See Attached List of Plaintiffs (Law Firm Taesan, Attorneys Kim Tae-hun, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Young Life Insurance Co., Ltd and 19 others (Law Firm Won et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

May 10, 2013

1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Each Defendants stated in the separate sheet No. 2, “(2) Defendant” shall pay to each Plaintiffs listed in the separate sheet of Plaintiffs 20% interest per annum from the day following the delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Contract to establish a mortgage and establishment of a mortgage between the plaintiffs and the defendants

1) Upon obtaining a loan from the Defendants, etc., the Plaintiffs provided the Defendants with real estate owned by the Plaintiffs or a person who pledged his/her property to secure another’s property as collateral, and completed the registration of establishment of a mortgage on each of the above real

2) The Plaintiffs, while entering into the instant loan and mortgage contract with the Defendants, used the loan transaction agreement, loan transaction agreement, mortgage contract, etc. prepared by the Defendants in advance (hereinafter “instant loan-related contract”).

3) Plaintiff 11 and 17 were merged with Defendant Chyp Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Chyp Korea Co., Ltd.”), Plaintiff 119 from Defendant Chyp Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Chyp capital”), and Plaintiff 79 (Plaintiff 45) from Plaintiff Chyp Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Hyundai Cyp Korea Co., Ltd”) on August 24, 2012; and Plaintiff Dypnp Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Hyundai Cyp”) without distinguishinging before and after the merger; Plaintiff Dypnp Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Cyp Capital”); Plaintiff Cyp Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Cyp”) and Plaintiff Cyp Korea Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff Cyp Korea Co., Ltd.”), and Plaintiff Cyp Korea Co., Ltd., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiffs financial institution”) demand the establishment of the relevant terms and conditions of loans from Defendant Chyp Korea Co.

4) As to the instant loan-related contract with the Plaintiffs and the Defendants regarding the remainder of the contract other than the loans mentioned in the foregoing 3, as seen below, the agreement between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants on whether the financial institutions and the customers will bear the expenses necessary for the establishment of the right to collateral security and the stamp tax, as shown in the bank-related standardized terms and conditions as seen below, and accordingly, the agreement is in the form stated in the physical cambling (hereinafter “instant selective standardized terms and conditions”).

(b) A major 3) Amendment to the standard terms and conditions related to banks;

1) Upon entering into a mortgage contract with customers in the past, banks have prepared the contract using eight types of standardized terms and conditions (hereinafter “standard terms and conditions in this case”), such as bank credit transaction terms and conditions, bank credit transaction terms and conditions (for business purposes), loan transaction agreement I (for business purposes), loan transaction agreement II (comprehensive passbook loan and household current loan), loan transaction agreement I (for business purposes), loan transaction agreement I), loan transaction agreement II (comprehensive passbook automatic loan and current loan), mortgage contract, mortgage contract, mortgage contract, etc. prepared in advance by the banks.

2) The standard terms and conditions of this case are the standard terms and conditions approved by the Korea Federation of Banks (hereinafter “the Korea Federation of Banks”) around December 2002 through prior examination by the Fair Trade Commission pursuant to Article 19-2 of the former Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions (amended by Act No. 10169, Mar. 22, 2010; hereinafter “former Standardized Contracts Regulation Act”). Of them, the contents of this case are as indicated below 6) in the table of “instant standard terms and conditions.”

3) Prior to the enforcement of the standardized terms and conditions in this case (amended on March 1, 2003), the former standardized terms and conditions stipulate that the customer should bear in full the stamp tax and the cost of establishing collateral security in accordance with the preparation of a written agreement with respect to loan transactions. Accordingly, the Fair Trade Commission announced the approval and implementation plan of the standardized terms and conditions in this case around December 9, 2002 and announced that the standardized terms and conditions in this case will induce competition between banks and expand the customer’s choice of bank banks by clearly concluding contracts with tax-bearing parties under the standardized terms and conditions in this case.

