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(영문) 대법원 1990. 8. 28. 선고 90다카10091,10107 판결
[건물철거등(반소)][공1990.10.15.(882),2021]
Main Issues

A. Whether Article 220 of the Civil Act on the right of free passage due to a division or partial transfer of land applies to a specific successor of the land or the right of passage (negative)

(b) Acknowledgement of the right to passage over surrounding land, in cases where a building is constructed on the land without a passage to a public road at a reasonable distance from the public road boundary of the site;

Summary of Judgment

(a)the provisions of Article 220 of the Civil Code concerning the right to free passage in a case where a land which cannot be contributed by division or a partial transfer of the land has occurred shall not apply to a specific successor of the land or the right to passage in a case where the land is directly applied only between the divided or a party to the transfer of the land;

나. 민법 제219조 에 규정된 주위토지통행권은 공로와의 사이에 통로가 없는 토지의 이용을 위하여 주위토지의 이용을 제한하는 것이므로 그 통행권의 범위는 통행에 필요한 범위 내에서 인정하되 이로 인한 주위토지소유자의 손해가 가장 적은 장소와 방법의 범위 내에서만 허용되는 것이므로, 포위된 토지 내에 건물이 대지의 공로에 가까운 동쪽 경계로부터 3미터 이상의 상당한 간격을 두고 건립되어 있어 이 대지 경계에 면하여 위 건물의 남단과 북단에 각각 설치된 양쪽 출입문 사이의 통행은 인접지를 통행하지 않더라도 그 토지의 경계 내에서 가능한 경우에는 그토지로부터 공로ㅀ 통행하기 위한 통로로서는 그 토지의 북단 부근에서부터 공로에 이르는 부분만이 필요하다고 보아야 할 것이다.

[Reference Provisions]

A. Article 220 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 69Da2277 delivered on October 19, 1971 (Gong1985, 418)

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and appellant

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1 and 2 others, Counsel for defendant-appellee

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)-Appellee

Attorney Lee Jae-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 89Na32502, 89Na32519 (Counterclaim), February 23, 1990

Text

The part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) regarding the counterclaim shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the Seoul High Court.

Reasons

1. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 1 by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant, Plaintiff 2) as the first ground for appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney.

Article 220 of the Civil Act concerning the right to passage over the surrounding land in a case where a parcel of land or a partial transfer of land has occurred, is a view of party members to the effect that the provision of Article 220 of the Civil Act concerning the right to passage over the surrounding land is applied only to a specific successor of the partitioned or partial transfer of the land and does not apply to a specific successor of the land or the land partitioned (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 69Da2277, Oct. 19, 197; 84Da921, Feb. 8, 1985).

According to the facts duly established by the court below, the land owned by the non-party state, which was originally divided, the land owned by the non-party state 296-53, which the plaintiffs claimed as the right of passage. However, the ownership was transferred by the investment in kind to the non-party 6 on January 6, 1988. Thus, it is clear that the defendant, the land owner of the above right of passage, as the specific successor of the above right of passage, cannot claim the right of passage under Article 220 of the Civil Act against the non-party 1, the current owner of the land.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

Since the right of passage over surrounding land as stipulated in Article 219 of the Civil Code limits the use of surrounding land for the use of land without a passage between the public road and the public road, the scope of the right of passage is recognized to the extent necessary for the right of passage, but it is allowed only to the extent of the place and method where the damage to

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심은 1심판결 이유를 인용하여 피고(반소원고, 이하 피고라 한다) 소유인 용인군 용인읍 김량장리 296의8 대지는 위요지이고, 그 지상건물은 지하 1층 지상4층 연면적 364.09평방미터의 철근콘크리트조 복합상가 건물로서 대중 음식점, 사무실, 주거용부분 등으로 이용되고 있으며, 위 위요지로부터 공로인 42번 국도까지는 약 27미터의 거리인 사실, 원고들 소유의 이 사건 대지인 같은 리 296의2 대지 및 같은 리 50대지는 피고 외에도 위 상가건물에 출입하는 사람들과 인근주민들이 통로로서 이용하고 있는 사실을 인정한 후, 위 건물의 용도 및 이 사건 대지의 통행상황, 위 토지의 통행사용에 관한 원·피고들간의 이해관계, 막다른 도로의 길이가 10미터이상 35미터미만인 경우의 도로폭은 3미터 이상이어야 한다는 건축법시행령 제62조 규정의 취지등 제반사정을 종합하여 보면, 위 피고 소유의 위요지에서 공로인 위 국도에 이르는 통로는 노폭 3미터로 함이 적당하므로 피고에게 이 사건 대지중 원심판결첨부 별지 제2도면표시 ㄱ, ㅌ, ㅎ, ㅋ, ㄱ의 각 점을 순차로 연결한 선내 (가), (라)부분 대 90평방미터에 대하여 주위토지통행권을 인정하는 것이 타당하다고 판단하였다.

However, according to the video of No. 10-1 to 3 (each photograph) of the evidence No. 10-3 (each photograph) as employed by the court below and the result of on-site inspection of the court below, since the south boundary of the site of this case is set up by the wall, the land of this case is used as a passage and parking lot only for the persons entering the site and building owned by the defendant, and it is not used as a passage for neighboring residents. However, if the results of the survey appraisal of April 8, 1989 on the date of profit of the first instance trial appraiser, the building constructed on the site of this case was constructed at a considerable distance of not less than 3 meters from the boundary of the site of this case owned by the plaintiff, and the passage between both doors installed on the south part of the building and the north part of the building of this case to the boundary of this site of this case is recognized as possible within the boundary of the defendant's ownership, even if the building of this case does not pass through the site of this case.

If the facts are as above, as a passage to a public road from the land owned by the above defendant, the entire part of the original adjudication (D) among the instant land cannot be deemed necessary, and only the part from the northwest to the meritorious deed of the above Defendant’s land should be deemed necessary, and this will also allow the Plaintiff, who is the surrounding land owner, to pass through the public road to the extent that the damage to the Plaintiff is the largest.

Without examining these points, the court below's finding the defendant's right of passage to the whole part of the site of this case owned by the plaintiff as to the whole is not a misunderstanding of legal principles as to the scope of the right of passage to surrounding land and insufficient deliberation, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, it is reasonable to discuss this issue.

Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the plaintiffs regarding the counterclaim is reversed and remanded. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-seok (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1990.2.23.선고 89나32502
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