The meaning of "house-to-house visit" as prescribed by Article 106 of the Public Official Election Act and the standard for determining whether an office, such as a government office, constitutes "house-to-house visit" prohibited by the same Article / Requirements for determining whether an office, etc. is "other open places where many people pass and pass pursuant to paragraph (2) of the same Article."

Article 106(1) and (2), and Article 255(1)17 of the Public Official Election Act

Supreme Court Decision 2009Do14558 Decided July 8, 2010 (Gong2010Ha, 1601)

Defendant 1 and two others

Defendants

Attorney Kim Tae-ju

Daejeon High Court Decision 2015No84 decided June 3, 2015

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Defendant 1’s ground of appeal

A. Article 106(1) of the Public Official Election Act provides that “No person shall visit each house for election campaign or for soliciting admission during the election period,” and Article 106(2) of the same Act provides that “a person eligible for election campaign may appeal to support a political party or candidate at a place where a ceremony for coming-of-age, marriage, funeral and marriage, funeral and marriage, etc. is achieved, and a road, market, store, store, bank, waiting room or other open place where many people pass and pass, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1).”

The term “house-to-door visit”, which is subject to a door-to-door visit, is not limited to the door-to-door living and not open to the public for the free access of the general public, or is a place for business, etc., or a place attached thereto. In addition, whether an office is “house-to-door” prohibited by this Article shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, such as the existence of a residence or office building, etc., the structure of the place, the relationship of use and the public disclosure and accessibility thereof, the occupant’s specific control and management form (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do14558, Jul. 8, 2010). In this case, in light of the legislative form and legislative intent of Article 106(1) and (2) of the Public Official Election Act, in order to view it as “other open places where many people are permitted to visit” pursuant to the above paragraph (2) of the same Article, such office should be considered as a place open or open for civil petitioners in light of the purpose, structure, and accessibility.

In the same purport, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that each of the offices of this case constitutes “house” subject to the prohibition of door-to-door visit as provided by Article 106(1) of the Public Official Election Act, on the grounds that the office of this case is basically a business office space for the public officials belonging to the ○○○○○○○○○○○○ Office to handle the affairs of the department under its jurisdiction, and that the civil petitioners failed to resolve the civil petition in the civil petition service office, through the instruction of the staff in charge, etc., exceptionally visit each office of this case. In so doing, each of the offices of this case did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation

B. In full view of the circumstances stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that Defendant 1 visited each of the offices of this case for an election campaign. Examining the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s determination on this part is justifiable, and there is no violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.

2. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendants 2 and 3

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court was justifiable to have found Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 guilty on the grounds indicated in its reasoning. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Sang-ok (Presiding Justice)