4) However, on January 4, 2005, the Korea Consumer Agency requested revision of the standard terms and conditions of this case since the consumer petition related to real estate mortgage loan has continuously increased to 10% per annum. Since the standard terms and conditions of this case are disadvantageous provisions to consumers, the Board of Audit and Inspection conducted an audit with the Fair Trade Commission around March 2006, and requested the Fair Trade Commission to take measures such as revision of the standard terms and conditions of this case, stating that the standard terms and conditions of this case are unfair terms and conditions that are to be borne by banks and customers so that they can be decided by mutual consent with regard to stamp taxes and expenses for establishing real estate mortgage, etc., so that the Fair Trade Commission can actually transfer them to customers. The National Ombudsman recommended the Fair Trade Commission to improve the terms and conditions of this case on September 20, 2006.

5) On September 28, 2006, the Fair Trade Commission recommended the Korea Federation of Banks to prepare a draft amendment of the amended standard terms and conditions of this case and request it to review them within four months. On February 12, 2007, the Korea Federation of Banks submitted a written opinion that the Korea Federation of Banks will maintain the standard terms and conditions of this case as it is. On January 30, 2008, based on Article 19-2(4) of the former Terms and Conditions Regulation Act, the Korea Fair Trade Commission revised the standard terms and conditions of this case as indicated in the amended standard terms and conditions column in the table under Article 19-2(4) of the former Terms and Conditions Regulation Act, and on February 11, 2008, it recommended financial institutions such as the Korea Federation of Banks of Banks and the Korean National Bank of Banks, etc. (hereinafter “financial institutions such as small banks, etc.”) to use the amended standard terms and conditions (hereinafter “Revised standard terms and conditions”) as mentioned above.

6) The main contents of the amended standardized terms and conditions related to this case are as follows. The main contents of the amended standardized terms and conditions were as follows. The revised terms and conditions related to housing mortgage loans of this case were changed to specifically specify the bank and its customer among the bank and its customers for each cost.

