Where the king of the victim of a traffic accident has contributed to the expansion of damage, etc. due to aggravation of the accident, the scope of compensation for damage.

Articles 393, 396, and 763 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 94Da1517 Decided November 25, 1994 (Gong1995Sang, 82) Supreme Court Decision 2004Da47734 Decided November 26, 2004 (Gong2005Sang, 42) Supreme Court Decision 2009Da95714 Decided March 25, 2010 (Gong2010Sang, 812)

Mez Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Clinical-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)

Daejeon District Court Decision 2014Na5805, 5812 Decided November 14, 2014

Of the part of the judgment below against the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant), the part of the principal lawsuit and counterclaim claim concerning property damage are reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Daejeon District Court Panel Division. The remaining appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the ground of appeal on the completion of extinctive prescription

In light of the purport of the entire pleadings and the result of the examination of evidence, the court shall render a judgment of the facts with free conviction in accordance with logical and empirical rules on the basis of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, so long as it does not exceed the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, the value judgment and fact-finding belong to the discretion of the fact-finding court, and the fact-finding court is duly affirmed by the fact-finding court (Articles 202 and 4

The court below accepted the judgment of the court of first instance, found that the defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter "the defendant") requested the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant; hereinafter "the plaintiff") to pay insurance money several times before the expiration of the period of extinctive prescription to the plaintiff (the plaintiff) constitutes the peremptory notice which constitutes a ground for suspending extinctive prescription, and accordingly, a series of acts in which the plaintiff company's person in charge of the plaintiff company sent text messages to the defendant with partial payment of insurance money to the defendant was sought suspension of performance until the defendant confirmed the existence and amount of the defendant's insurance claim and notified the defendant thereof. Thus, the court below held that the defendant's right to claim insurance payment against the plaintiff was not extinguished by prescription until the reply as to whether the insurance money was paid or not.

The part of the ground of appeal disputing the fact-finding in the judgment of the court of fact-finding is merely an error in the selection of evidence and the determination of the value of evidence, which belong to the free evaluation evidence of the court of fact-finding. In addition, even if examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence duly admitted, the judgment of the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the interpretation of peremptory notice and expression of intent as grounds for interruption of prescription or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations

2. As to the ground of appeal as to the degree of contribution to the king

A. In a case where the king evidence of the victim of a traffic accident has contributed to the occurrence of the victim's occurrence of a specific injury, the prolonged period of medical treatment, and the expansion of the degree of disability after the completion of medical treatment, it is reasonable to impose the amount of compensation corresponding to the victim's total damages according to the degree deemed that king contributed to the occurrence of the whole consequence of the injury including the specific injury (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da1517, Nov. 25, 1994; 2009Da95714, Mar. 25, 2010).

B. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the lower court accepted the result of the first instance court’s physical appraisal commission that the Defendant’s king’s contribution to the occurrence of the aftermathal disability caused by the instant accident is 50% higher, and calculated the lost income according to the labor disability ratio after reflecting the contribution ratio.

In light of the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the court below should have deducted the medical expenses paid by the plaintiff to the defendant from the plaintiff's damages by considering the part corresponding to the degree of contribution of the above king, as to the medical expenses paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, barring special circumstances, and should have deducted the amount equivalent to the future medical expenses recognized by the court below, if the future medical expenses were related to the above king, then the remaining damages should have been recognized by deducting the amount equivalent to the contribution ratio of the king.

C. Nevertheless, the lower court did not determine the Plaintiff’s assertion that the amount equivalent to the portion of the Plaintiff’s medical expenses and the Defendant’s future medical expenses should be deducted from the amount of damages, but did not fully deduct the Plaintiff’s medical expenses paid from the amount of damages and ordered the Defendant to compensate for the entire future medical expenses recognized as the Defendant. Therefore, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the degree of contribution to the documentary evidence, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the plaintiff as to the principal lawsuit and counterclaim concerning property damage is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ko Young-han (Presiding Justice)