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The judgment below
Among them, the part regarding Defendant A’s door-to-door visit is reversed, and this part of this case is applied.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the grounds of appeal on Defendant A’s door-to-door visit, Article 106(1) of the Public Official Election Act provides that “No person may visit each door-to-door for an election campaign or for the solicitation of admission and admission during the election period,” and Article 106(2) of the same Act provides that “a person eligible to engage in an election campaign may appeal for support for a political party or candidate at a place where a ceremony of coming-of-age, marriage, funeral and marriage is held, and at a road market, store, multiple bank, waiting room, or other open
The term "house-to-house visit" in this Article is not limited to the house-to-house in daily life and not open to the public for free access of the general public, or may correspond to a place for business, etc. or a place attached thereto.
In addition, the issue of whether a visit is prohibited under this Article should be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, such as the existence of residence or office buildings, structure of the place, the relationship of use, disclosure and accessibility, and the specific form of control and management by the occupant.
(see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do14558, Jul. 8, 2010). In particular, in light of the form of the provision of Article 106(1) and (2) of the Public Official Election Act and the legislative intent thereof, the office’s office’s “other open places where many people pass and walk” is permitted pursuant to Article 106(2) of the Public Official Election Act, the office’s office should be considered as a place or space open for general civil petitioners in light of the purpose, structure, accessibility, etc. of internal space.
(See Supreme Court Decision 2014Do17290 Decided September 10, 2015 and Supreme Court Decision 2015Do8605 Decided September 10, 2015). The reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted are as follows.