본문내 포함된 표 이 사건 표준약관 개정 표준약관 〈은행여신거래기본약관(가계용), 은행여신거래기본약관(기업용)〉 〈은행여신거래기본약관(가계용), 은행여신거래기본약관(기업용)〉 제4조 비용의 부담 제4조 비용의 부담 ①다음 각 호의 비용은 채무자가 부담하여야 합니다. ①채무자는 채무불이행에 따라 발생하는 다음 각 호의 비용을 부담하여야 합니다. 1.채무자·보증인 또는 물상보증인에 대한 은행의 채권·담보권 등의 권리의 행사·보전(해지 포함)에 관한 비용 1.채무자, 보증인 또는 물상보증인에 대한 채권 또는 담보권의 행사나 보전[가압류 또는 가처분(그 해지도 포함) 등을 말함] 2.담보목적물의 조사·추심·처분에 관한 비용 2.담보목적물의 조사 또는 추심 3.채무이행 지체에 따른 독촉 및 통지비용 3.채무이행의 독촉을 위한 통지 〈은행여신거래기본약관(가계용)〉 〈은행여신거래기본약관(가계용)〉 제4조 비용의 부담 제4조 비용의 부담 ②제1항에 의한 비용을 은행이 대신 지급한 경우에는, 채무자는 곧 이를 갚으며, 곧 갚지 아니하는 때에는 대신 지급한 금액에, 대신 지급한 날부터 다 갚는 날까지의 날짜수 만큼, 가계대출금약정금리로, 1년을 365일로 보고 1일 단위로 계산한 금액을 더하여 갚아야 합니다. ②제1항의 비용을 은행이 대신 지급한 경우에는, 채무자는 곧 이를 갚아야 합니다. 채무자가 이를 곧 갚지 아니한 때에는 은행이 대신 지급한 금액에, 대신 지급한 날부터 다 갚는 날까지의 날짜수 만큼, 상법 제54조(상사법정이율)에 의한 연 6푼의 범위 내에서 약정금리로 하고, 1년을 365일로 보고 1일 단위로 계산한 금액을 더하여 갚아야 합니다. 〈여신거래기본약관(기업용)〉 〈여신거래기본약관(기업용)〉 제4조 비용의 부담 제4조 비용의 부담 ②제1항에 의한 비용을 채무자가 지급하지 않아서, 은행이 대신 지급한 경우에는, 채무자는 곧 이를 갚으며, 곧 갚지 아니하는 때에는 대신 지급한 금액에, 제3조 제5항에 정하는 바에 따라 대신 지급한 날부터 다 갚을 때까지의 지연배상금을 더하여 갚아야 합니다. ②제1항에 의한 비용을 채무자가 지급하지 않아서, 은행이 대신 지급한 경우에는, 채무자는 곧 이를 갚아야 합니다. 채무자가 이를 곧 갚지 아니한 때에는 은행이 대신 지급한 금액에, 대신 지급한 날부터 다 갚는 날까지의 날짜수 만큼, 상법 제54조(상사법정이율)에 의한 연 6푼의 범위 내에서 약정금리로 하고, 1년을 365일로 보고 1일 단위로 계산한 금액을 더하여 갚아야 합니다. 〈대출거래약정서Ⅰ(가계용)〉 〈대출거래약정서Ⅰ(가계용)〉 제3조(인지세의 부담) 제3조(인지세의 부담) ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 (□본인, □은행, □각 50%씩 본인과 은행)이 부담합니다. ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 각 50%씩 본인과 은행이 부담합니다. 〈대출거래약정서Ⅱ(종합통장자동대출 및 가계당좌대출용)〉 〈대출거래약정서Ⅱ(종합통장자동대출 및 가계당좌대출용)〉 제5조(인지세의 부담) 제5조(인지세의 부담) ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 (□본인, □은행, □각 50%씩 본인과 은행)이 부담합니다. ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 각 50%씩 본인과 은행이 부담합니다. 〈여신거래약정서Ⅰ(기업용)〉 〈여신거래약정서Ⅰ(기업용)〉 제6조(인지세의 부담) 제6조(인지세의 부담) ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 (□본인, □은행, □각 50%씩 본인과 은행)이 부담합니다. ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 각 50%씩 본인과 은행이 부담합니다. 〈여신거래약정서Ⅱ(종합통장자동대출 및 당좌대출용)〉 〈여신거래약정서Ⅱ(종합통장자동대출 및 당좌대출용)〉 제7조(인지세의 부담) 제7조(인지세의 부담) ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 (□본인, □은행, □각 50%씩 본인과 은행)이 부담합니다. ①이 약정서 작성에 따른 인지세는 각 50%씩 본인과 은행이 부담합니다. 〈근저당권설정계약서〉 〈근저당권설정계약서〉 제8조(제 절차이행과 비용부담) 제8조(여러 절차의 이행과 비용부담) ②채권자는 제1항의 절차에 드는 비용의 종류와 산출근거를 채무자와 설정자에게 설명하였고, 그 부담 주체를 정하기 위하여 “□” 내에 “√” 표시를 하고 그 정한 바에 따르기로 합니다. ②채권자는 제1항의 청구를 할 때 당해 등기에 드는 비용의 종류와 산출근거를 채무자와 설정자에게 별도의 서면에 의하여 설명합니다. 채권자가 이 설명을 하지 아니한 비용은 채무자와 설정자에게 청구하지 아니하며, 이 설명을 한 비용은 다음 각 호에 따라 부담합니다. 1.국민주택채권매입비 : 채무자 또는 설정자 구 분 부담주체 2.등록세, 교육세, 등기신청수수료 및 법무사수수료 채무자 설정자 채권자 가.근저당권 설정등기를 하는 경우 : 채권자 등록세 □ □ □ 나.근저당권 말소등기를 하는 경우 : 채무자 또는 설정자 교육세 □ □ □ 3.근저당물건의 조사 또는 감정평가 수수료 국민주택채권매입 □ □ □ 가.근저당권을 설정하기 위한 경우 : 채권자 법무사수수료 □ □ □ 나.채무자의 채무불이행으로 인하여 근저당권을 행사하는 경우 : 채무자 또는 설정자 말소(저당권 해지) □ □ □ 4.기타 비용으로서 부담주체가 분명하지 아니한 비용 : 채권자와 채무자 또는 설정자의 균분 감정평가수수료 □ □ □ □ □ □ 〈저당권설정계약서〉 〈저당권설정계약서〉 제8조(제 절차이행과 비용부담) 제8조(여러 절차의 이행과 비용부담) ②채권자는 제1항의 절차에 드는 비용의 종류와 산출근거를 채무자와 설정자에게 설명하였고, 그 부담 주체를 정하기 위하여 “□” 내에 “√” 표시를 하고 그 정한 바에 따르기로 합니다. ②채권자는 제1항의 청구를 할 때 당해 등기에 드는 비용의 종류와 산출근거를 채무자와 설정자에게 별도의 서면에 의하여 설명합니다. 채권자가 이 설명을 하지 아니한 비용은 채무자와 설정자에게 청구하지 아니하며, 이 설명을 한 비용은 다음 각 호에 따라 부담합니다. 1.국민주택채권매입비 : 채무자 또는 설정자 구 분 부담주체 2.등록세, 교육세, 등기신청수수료 및 법무사수수료 채무자 설정자 채권자 가.저당권 설정등기를 하는 경우 : 채권자 등록세 □ □ □ 나.저당권 말소등기를 하는 경우 : 채무자 또는 설정자 교육세 □ □ □ 3.저당물건의 조사 또는 감정평가 수수료 국민주택채권매입 □ □ □ 가.저당권을 설정하기 위한 경우 : 채권자 법무사수수료 □ □ □ 나.채무자의 채무불이행으로 인하여 저당권을 행사하는 경우 : 채무자 또는 설정자 말소(저당권 해지) □ □ □ 4.기타 비용으로서 부담주체가 분명하지 아니한 비용 : 채권자와 채무자 또는 설정자의 균분 감정평가수수료 □ □ □ □ □ □

