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(영문) 대법원 1992. 4. 28. 선고 91다37324 판결
[소유권이전등기절차이행][공1992.6.15.(922),1705]
Main Issues

The scope of application of Article 220 of the Civil Code on the Right of Free Ownership

Summary of Judgment

The provisions of Article 220 of the Civil Act, which provides that the right to passage for the captured land shall be limited to the previous land before the partition or partial transfer of the land, and in such a case there is no obligation to compensate for the passage, shall not be applied to the specific successor of the land or the land submerged, either directly or partially transferred, which is applicable only between the parties to the division or the partial transfer.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 220 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1678 (Gong1991, 2218) (Gong1991, 2218) (Gong1991, 418) and 190.8.28 (Gong1990, 2021) and 90Da12670, 12678 (Gong191, 2218) and 191.

Plaintiff-Appellant

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant-Appellee

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 90Na30080 delivered on September 3, 1991

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

Article 220 of the Civil Act provides that the right to passage for any parcel of land which cannot be formed through a public service due to the division or the partial transfer of such land shall be limited to the previous parcel of land before the division or the partial transfer of such land and that in such a case there is no obligation to compensate for traffic, the provision of Article 220 of the Civil Act provides that the land shall be applied directly to only the parties to the division or the partial transfer of such land and shall not be applied to the specific successor of the land or the traffic destination (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 69Da227, Oct. 19, 197; Supreme Court Decision 84Meu921,922, Feb. 8, 1985; 90Meu109107, Aug. 28, 1990).

As determined by the court below, the non-party 2, who originally owned the building on the ground surface on the surface indicated by the drawings No. 1 (A) of the judgment of the court below among the land in this case, which is the ownership of the non-party 1 Co., Ltd., and purchased the building on the ground surface, specifying each part of the above land which is located in the building owned by them, and thereafter the plaintiff purchased the above land and the building on the ground through the non-party 3, and if the land and the building on the ground were purchased on the whole by the non-party 4 and the non-party 5 in sequence, the plaintiff and the defendant constitute a specific successor to each of the above land, and therefore, the provisions of Article 220 of the Civil Act are applied to them, and therefore, the existence of a traffic right should be determined pursuant to the provisions of Article 219 of the same Act

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there is no violation of law as otherwise pointed out.

The Supreme Court precedents are not appropriate, unlike the case of this case.

The argument is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Yong-sung (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울민사지방법원 1991.9.3.선고 90나30080
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