(영문) 대법원 2019.6.13.선고 2018다271725 판결

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff as to lost income shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to Busan District Court.

The remaining appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the ground of appeal on maximum working age

A. In the Supreme Court en banc Decision 88Meu16867 Decided December 26, 1989 (hereinafter “former en banc Decision”), the Supreme Court discarded the previous view that the maximum working age of a person engaged in general physical labor or a person engaged mainly in physical labor (hereinafter “physical labor”) is 55 years in light of the empirical rule. From that end, the Supreme Court has maintained the view that the maximum working age of physical labor should be deemed 60 years in light of the empirical rule.

However, as Korea’s social and economic structure and living conditions rapidly improve and develop, and the improvement and improvement of legal system, the above view became difficult to maintain as circumstances that served as the basis of the foregoing empirical rule at the time of the previous en banc Decision, barring any special circumstance, it would be in accord with the empirical rule to deem that a person is able to operate between 60 and 65 years of age (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da248909, Feb. 21, 2019).

When a fact-finding court recognizes the maximum working age, which serves as the basis for calculating lost earnings, the maximum working age may be determined by examining all the circumstances, such as the population of workers by age, employment rate, labor participation rate, and working conditions and retirement age limit by occupation, in addition to the social and economic conditions such as average remaining life, economic level, and employment conditions of the people, and other relevant factors (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da100920, May 13, 201).

B. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court recognized that the Plaintiff could engage in daily work until the age of 60, in calculating the actual income of the Plaintiff who partially lost his labor ability due to the instant accident.

However, as seen earlier, the previous empirical rule, which set the maximum working age of physical labor up to 60 years, was difficult to maintain any longer according to changes in empirical facts that served as the basis thereof.

Therefore, the lower court, based on the overall circumstances that serve as the basis of the empirical rule, tried to derive the maximum working age of physical labor presumed to be in light of the empirical rule, or to examine whether there exist any special circumstances to recognize the Plaintiff’s maximum working age differently from the newly derived maximum working age in light of the empirical rule, thereby readily setting the Plaintiff’s maximum working age according to the previous empirical rule until reaching 60 years, without reaching that determination. In so doing, the lower court erred by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the maximum working age, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

2. As to the ground of appeal on the ratio of liability

A. In a case where the amount of damages is limited in light of the ideology of the damage compensation system, the fair apportionment of damages, taking into account all the circumstances, the fact-finding or the proportion of the reasons for mitigation of liability belongs to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is deemed that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da92466, Jun. 11, 2009, etc.).

B. Based on the judgment of the first instance court, the lower court: (a) determined that the Plaintiff was negligent in passing through one lane, other than the designated lane, without wearing the safety cap at the time of the instant traffic accident, and such negligence caused the expansion of damages; and (b) limited the Defendant’s liability ratio to 85%.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the limitation of liability, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff regarding lost income is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The plaintiff's remaining appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.