C. Progress of the relevant administrative case

1) On March 13, 2008, financial institutions, including non-party banks, filed an administrative litigation (2008Nu7962; hereinafter "related administrative case") with the Seoul High Court against which it seeks the cancellation of a permit to use the above standardized terms and conditions and the revised disposition. On November 20, 208, the above court revoked the basic terms and conditions of bank credit transactions (i) and Article 4 (1) 2 and 4 (2) of the basic terms and conditions of bank credit transactions (for example, bank loan) from among the standardized terms and conditions in this case, each of the revised standardized terms and conditions in this case are unfairly unfavorable to customers, and thus, they constitute unfair terms and conditions. (ii) Article 3 (1) of the Loan Transaction Agreement I (for household loan and household loan), Article 5 (1) of the Loan Transaction Agreement (for example, Article 208) and Article 6 (1) of the Credit Agreement (for example, Article 7 (1) of the revised standardized terms and conditions in this case) and Article 8 (2) of the revised standardized terms and conditions in this case.

2) Only the Fair Trade Commission filed an appeal. On October 14, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the part of the judgment of the court below against the Fair Trade Commission, and remanded this part of the case to the Seoul High Court on the ground that the part related to bank credit transactions of six types, such as Article 3(1) of the Loan Transaction Agreement I (Provisional Use) of the standardized terms and conditions in this case, is not a separate provision at issue but a comprehensive consideration of the entire contents of the standardized terms and conditions, and it is determined after the overall consideration of the contents of the standardized terms and conditions, not a separate provision at issue in examining whether the standardized terms and conditions in this case fall under the standardized terms and conditions in Article 19-2(3) of the former Act.

