의 공식적 보고서를 발표하였으며, 1964년에는 미국의 보건총감보고서에서 흡연이 폐암의 주된 원인이라는 연구결과가 발표된 점, ④ 그 무렵 우리나라에서도 신문 등을 통해 위와 같은 영국과 미국의 보고서 내용이 보도되었고, 그 이후부터 1990년대까지 담배가 건강에 해롭고 폐암 등 다양한 질병의 원인이 되며 사망률을 높인다거나, 담배 연기에 니코틴, 일산화탄소, 벤조피렌, 질소산화물, 잔류 농약 등 유해한 성분이 다량 포함되어 있다는 내용이 신문 등을 통하여 수십 차례 보도된 점, ⑤ 더욱이 피고들은 국민건강증진법, 청소년보호법 등의 관계 법령에 따라 흡연이 건강에 해롭다는 내용의 경고 문구나 19세 미만 청소년에게 판매를 금지한다는 내용이 포함된 표시 문구를 담뱃갑에 표시한 점, ⑥ 이러한 언론 보도와 법적 규제 등을 통하여 흡연이 폐를 포함한 호흡기에 암을 비롯한 각종 질환의 원인이 될 수 있다는 것이 담배소비자들을 포함한 사회 전반에 널리 인식되게 되었다고 보이는 점, ⑦ 흡연으로 니코틴에 대한 의존증이 어느 정도 생길 수 있다고 하더라도, 그 의존의 정도와 유발되는 장해 증상 및 그 강도 등에 비추어 흡연을 시작하는 것은 물론이고 흡연을 계속할 것인지 여부는 자유의지에 따른 선택의 문제로 보일 뿐만 아니라, 흡연을 시작하는 경우 이를 쉽게 끊기 어려울 수도 있다는 점 역시 담배소비자들 사이에 널리 인식되어 있었던 것으로 보이는 점, ⑧ 피고들이 담배를 수입ㆍ제조ㆍ판매하면서 2008년도경에 이르러서야 담배의 유해성 외에 담배의 중독성을 경고하는 표기를 추가한 것으로 보이기는 하나, 피고들이 그 당시 법령에서 요구하는 표기 의무를 이행한 이상, 그 시점에 법령에서 요구하지 아니하였던 표기를 하지 아니하였다고 하더라도, 그것이 흡연자들에 대한 관계에서 위법하다고 보기 어려운 점, ⑨ 피고들이 담배의 판매를 촉진할 목적 등으로 ‘자연, 순, 웰빙, 1mg, 마일드, 라이트, 부드럽게, 시원하게, 유해성분을 걸러내는 능력, 해독작용’ 등의 문구를 사용하였다고 하더라도, 담배소비자들의 입장에서는 피고들이 표기한 경고 문구와 위와 같은 광고 문구를 종합하여 흡연 여부를 자유롭게 결정할 수 있는 지위에 있었고, 위와 같은 광고 문구로 인하여 흡연자들의 흡연 개시 여부 또는 지속 여부를 결정하는 자유의지에 본질적인 영향을 미친다고 보기 어려운 점(담배 흡연자들이 담배의 유해성 내지 중독성에 관한 경고 문구에도 불구하고 위와 같은 광고 문구로 인하여 담배의 유해성 내지 중독성을 인식하지 못한 채 흡연 개시 또는 흡연 지속에 이르렀다고 인정할 만한 증거가 없다) 등을 종합적으로 고려하면, 담배제조자인 피고들이 법률의 규정에 따라 담뱃갑에 경고 문구를 표시하는 외에 추가적인 설명이나 경고 기타의 표시를 하지 않았다고 하여 피고들이 제조ㆍ판매한 담배에 표시상의 결함이 인정된다고 하기는 어렵다.

