A. Whether the title trustee falls under a “non-homeowner” under the Housing Construction Promotion Act

(b) Period as a homeless person who is necessary for becoming a member of the housing association; and

(c) Character of regulations, such as the Housing Construction Promotion Act for membership qualifications;

A. In light of the legislative purpose of the Housing Construction Promotion Act, the same Act, the Enforcement Decree or the Enforcement Rule thereunder, the regulations on housing supply, and the title trust, the trustee, externally, can acquire the complete ownership of real estate and perform effective disposal acts, so the trustee should bear the disadvantages incurred by holding the registered title along with his/her profits. If the title trustee of a house is recognized as a non-resident under the same Act, the provisions of the same Act are abused as a means of escape, and thus, it is highly likely to undermine the purpose of the same Act to secure the residential stability of the non-resident and to establish the housing supply order, barring any other special circumstances, whether the title trustee of a house is a non-resident under the same Act shall be determined on the basis of the owner in the public record, and the title trustee of a house shall not be deemed to be a non-resident, and further, he/she shall not be a member of the workplace association.

B. In light of the definition of a housing association and the provisions of Article 4(1) of the Regulations on Housing Supply as stipulated in Article 3 subparag. 9 of the Housing Construction Promotion Act, members of a workplace association are required to be at least members of the association, and from the beginning, persons who are members of the workplace association from the beginning, to be homeless at the time of authorization to establish the association, and to be homeless until they

(c) regulations such as the Housing Construction Promotion Act or its Enforcement Decree concerning the qualifications of members of the housing association cannot be said to be an optional provision that may exclude the application thereof at the parties’ will;

Article 47 of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992); Article 4(1) of the Rules on Housing Supply

(a)B. (c) Supreme Court Decision 92Da49034 delivered on July 27, 1993 (dong) 93Da2926 delivered on July 27, 1993 (dong) 93Da4878 delivered on July 27, 1993 (dong) 93Do267 delivered on May 14, 1993 (Gong193,1761)

[Judgment of the court below]

Korean Exchange Bank and Busan Western District Employees' Housing Association

Busan District Court Decision 92Na7532 delivered on October 1, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

Article 3 subparag. 9 of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530, Dec. 8, 1992; hereinafter the same Act) which the Plaintiff had entered into force at the time of joining the Defendant Union provides that the workplace housing association (hereinafter referred to as the “workplace association”) established by an employee who does not own a house at the same workplace to acquire a house. In order to ensure the stability of the residential life of the people without the purpose of the same Act and enhance the housing standards for all the people, matters necessary for the construction of a house shall be prescribed (Article 1). Article 32 of the same Act provides that a project owner shall supply a house according to the terms, methods, and procedures of the housing supply under the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation to maintain the order of housing supply. The regulations on housing supply, which is the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation based on Article 32 of the same Act, stipulate that the housing owner shall not have any preferential status in terms of housing supply, and that the trustee shall not be deemed to have any special interest in the housing supply of the housing under the name of the Act and the Enforcement Rule.

The precedents pointing out in theory are not appropriate in this case.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no reason to argue that the judgment below erred in the misapprehension of the legal principles of the same Act.

On the second ground for appeal

1. In light of the definition of a housing association and the provisions of Article 4(1) of the Rules of supply as stipulated under Article 3 subparag. 9 of the same Act, a member of a workplace association must be deemed to be a homeless person at the time of establishment authorization, and a person who first becomes a member of a workplace association should be deemed to be a homeless person at the time of establishment authorization, and a person who first becomes a member of a workplace association should be deemed to be a homeless person until the time of occupancy (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do267 delivered on May 14, 1993). The judgment below to the same purport is just, and there is no misunderstanding

2. The argument that the housing association cannot present the concept of the public notice date for the recruitment of occupants in the case of a housing association, and thus it is sufficient for a homeless person to move into the housing association.