3) On April 6, 2011, Seoul High Court (Seoul High Court Decision 2010Nu35571) decided on April 6, 201, on the following grounds: “The part related to bank credit transactions in the standard terms and conditions in this case including Article 3(1) of the Loan Transaction Agreement I (Provisional Use) shall be deemed to be unfair since a bank in a superior position in loan transaction requires customers to bear the expenses to be borne by the bank from among the loan-related expenses or transfer them to customers in fact by using its status; thus, it is reasonable to deem that the revised standard terms and conditions in this case is unfair; thus, the Fair Trade Commission’s request for the right to use the amended standard terms and conditions in this reason is legitimate; and the Fair Trade Commission’s decision on January 30, 2008 was merely an internal decision made by the Fair Trade Commission, and thus cannot be deemed an administrative disposition subject to appeal; the Fair Trade Commission’s decision was dismissed on February 11, 2008.”

4) The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on August 25, 201 by Nonparty Bank and other financial institutions, but the judgment became final and conclusive after remanding the case.

[Ground of recognition] In the absence of dispute, Gap's 1 through 123, 125, 129 evidence, Eul's 1 through 3, Eul's 2 through 7, Eul's 1 to 3, Eul's 1 to 3, Eul's 1, 2, Eul's 1 to 11, Eul's 1 to 4, Eul's 1 to 11, Eul's 1 to 11, Eul's 1 (including 3 numbers where there are branch numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiffs

1) Under the terms and conditions of the instant obligor’s obligation, the Plaintiff, the obligor, is obliged to fully bear the expenses of stamp tax and mortgage establishment by the Plaintiff’s side, which is the obligor, is a provision which is unreasonably unfavorable to the customer, contrary to the provisions of the statutes and judicial precedents on the subject of the cost burden, and is null and void pursuant to

2) Of the standard terms and conditions in this case, ① Article 3(1) of the Loan Transaction Agreement I (for household loan and household loan), Article 5(1) of the Loan Transaction Agreement II (for enterprise loan), Article 6(1) of the Credit Transaction Agreement I (for enterprise loan), and Article 7(1) of the Credit Transaction Agreement II ( for integrated passbook loan and party loan), which provide that the subject of burden of stamp tax may be selected by the customer, and ② a mortgage contract, ② a mortgage contract, respectively, as provided by Article 8(2) of the mortgage contract, registration tax, education tax, national housing bond purchase fee, certified judicial scrivener fee, cancellation (expenses for mortgage termination), appraisal fee, which is unfairly unfavorable to the customer, is invalid pursuant to Article 6 of the Terms and Conditions Regulation Act, and is also invalid.

3) The loan agreement of this case states that stamp taxes, registration taxes, local education taxes, certified judicial scrivener fees, appraisal fees, etc. may be selected from among the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. However, at the time of loan agreement, the Defendants did not provide the Plaintiffs with the information that they should bear, as a matter of course, the expenses incurred in creating the right to collateral security, and did not properly explain the burden of such expenses. In the event that the Plaintiffs are liable to bear the expenses incurred in establishing the right to collateral security, the Defendants charged the Plaintiffs with the expenses incurred in creating the right to collateral security by informing the Plaintiffs that a loan transaction agreement unfavorable to

4) According to the relevant statutes and the Supreme Court precedents, the stamp tax out of the loan-related incidental expenses shall be borne equally by the creditor and the debtor, and the cost of establishing the right to collateral security shall be borne by the Defendants, the creditor, who acquired the right

5) Therefore, the Plaintiffs suffered losses based on the terms and conditions of the debtor and the instant multiple-choice terms and conditions that are null and void (hereinafter “instant standardized terms and conditions”). The Defendants acquired 50% of the stamp taxes that the Defendants are liable to pay from the Plaintiffs and the aggregate of the expenses incurred in establishing the right to collateral security, without any legal grounds, and each Defendants indicated in the separate sheet “(2)” in the separate sheet, are obligated to return the corresponding amount indicated in the “(3) claim amount” in the separate sheet to each Plaintiffs indicated in the separate sheet.