3) Whether the tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by the Defendants was defective due to lack of safety ordinarily required as a product

6. The following circumstances are acknowledged in light of the evidence and the purport of oral argument as seen earlier: ① manufacturing, selling, and smoking have been legally, socially, and socially permissible without any restriction on the quality or level of tobacco as a kind of tobacco product in Korea; and there are no circumstances to deem that such legal systems or social norms have changed. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that the tobacco substance exists in the tobacco and its smoke, which is a symbol product, or may cause health harm and dependence on the tobacco itself, lack of safety ordinarily expected; ② if there are non-processed food, and there are some kinds of tobacco are added to the food, and ③ if the Defendants are able to smoke, it is difficult to see that the Defendants were able to smoke because of its lack of tobacco consumption without any restriction on the quality or level of tobacco as a kind. It is difficult to see that the Defendants were able to have smoked and melted tobacco consumption in light of the fact that tobacco consumption is likely to cause any harm to the smoking substance itself.

4) Sub-committee

Therefore, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is difficult to deem that the Defendants are liable for tort liability under the Product Liability Act against the instant subject persons.

D. Whether general tort liability is established

1) The plaintiff's assertion

The Defendants, as a tobacco importer, manufacturer, and seller, knew that tobacco is harmful and addicted products, failed to take necessary measures to avoid or reduce the risk (violation of duty to avoid results). Rather, they denied, reduced, and discarded the risk of smoking. The Defendants, using the advertisement phrase such as “low and low nicotine,” thereby inducing tobacco consumers to smoke by drinking in a manner that the tobacco containing less tar or nicotine is less harmful (affirmative deception). In addition, the Defendants committed a tort such as increasing the smoking population through illegal promotion activities (other illegal acts). Accordingly, the Defendants, as a joint tortfeasor, are liable for tort against the instant persons.

2) Determination

In full view of the following circumstances that can be recognized based on the aforementioned evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that the Defendants committed a tort, such as violating the duty to avoid the outcome or actively deceiving tobacco consumers, including the subject of this case, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this differently.

A) As seen earlier, it is difficult to view tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by the Defendants as either a design defect or indication defect, or a product lack ordinary safety as a product. Therefore, under the premise that tobacco has a design defect or indication defect and lack ordinary safety, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Defendants failed to take measures to avoid this defect is difficult to accept as it is (related to breach of duty to avoid results).

B) The Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff introduced a research result that denies the risk of smoking or reduced the risk of smoking by publishing and distributing a book indicating that Defendant D&W “I is harmful to smoking” (No. 258), or that it reduced the hazard or addiction of smoking. However, even if the above act committed by Defendant D&C, in order to recognize the Defendants’ liability for damages, it shall be recognized that the above act by Defendant D&C was committed against the instant subjects or that the instant subjects were obstructed smoking or smoking cessation. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the instant subjects were distributed with the said book, or that the said research result or interview was conducted, and there is no evidence to support that the existing smoking behavior was changed (increased in smoke) or lost or reduced smoking cessation areas (affirmative).

C) Furthermore, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that the Defendants were fully aware of the hazards and addiction of tobacco, but reduced or discarded it (affirmative with regard to the positive deception).

D) There is a research result that the smoking of low tar and low nicotine tobacco does not differ from that of general tobacco in terms of risk or toxicity. However, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that among the instant persons, it is difficult to specify a person who smoked a tobacco containing an advertisement phrase, such as “low tar and low nicotine,” among the tobacco manufactured and sold by the Defendants, and that the name of the product was not suitable for the suspension of smoking or the amount of smoking, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it (affirmative in relation to positive deception).

E) Furthermore, the perception that low tar and low nicotine tobacco is harmful to health not only in Korea but also in foreign countries has been maintained for a long time. ② Since low tar and low nicotine tobacco is less than the general tobacco, the quantity of tar or nicotine reached the human body because it reaches the human body because it is less than the general tobacco for a smoker to inhale more deeply, the quantity of tar or nicotine depends on smoking behavior, smoking environment, or smoking situation, or the inseminator’s choice, ③ if the quantity of tar included in one cigarette smoke, and nicotine is reduced in the same manner in the same condition, it is anticipated that the transfer of tar and nicotine will be reduced in the body, and nicotine will be reduced in the case of smoking in the same condition. In light of the above, there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge otherwise (affirmative).

