(a) Whether the right to demand a purchase of ground object by the land lessee is recognized even if the right of lease is extinguished by the notification of cancellation of the lease by the lessor for the lease without a fixed period;

(b) Legal nature and effect of the lessee's right to demand the purchase of ground water;

(c) Whether a claim for removal of a lessor's building and delivery of a site is included in a claim for purchase price of the building and a claim for specification of the building at the same time as the purchase price

D. In the case of “C”, whether or not the lessor has the duty to explain the building in return for payment and reimbursement, or whether or not the lessor wishes to request for the surrender of the building

A. The right to demand the purchase of the ground object by the land lessee is equally recognized in the case of lease with no fixed period of time where the lease is terminated by the lessor’s notice of termination.

B. Ground water purchase right is a so-called formation right, which is established between the lessor and the lessee, and when the lessee exercises the right to purchase the ground water, the lessor may not refuse to purchase it, and this provision is a mandatory provision, and thus, the agreement unfavorable to the lessee is invalid.

C. Upon termination of a land lease, a lessor’s request for removal of a building and delivery of a site shall not be deemed to include a claim seeking purchase price of the building at the same time as the purchase price of the building.

D. In the case of “C”, the court should seek to resolve the dispute once by rendering a judgment of the evacuation of the ground object in case where the lessor seeks to maintain the previous claim continuously, or in case where the lessor has changed the lawsuit to respond to his seat in return for payment and reimbursement (preliminaryly, even if any) and the lessor has to do so. Accordingly, in this case, the court’s judgment of the 72Da341 delivered on May 23, 1972 should be modified to the effect that it did not err by ordering the court to examine the above points.

(a)b)Article 283(a) of the Civil Code, article 643(b) of the Civil Code, article 635, article 652(d) of the Civil Code;

A. Supreme Court Decision 76Da2324 delivered on June 7, 197 (Gong1977, 10151). (B) Supreme Court Decision 91Da36130 delivered on April 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 1572) (Gong1572), 92Da22435 delivered on October 9, 1992 (Gong192, 312), D. Supreme Court Decision 72Da341 delivered on May 23, 1972 (Nob20Du63), 66Da548 delivered on May 24, 1966 (Nob230) (Nomen296).

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant 1 and 2 Defendants, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee

Daegu District Court Decision 93Na823 delivered on June 1, 1994

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daegu District Court Panel Division.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

The Civil Act(Article 643 and Article 283) provides that in the lease of land for the purpose of owning a building or other structure or planting, collecting, cultivating, or cutting down trees, if there is a building, trees, or other ground facilities at the expiration of the period, the lessee may demand renewal of the contract, and if the lessor does not want renewal of the contract, the lessee may demand the purchase of the building or trees at a reasonable price (land lessee's right to demand purchase of the land).

It is reasonable to view that the right to demand the purchase of ground property by a land lessee is equally recognized in the case where the right of lease is extinguished by the notification of termination by the lessor with respect to the lease without a fixed period of time (Supreme Court Decision 76Da2324 delivered on June 7, 197).

In addition, when the lessee exercises the right to demand the purchase of the ground object, the lessor may not refuse the purchase. In other words, the right to demand the purchase of the ground object is the so-called formation right, and the sale of the ground object between the lessor and the lessee becomes effective. This provision is a mandatory provision, and the agreement unfavorable to the lessee is null and void (Article 652 of the Civil Act).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the plaintiff acquired ownership of the building site of this case on October 13, 1983, and the defendants had previously owned each of the buildings of this case on the above ground, paid the plaintiff the annual rent of KRW 3,000 to KRW 5,00 per annum on the site of each of the above buildings. Since 190, the above rent was increased to KRW 10,000 per annum, and the plaintiff and the defendants had paid the above rent before the lawsuit of this case was filed. The court below determined that the lease contract was concluded without a fixed period for the purpose of owning each of the above buildings, since the plaintiff and the defendants had purchased each of the above lease contract of this case from November 23, 1992 to around June 23, 1993, each of the above lease contract was terminated and the purchase price of each of the above buildings was terminated, and each of the above plaintiffs and the defendants had purchased each of the above facts.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding by the court below is acceptable, and there is no error of law by incomplete deliberation such as litigation or by mistake of facts against the rules of evidence.

In addition, if the facts are identical to the above, the judgment of the court below that each of the above buildings was sold at the price equivalent to the market price is correct in accordance with the above legal principles, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the right to demand purchase by land lessee or violation of the principle of pleading. There is no reason to discuss.

2. On the third ground for appeal

In this case, the plaintiff's removal of the building and the request for the delivery of the site can not be deemed to include a claim for the purchase price of the building at the same time as the purchase price of the building (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 66Da548, May 24, 1966; Supreme Court Decision 66Da712, Jun. 28, 1966; Supreme Court Decision 72Da341, May 23, 1972). Thus, there is no reason to criticize the court below on the premise of the opposing opinion.

3. On the fourth ground for appeal

If a lessee exercises a legitimate right to demand the purchase of a ground object against the lessee's claim for the removal of the ground object and delivery of the site, the lessor's claim cannot be accepted as it is, since the sale of the ground object is established between the lessor and the lessee.

In this case, it is reasonable to view that the lessor has the intention to file a claim for the surrender of the ground object due to the payment and repayment of the payment (preliminaryly even if any) and that if the lessor has changed the lawsuit to respond to his/her seat, it is necessary to view that it is necessary to resolve the dispute once by rendering a judgment on the surrender of the ground object.

This is because, even though the lessor's claim was reasonable at the time of filing a lawsuit, if the lessor's claim is not accepted due to changes in the situation that the lessee's claim is the exercise of the right to demand the purchase after filing a lawsuit, the lessor may have an intention to order the preservation of the ground property by payment and repayment, rather than in full loss of the claim for removal of the ground in general. In addition, even in the location of the lessee's address, this court's name is based on the lessee's defense and is within the reasonable scope, and thus, is within the reasonable scope. Therefore, the lessee's name is not particularly disadvantageously unfavorable by the name of such court, and rather, it is consistent with the intention of the lessee who exercises the right to demand the purchase by the name of the court.

In addition, in the above cases, the court shall dismiss the claim of the land lessor without clarifying the above points and dismiss the claim, if possible, it shall be required to institute a lawsuit against the land property name even, and both parties shall be aware of the same unfavorable result. Therefore, it shall not be very unreasonable in the litigation economy.

Therefore, unlike this, the Supreme Court Decision 72Da341 Decided May 23, 1972, which held that even in such a case, it did not err by ordering the court to examine the above points, is to be modified thereby.

Therefore, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the defendants exercised the right to purchase a building solely on the ground that they did not see the plaintiff's intent to request the purchase of the building, and erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of the duty of explanation, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, there is a ground to charge this error.

4. The judgment of the court below is reversed without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Park Jong-ok (Presiding Justice) (Presiding Justice) Park Jong-tae (Presiding Justice) and Lee Jong-sik-ho (Presiding Justice), Lee Jong-tae, Kim Jong-ho (Presiding Justice), this money was transferred to Lee Jong-tae, Kim Jong-tae, Kim Jong-tae, Lee