B. The Defendants

1) The instant multiple-choice terms and conditions grant customers a choice so that customers may choose to bear the relevant expenses. The Plaintiffs, after comparing and balancing all the terms and conditions of interest rates, etc., decided to bear the stamp tax and the cost of establishing the right to collateral security, cannot be deemed as the terms and conditions, and the Plaintiffs should bear the expenses of establishing stamp tax and the right to collateral security in accordance with

2) Although it is reasonable to deem the Plaintiffs’ selection of the instant multiple-choice terms and conditions and the instant obligor’s burden terms and conditions as “unfair terms and conditions” under Article 19-2(3) of the former Terms and Conditions Regulation Act in the relevant administrative cases, they do not constitute “unfair terms and conditions in breach of trust and good faith,” which are grounds for invalidation under Article 6(1) of the former Terms and Conditions Regulation Act, and thus, do not constitute “unfair terms and conditions in violation of trust and good faith.

3) In addition, even if the above terms and conditions are null and void, there are explicit and implied agreements between the plaintiffs and the defendants on the burden of the plaintiffs on establishing the stamp tax and the right to collateral security, or commercial practices on such agreements, and the plaintiffs showed benefits that are reduced from the loan interest rate or the right to collateral security rate instead of bearing the stamp tax and the cost of establishing the right to collateral security, so the plaintiffs did not have suffered losses from the plaintiffs, and the defendants did not have obtained benefits equivalent to 50% of the stamp tax and the cost of establishing the right to collateral security.

3. Determination

A. Determination on the instant multiple-choice terms and conditions

1) The terms and conditions under the former Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions do not apply to the terms and conditions of a contract since the negotiation has been made between one party and the other party and the content of the contract does not constitute a standardized contract (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da74863, Feb. 1, 2008). In addition, even if a standardized contract includes a standardized contract term or transaction amount, if the standardized contract term or transaction amount is generally included, it is difficult to supplement the term and transaction amount, and if it is expected that the contents should be determined by a specific agreement between the parties, it shall not be immediately deemed a standardized contract (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Da8353, Nov. 27, 20

2) Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments in evidence Nos. 7, 8, 13, and 4 and 5 as to Eul evidence Nos. 2-7, 8, 13, and 4 and 5, when Plaintiff 18 (Plaintiff 8 in the appellate trial) receives a loan from the defendant's life insurance, the registration tax, education tax, certified judicial scrivener's fee, and expenses for the right to collateral security are borne by the defendant's life insurance. When Plaintiff 47 (Plaintiff 25 in the appellate trial) receives a loan from the defendant's life insurance, the registration tax, education tax, certified judicial scrivener's fee, and expenses for the purchase of national housing bonds were borne by the defendant's life insurance, and when Plaintiff 67 receives a loan from the defendant's new life insurance company (hereinafter "new life insurance"), the registration tax, education tax, education tax, and the expenses for the purchase of national housing bonds were borne by the defendant's new life insurance company, and the fact that the defendant's new life insurance company was paid by the defendant's new life insurance company.

This has been a very diverse result of the agreement on the subject of the burden by each customer. Of the instant multiple-choice terms and conditions, it does not have to unilaterally bear the burden on the part of the plaintiff, but it would be subject to the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant in the course of individual loan contract by allowing the subject of the burden of expenses. This is to include the expected result as the result of contract negotiation in the contents of contract, and it is more complicated than arranging the result as the method of choice by directly receiving the result after contract negotiation. Thus, the agreement or agreement reached by the plaintiffs who are the customer by expressing the burden of expenses by themselves in the form of financial transaction can be deemed as a separate agreement on the subject of the burden of recognition tax and mortgage creation between the defendants who are financial institutions and the plaintiffs who are customers.