F) Even if the Defendants committed an unlawful promotional act by offering profits to tobacco consumers, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the instant persons commenced smoking or continued smoking due to the Defendants’ unlawful promotional activities, and as seen earlier, insofar as it is difficult to recognize that the tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by the Defendants was defective, even if the Defendants were to engage in illegal promotional activities, it is difficult to deem that the causal relationship exists between the Defendants’ unlawful promotional activities and the instant disease against the instant persons (related to other tort).

3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that the Defendants committed a tort against the instant subject persons, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this differently, so the Defendants are not liable for damages due to general tort.

E. Whether tort liability due to breach of the former Consumer Protection Act or the Framework Act on Consumers is established

1) The plaintiff's assertion

The Defendants breached their duty to protect consumers under the former Consumer Protection Act (amended by Act No. 7988, Jan. 4, 1980; hereinafter the same shall apply) or the Framework Act on Consumers. As such, the Defendants breached their duty to protect consumers under the former Consumer Protection Act (amended by Act No. 7988, Sep. 27, 2006; hereinafter the same shall apply).

2) Determination

A) The former Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") provides that the State shall establish and implement necessary policies so as to protect the safety and economic rights and interests of consumers and their lives and bodies, and to rationalize their lives as consumers (Article 2). The competent Minister may, in order to prevent any danger and injury to consumers in accordance with the substance or the method of use of the goods under his/her control, determine or modify the standards to be observed by enterprisers with respect to the contents of the goods, including ingredients, content, and structure, the contents and methods of indicating instructions or warnings, etc. in use, and other matters deemed necessary for preventing any danger and injury (Article 12(1)). Meanwhile, a person who manufactures, sells or provides goods shall endeavor to protect consumers and actively cooperate in the consumer protection policy conducted by the State and local governments (Article 3), and Article 12(1) of the Framework Act on Consumers shall not manufacture or sell goods in violation of the standards (Article 13). Article 19(1) of the Framework Act on Consumers provides that "an enterpriser shall provide information about goods or property to consumers in good faith."

B) However, as alleged by the Plaintiff, even if the above provisions of the former Consumer Protection Act or the Framework Act on Consumers are not solely aimed at promoting the public or the whole of the general public, but also established in order to protect the safety and interests of the individual members of society, it is difficult to view that the Defendants were negligent in violating the obligations under the former Consumer Protection Act or the Framework Act on Consumers on the ground that the Defendants did not explain, warn, publicize, etc. of tobacco hazards as alleged by the Plaintiff in light of various circumstances as seen earlier, i.e., the progress of research on dynamic relations between smoking and the outbreak of lung cancer, etc., the content of reports by various media, i.e., tobacco consumers, the degree of awareness of smoking risks, and the content of warning phrases indicated on cigarette packaging, etc. since 1976 (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da22092, Apr. 10, 2014).

3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, the defendants are not liable for damages due to the violation of the former Consumer Protection Act or the Framework Act on Consumers.

F. Whether causation between the Defendants’ act and the occurrence of the instant disease is acknowledged

1) Relevant legal principles

The term epidemiology is a study aimed at identifying the correlation with various natural and social factors by analyzing the outbreak, distribution, and extinction of diseases as a collective phenomenon in a statistical manner, and thereby finding the method of preventing and reducing the occurrence of diseases accordingly. The epidemiology is not to find out and reveal the cause of disease caused by an individual belonging to the group. Therefore, even if it is recognized that there is an epidemiological correlation between a certain risk factor and a certain disease, it is not clear what is the cause of disease caused by an individual belonging to the group. However, if the rate of disease caused by a group exposed to a risk factor is higher than the rate of disease caused by another group not exposed to the risk factor, it can be inferred how the disease caused by an individual belonging to the group might be caused by such risk factor depending on the degree of higher ratio.

On the other hand, unlike “specific disease” that occurs by a specific sick person and clearly corresponding to the cause and result, so-called “non-specific disease” means a disease that occurs in combination with congenital factors, such as genetic and physical properties, drinking, smoking, age, eating habits, occupational and environmental factors. In the case of non-specific diseases, even if the epidemiological correlation exists between a specific risk factor and the non-specific disease, insofar as there is no possibility that the individual or group exposed to the risk is exposed to other risk factors, the epidemiological correlation merely means that the exposure to the risk factor is likely to cause the disease or increase if it is exposed, and it does not lead to the conclusion that the cause of the disease is the risk factor.