3. In addition, although the Enforcement Decree of the same Act does not provide any provision for the qualifications of the members of the housing association with respect to the qualifications of the members of the housing association, the provision for the qualifications of the members of the housing association in Article 4 (1) of the Rules of Supply, which is the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, is in violation of the superior laws and subordinate statutes. However, the ground provision for the supply regulations is Article 32 of the same Act, and the provision for the qualifications of the members of the housing association in Article 42 (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the matters concerning the qualifications of the members of the housing association should be included shall not be deemed to be the purport that the qualification of the members of the housing association can be freely determined. Rather, in light of the purport of the provision of Article 32 of the same Act, it

4. A member of a workplace union is entitled to purchase a house by establishing the association and joining the association, and the status of the member is finalized by authorization for the implementation of the project. Thus, in a case where it is found that a member of the workplace union is not qualified as such, expulsion measures can be taken to lose the status of the member regardless of whether the member is deprived of such member's qualification under the rules of the association, and this is legitimate as it is in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 (1) of the same Act and the supply rules, and as long as the facts and legal relations as seen above, the plaintiff is not entitled to receive the allocation of

There is no reason for this issue.

On the third ground for appeal

The purport of the judgment of the court below is that the plaintiff joined the defendant association, which is a work union composed of homeless employees, and the defendant association ordered the plaintiff pursuant to the guidelines on the establishment and operation of the housing association of the construction department because the plaintiff acquired and disposed of other apartment buildings in the middle, and therefore, the plaintiff's expulsion based on the above guidelines is merely an internal administrative agency's internal administrative work rules, and thus it is illegal and invalid. Thus, the above guidelines are justified in holding that the expulsion against the plaintiff is lawful by clarifying the legal grounds for Article 32 of the above Act and Article 4 of the supply rules. There is no violation of the principle of pleading.

The issue is that the plaintiff asserts that he is the above guidelines, and the defendant also led to confession. The court below recognized the plaintiff's ground for expulsion as Article 32 of the same Act and Article 4 of the supply regulations, which violates the principle of pleading. However, the court below did not recognize that the defendant's ground for expulsion of the plaintiff is not the above guidelines, but it has revealed the legal basis of the guidelines on the premise that the above guidelines are the ground for expulsion. However, the legal basis of the expulsion cannot be applied to the legal basis of the expulsion, such as the binding force of confession. Thus, it cannot be accepted.

There is no reason for this issue.

On the fourth ground

The issue is that the construction of a partnership apartment has been completed almost at the expense of the association members including the plaintiff, the purpose of the law is to purchase a house owned by a homeless person and improve the residential standards of the tenant. The plaintiff's disposal of the house before moving into a partnership apartment, and the law does not limit the number of buyers of the private house to the homeless person. It is harsh that the housing association requires the long-term non-household person from the approval of the project plan to move into a house. At present, there is a lack of effective demand for the apartment house, and it does not cause damages to other homeless persons. In reality, denying the right to remove the plaintiff as the tenant and the right to allocate the apartment house is abuse of rights. However, in this case, the plaintiff's denial of the status of the tenant in this case does not meet the qualification requirements required by the Act or the Enforcement Decree of the Act, and thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiff violated the above Act and subordinate statutes, and thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's abuse of rights can not be seen as abuse of rights.

There is no reason for this issue.

On the fifth ground

1. In this case, as long as the plaintiff was expelled from the defendant association, the right to allocate the apartment, which is granted under the premise that the plaintiff is in the position of the union member, naturally lose the right to allocate the apartment, and even if the defendant association agreed to sell the apartment to the plaintiff who was expelled from the union member, it is illegal and invalid

2. Where a member of a housing association is expelled, the housing not allocated to him/her shall be sold in accordance with the lawful procedures to the person who satisfies the requirements, and the provisions of the same Act or its Enforcement Decree, etc. concerning the qualifications of the members of the housing association shall not be an optional provision that can be excluded from

In addition, even though this provision is not an effective provision, in this case, if the defendant union denied the plaintiff's qualification and properly expelled the plaintiff's qualification, and if the defendant union decided to allow the plaintiff to arbitrarily distribute the house which was originally allocated irrespective of the name of the plaintiff, it constitutes an act of violating the provisions of the laws and regulations on the qualification for housing supply, and thus, it shall be deemed null and void as an act of anti-social order.

3. Although the judgment of the court below is somewhat insufficient, the decision of the court below that the agreement was null and void even if there was such an agreement as the plaintiff's assertion in the household affairs, the decision of the court below is justified, and therefore, the discussion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)