3) In addition, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the conclusion of a contract and the terms and conditions of a loan between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants are performed under the direction of the Defendants, and most of loan customers enter the key contents of a loan agreement and a mortgage agreement in the real situation as the employees of financial institutions are informed of the major contents of the loan agreement and mortgage agreement. It is difficult to readily conclude that such circumstance is obvious in light of the average educational level of Korean financial consumers who engage in a

4) Furthermore, it is reasonable to view that, in the event that the Defendants determine that the costs of establishing a right to collateral security are to be borne by the Defendants, a loan transaction agreement cannot be concluded with terms unfavorable to the Plaintiffs, and ultimately, the Plaintiffs and the customers, such as the Plaintiffs, have also been provided with loans by setting the counterpart who collected information on the interest rate and other expenses incidental to loans and offered the most favorable conditions to them by comparing them. It is reasonable to view that, in the absence of choice as instructed by the Defendants due to the risk of refusal of loans, it is not because the financial institution is unilaterally superior to the Defendants, but it is not due to the fact that the loan users are in a relatively poor economic position (not only in a relatively poor economic position against the financial institution, but also in a situation of individual loan users, including credit rating, etc.). This difference not only causes a difference in the loan interest rate, but also causes a difference in the negotiating power in the process of the agreement.

5) Comprehensively taking account of the above facts, it is difficult to see that the defendant was planned to unilaterally determine the person who bears the burden of establishing the stamp tax and the right to collateral security, and it is not determined in advance as to the person who bears the burden, and it is not required to uniformly bear the above expenses without considering all the circumstances of the plaintiffs who are parties to the transaction. Therefore, the provisions concerning the person who bears the burden of establishing the stamp tax and the right to collateral security among the terms and conditions of the contract of this case cannot be seen as a standardized contract.

6) It is reasonable to view that there has been an explicit or implied agreement that the Plaintiff bears the expenses, even in a case where the above cost is not a body against the obligor. In other words, even though the Defendant explained that the Plaintiff bears the expenses, as a matter of course, the Plaintiffs did not have any choice but to have followed it, or the Defendant demanded the Plaintiff to pay the expenses without any specific explanation, and the Plaintiff’s fault did not comply with it, such result is not the Plaintiffs’ burden because the terms and conditions of the contract of this case have already been stipulated as the terms and conditions that the Plaintiff would bear with respect to the person who bears the burden of the expenses for creation of knowledge and mortgage, as the terms and conditions of the contract of this case have already been stipulated as the terms and conditions that the Plaintiff would bear with respect to the person who bears the expenses for creation of mortgage. The Plaintiff’s burden should be deemed to have been explicitly or implicitly agreed in a manner accepting the Defendant’s demand

7) If so, there is no assertion or proof as to the invalidity of individual agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants on the subject of the burden of establishing the right to know-how and the right to collateral security. Thus, it cannot be said that the defendants received the cost of establishing the right to know-how and the right to collateral security without any legal ground. Therefore, it is not reasonable to examine the remaining points of the plaintiffs' claim regarding unjust enrichment in accordance

B. Determination on the terms and conditions of the debtor's liability of this case

1) The nature of the standardized contract of this case to the debtor

"Terms and Conditions" in the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions refer to the terms and conditions of a contract, regardless of its name, form, or scope, which are prepared in advance by either party to the contract to enter into a contract with a large number of other parties, and according to the above facts, the terms and conditions of the debtor-paid contract

2) Whether the terms and conditions of the instant obligor’s share are null and void under Article 6 of the former Terms and Conditions Regulation Act

A) In order for the debtor's terms and conditions to be recognized as null and void under private law, they should be "a standardized contract which has lost fairness in violation of the principle of trust and good faith" under Article 6 (1) of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions. Here, "the principle of trust and good faith" refers to the principle that the standardized contract maker shall prepare a standardized contract that does not go against the legitimate interests of the other party to the contract and reasonable expectations, and "a standardized contract which loses fairness" refers to an unfair disadvantage to the customer by weighing and balancing the interests of the enterpriser and the interests of the customer. In light of Article 6 (2) of the same Act, "a standardized contract which loses fairness" is presumed to be "a loss of fairness", and "a clause which is unreasonably unfavorable to the customer" is a mere ground for presumption, each of the above requirements are different in terms of the aspect and scope of regulation, and thus the violation of the above "the principle of trust and good faith" and "the loss of fairness" should be null and void.