Therefore, even if epidemiological correlation between a specific risk factor and a non-specific disease is acknowledged, it cannot be deemed that the causal relationship between an individual and the non-specific disease is proved to be probable. In such a case, as a result of an epidemiological investigation conducted by comparing the exposed group with an non-explosion general group, the proportion of non-explosion disease in the non-explosion exceeds considerably the ratio of the non-explosion disease in the non-exploitation group, and it must be proved that the non-exploitation disease was caused by the risk factor, such as additional proof of the time and degree of exposure, the time of occurrence, health conditions before the exposure, living habits, changes in the conditions of the disease, family history, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 201Da20129, Apr. 21, 2014).

2) Whether causation is recognized

A) Whether the causal relationship is presumed as a unique disease

(1) Facts of recognition

According to the overall purport of Gap evidence Nos. 23, 49, and 83, domestic research personnel in 2004 and 2005 announced the following results of research.

(A) The relative risk level of a Smokingr's waste cancer (10%) relative risk level is 21.7 times, 11.7 times, and 11.7 times, and 5.4 times, the relative risk level of a smoker's after-hand cancer is 5.4 times, respectively.

(B) On the contrary, the relative risk of a Smokingr’s waste cancer (ray cancer) is 2.1 times.

(2) Whether the legal principle of presumption of causation is applied

(A) In light of the above legal principles, in order to constitute “specific disease”, the disease must occur by a specific sick person and must clearly respond to the cause and result. Therefore, in the absence of exposure to a specific sick person, it should be required that the unique disease did not occur almost.

(B) However, there is a research result that Gap's evidence and evidence Nos. 53, 90, 141, Eul's 11 through 13, 15 through 19, 22 through 27, 29 through 54, 73, 75, 76, 77, Eul's 10, and 42 can be acknowledged by adding the overall descriptions and arguments of evidence and evidence Nos. 53, 90, 141, Eul's 15 through 19, 22 through 27, 73, 75, 76, 77, and Eul's 10, and 42, the following circumstances can not be ruled out that the possibility of suffering from other factors than smoking can be determined by considering the fact that the other factors such as air pollution, family history, past illness, drinking, occupation, etc., even if found that a large number of diseases occurred after the occurrence of the disease can be seen as one of the patients.

B) Whether causation is acknowledged as non-specific diseases

(1) Therefore, as long as the instant disease constitutes non-specific diseases, the Plaintiff must prove, as a result of an epidemiological investigation by comparing the group exposed to smoking with the non-explosion group, that the rate of the instant disease in the group exposed to smoking considerably exceeds the rate of the disease caused by the instant disease in the group exposed to the risk. The Plaintiff must prove the probability that the instant disease, which is non-specific diseases, was caused by smoking, by additional proof of the time and degree of exposure, the outbreak period, the health conditions before exposure to the risk factor, the health conditions before exposure to the risk factor, the changes in the state of disease, and family history, etc.

(2) First, according to the facts acknowledged earlier, there is room to view that the rate of the disease of this case in the group exposed to smoking considerably exceeds the rate of the disease of this case in the non-smoking group.

(3) However, in order to recognize the causal link between smoking and the instant disease, indirect facts, other than smoking, should be additionally proven in the course of examining the timing and degree of exposure, the outbreak time, the health condition before being exposed to smoking, living habits, changes in the state of disease, family history, etc., that are difficult to deem that the instant subject was a dangerous person other than smoking, but only the fact that the instant subject person had a smoking power for not less than 20 years and was diagnosed with the instant disease can be found.

According to the above facts, even if the results of the examination conducted prior to the instant disease, which is a dangerous smoking and non-specific disease, can be acknowledged as epidemiologic causal relationship, it is difficult to conclude that the probability of recognizing the causal relationship between the two was proved by the fact that the instant subject was smoked and that the instant disease was contracted, or that the Plaintiff fulfilled the burden of proof.

