If the victim has filed a claim for damages with the National Compensation Council, the starting point of the period of six months prescribed in Article 174 of the Civil Act

The claimant's claim for damages to the State Compensation Council constitutes a peremptory notice to the debtor to discharge his liability for damages, and until the State has deliberated and decided on the above claim, and thus, the period of six months under Article 174 of the Civil Act shall not run until the above decision is made by the State Compensation Council.

Gangnam-gu et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant Kim flood

Representatives of the Republic of Korea Law, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Justice

Seoul High Court Decision 72Na2913 delivered on December 20, 1974

We reverse the original judgment. The case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

Judgment on the Plaintiffs’ grounds of appeal by the Plaintiffs,

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, in this case, which is a lawsuit claiming compensation based on the State Compensation Act, the plaintiffs became aware of tort 1968.9.14, and according to the procedure set forth in the State Compensation Act, the date when the plaintiffs filed an application for compensation by the State Compensation Council was dismissed on May 27, 1971 and the date when the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit was dismissed on March 30, 1972. Since the plaintiffs' filing of an application for compensation to the State Compensation Council was confirmed on March 30, 197, it constitutes a case where the plaintiffs notified the defendant to perform the obligation to compensate for damages within 6 months after it was set forth in Article 174 of the Civil Act, the plaintiffs can have an effect of interrupting prescription only if they did not take the procedure set forth in the above Article 174 of the Civil Act within 6 months from the date when the plaintiffs received the above claim for compensation for damages until the expiration of the statute of limitations period. Thus, the court below's determination that the period of extinctive prescription period should not be interpreted as the obligee's starting period of extinctive prescription period.

Therefore, the original judgment shall be reversed and remanded to the original judgment. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Young-young (Presiding Justice)