B) However, as seen earlier, the relevant administrative case concerning the standard terms and conditions in this case recognized that the terms and conditions in this case constituted unfair terms and conditions in accordance with Article 19-2(3) of the former Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions. Accordingly, we examine whether the judicial effect becomes invalid as it constitutes an unfair terms and conditions in Article 6 of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions.

However, Article 19-2(3) of the former Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions constitutes an administrative and prior regulation to establish a sound trade order through the standard terms and conditions and prevent unfair terms and conditions from being widely used. On the other hand, Article 6 of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions, which is based on the provision of a certain term and conditions, constitutes a judicial and ex post facto regulation as to whether or not the judicial effect of the provision should be denied. Even if the terms and conditions in this case violate Article 19-2(3) of the former Act, banks are allowed to use the above terms and conditions. However, even if the terms and conditions in this case are against Article 19-2(3) of the former Act, banks are limited to the restriction that customers can easily indicate the part of the standardized terms and conditions recommended by the Fair Trade Commission, and it is limited to the restriction that the Fair Trade Commission does not use the standardized terms and conditions marks. In full view of the fact that Article 19-2 of the former Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions and the Article 6(1) of the Act is not a legal effect of the terms and conditions in this case.

C) Furthermore, considering that the terms and conditions of the instant loan agreement are difficult to determine whether the terms and conditions of the instant loan agreement is fair in violation of the principle of trust and good faith, it is difficult for the Plaintiffs to view that the terms and conditions of the instant loan agreement and the interest rate of the Plaintiff’s non-party-based loan contract to the effect that it is difficult for the Plaintiff-based financial institution to fairly and fairly bear the same interest as that of the Plaintiff-based loan agreement and thus, it is difficult for the Plaintiff-based financial institution to view that the interest of the Plaintiff-based loan agreement and the interest rate of the Plaintiff-based loan would be reduced as being unfair if it is against the principle of trust and good faith, and thus, it is difficult for the Plaintiff-based financial institution to view that the interest of the Plaintiff-based loan agreement and the interest rate of the Plaintiff-based loan would be reduced to the Plaintiff-based loan agreement and the interest rate of the Plaintiff-based loan would be unreasonable in light of the following circumstances:

4. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit.

[Attachment]

Judges Kang Jae-chul (Presiding Judge)

(1) Plaintiff 119 entered into a contract for the lease of facilities with Defendant Filisung Capital, and the Plaintiff 119 provided Plaintiff 119 and the Nonparty’s real property as collateral and completed the registration of the establishment of neighboring real property; hereinafter “instant loan, etc.”).

2) There is a difference in the specific form and provision of a loan agreement concerning the creation cost of a right to collateral security and the burden of stamp tax according to the Defendants. However, all of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants agree with the agreement and accordingly, they are considered en bloc.

3) Although the Defendants in this case are not banks, they are not directly related to the amendment of the standardized terms and conditions as seen below, the Plaintiffs filed the instant claim based on the amendment of the standardized terms and conditions applicable to banks and the result of relevant administrative litigation. Since the instant loan-related contract used by the Defendants is written with respect to the subject of cost of creating a right to collateral security in a manner similar to the bank-related standardized terms and conditions, it is determined based

Note 4) Because of a relatively poor economic position on the side of the customer seeking a loan, there may be cases where the bank could not accept the demand for reimbursement of expenses. However, as seen earlier, a variety of agreements were derived on the actual cost-bearing parties, and the customer did not naturally bear the loan-related costs.

(5) Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2435 Decided June 9, 1987, which seems to be contrary to the above, is that the expenses incurred in order to secure a security interest with respect to provisional registration and transfer for security should be borne by the secured party. Therefore, the facts underlying the establishment of a right to collateral security differ from this case.