(4) Therefore, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to acknowledge the causal relationship between the smoking of tobacco imported, manufactured, and sold by the Defendants and the occurrence of the instant disease, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

G. Conclusion on the conjunctive cause of claim

Therefore, insofar as the Defendants did not bear liability for damages due to a tort against the subject of this case, it is without merit to further examine whether the Plaintiff’s claim related to the conjunctive cause of this case is relevant to each act of the Defendants.

5. Final conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim against the defendants is without merit, and all of them are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment 1] Types of tobacco manufactured and sold by Defendant K&W: omitted

[Attachment 2] Types of tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by Defendant Handwritten lease: omitted.

[Attachment 3] The kinds of tobacco imported, manufactured, and sold by Defendant Briman Scash Republic of Korea and Brash Republic of Korea: omitted;

[Attachment 4] List: omitted

[Attachment 5] Relevant Acts and subordinate statutes: omitted

Judges Hongk (Presiding Judge)

(1) Although Defendant K&W did not operate tobacco import business differently from the rest of the Defendants, Defendant K&W marks “import, manufacture, and sale” for convenience when it marks the Defendants’ business in a lump sum.

2) One day’s cigarette is 1 A with a smoking capacity of one year per day.

주3) 별지 4 〈표〉 비고란 기재 중 ① 피고 케이티앤지 제품만 피운 대상자를 ‘○’로 표시하고, ② 피고 케이티앤지와 피고 한국필립모리스의 제품을 피운 대상자를 ‘◐’로 표시하였으며, ③ 피고 케이티앤지와 피고 브리티쉬아메리칸토바코코리아 및 브리티쉬 아메리칸 토바코 코리아 제조의 제품을 피운 대상자를 ‘◑’로 표시하였고, ④ 피고들 제품을 모두 피운 대상자를 ‘●’로 표시하였다(원고의 표기 방식을 그대로 따르기로 한다).

4) Article 682(1) of the Commercial Act: Where damage is caused by a third party’s act, the insurer who has paid the insurance money shall acquire the rights of the policyholder or the insured with respect to the third party within the limit of the amount paid.

5) In other words, the above Supreme Court Decision 94Da5472 Decided January 26, 1996 determined the establishment of liability for damages or the scope of liability for damages on the basis of the probability that the damage can be seen as indirect damage, in the above Supreme Court Decision 94Da5472 Decided January 26, 1996, where the perpetrator caused the electric wires by shocking the telecommunication line located in the factory area, and the electric wires were cut off, the victim, who was supplied with electricity through the said electric wires, suffered the wind that the factory operation was suspended for a considerable period of time due to the suspension of power supply, and the machinery that was operated in the factory at the time of the suspension of the operation of the Gap self-factory, caused the malfunction of the materials in the process of the work as "indirect damage". In other words, in the above Supreme Court Decision 94Da5472 Decided January 26, 196, since it is difficult to view that the victim had a legal obligation to bear the above damage, it constitutes "damage" constituting tort liability.

6) Since the case is commonly applicable to the Defendants, it is determined without distinguishing between the time of establishment, manufacturing, and sale by the Defendants.

ju7) Tobacco produced by sled sled of coloned leaves and then sled up in a paper.

Note 8) When tobacco smoke passes through a tent, it is mixed with tobacco smoke by entering the air through a tent. At each time of smoking, Smokingers are going together with more air, and thus, smoke of a quantity less than the time when there is no tent.

9) The evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that a tobacco imported, manufactured, or sold by the Defendants had a defect in design or indication as a product. Furthermore, the Defendants’ act constitutes a tort under the Civil Act or a violation of the former Consumer Protection Act or the Framework Act on Consumers is insufficient to recognize that such act constitutes a violation of the duty under the Framework Act on Consumers. Therefore, there is no need to further examine whether causation exists between the Defendants’ act and the occurrence of the instant disease, but there is no issue in this case, and therefore, it is a separate item to

Note 10) The relative risk is an index showing the correlation between a specific risk factor and a disease, calculated by dividing the outbreak rate of a group exposed to a risk factor by the outbreak rate of a group exposed to a risk factor.